


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
THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT


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
  
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
Certificate of Approval:

  
Thomas Vocino  
Professor  
Department of Political Science and  
Public Administration

  
Carl Grafton, Chair  
Professor  
Department of Political Science and  
Public Administration

  
Anne Permaloff  
Professor  
Department of Political Science and  
Public Administration

  
Gerard Gryski  
Professor  
Department of Political Science

  
Stephen L. McFarland  
Dean  
Graduate School

KINGDON ON DEFENSE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY STREAMS  
APPROACH AND A POLICY STREAMS ANALYSIS OF  
THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

Tony V. Klucking

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

KINGDON ON DEFENSE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY STREAMS  
APPROACH AND A POLICY STREAMS ANALYSIS OF  
THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

Tony V. Klucking

Doctor of Philosophy, August 4, 2003

(M.P.A., Troy State University, 1993)

(B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1982)

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The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) is landmark public policy. It is significant because of the continuous call for defense reorganization since 1941 and the failure of the government to enact any meaningful change to defense organization since 1958. The GNA is also significant because of the nearly universal opposition it faced at the outset. The strength of the opposition to defense reorganization legislation begs the question of how the GNA arrived on the public agenda and then the Congress' decision agenda. Furthermore, why did defense reorganization appear on the agenda in 1986?

John Kingdon's policy streams model from *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* is one of the most widely cited agenda setting and alternative specification models and is also one of only a handful of models that attempts to answer why an item rises to the decision agenda when it does. The policy streams model is therefore ripe for application to defense reorganization policy and to answer why the GNA appeared when it did. Before we can answer the why questions, it must be shown that John Kingdon's policy streams model is applicable to the defense policy process.

Using Robert Yin's case study methodology, this research conducts an historical case study analysis of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This study employs original research into government records, as well as analysis of documented first-hand accounts of the activities that led to the passage of the Act. The methodology breaks Kingdon's model and the historical record into component parts and then seeks to relate patterns, similarities, and differences. It is found that, up to a point, Kingdon's model translates well from the policy areas from which it was developed into the defense policy area. However, a qualitative analysis suggests that Kingdon's policy streams model offers only marginal insights into studies of the defense policy process. Despite its popularity, the policy streams model suffers from a number of defects that limit its use to a general understanding of the context and elements involved in a policy area, and it fails to identify the mechanism that identifies "when an idea's time has come."

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The author would also like to thank his wife, who completed the same post-graduate program one year sooner and who makes studying look easy; his daughter who waited patiently for her Daddy to finish so she could get a puppy; his committee for giving the final product the nod; his family and friends who helped with words of encouragement along the way; and his Lord, Jesus Christ, who really does make all things possible.

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## I. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AND POLICY STREAMS

### *Introduction*

National defense is big business. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2000, the Department of Defense employed 1,384,400 active duty military personnel, 864,600 reserve component personnel, and 698,300 civilian personnel for a total of 2,947,300 personnel, according to the *Historical Tables: Budget of the United States Government* (Executive Office of the President, 2001, p. C-1). These personnel and the defense programs they administered accounted for \$295 billion in federal spending in FY 2000. For FY 2003, the Defense Authorization Bill provides \$393 billion for defense programs and personnel—a 33 percent increase due largely to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The *Historical Tables* also reveal that defense spending consistently represents the largest portion of discretionary spending in the Federal budget (2001, p. 123). For example, FY 2000 defense outlays totaled \$295.0 billion out of \$614.8 billion in discretionary spending—48 percent of the discretionary budget. How defense dollars are spent is directly related to how the Department of Defense (DOD) is organized and DOD organization directly affects the ability of the nation to conduct military operations. Thus, the public policies that shape the organization of the DOD are inherently important for their economic impact and their ability to ensure the nation's security. Understanding the factors that bring defense reorganization to the decision agenda and that shape the alternatives available for selection is therefore no less important.

### *Overview of the Study*

This study examines the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 using John Kingdon's (1995) policy streams model employing a case study research methodology. The policy streams model is an agenda setting model intended to provide an understanding of how an idea's time has come. Similarly, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) was an idea's time that came and was a watershed event because it passed at all. The purpose of the study is to make sense of why defense reorganization figured so prominently in the government's decision agenda and why it did so when it did. Most policy analysis models of the policy process could be applied to this study to answer why defense reorganization was on the decision agenda. However, only two models can address the time element of why defense reorganization was on the decision agenda in 1986—the policy streams model and the punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).

### *Two Definitions: Reform and Reorganization*

Many times in the literature the terms reform and reorganization are used synonymously. Some studies overtly state there is not a distinction (Gunderson, 1997, p.1) or use them interchangeably as a writing style (Locher, 2002b; Lovelace, 2000). As they are used in the present study, they are related, but they are not the same. Reform is the alteration of process, policy, or procedure and may require an organizational structure change to implement. Conversely, reorganization is the alteration of organization structure and may require the change of process, policy, or procedure once implemented. Therefore, the distinction is a matter of degree in the abstract and depends on the

preponderance of effort—is it a process oriented change or structure oriented change?  
(see Mosher, 1967; Shafritz, 1985, p. 468.)

In practice, defense reform is associated with the defense acquisition and spending processes whereas defense reorganization is associated with the organization of military forces in a chain of command. Applied to Kingdon's study, his examination of transportation policies focused on the deregulation of commercial air, rail, and trucking industries—reform oriented process changes. In political science, reform is also associated with the Progressive Movement from the 1870's to 1918. The Progressive or Reform Movement sought to “improve governing institutions by bringing science to bear on public problems” (Shafritz, 1985, p. 434). In other words, reform is centered on the change of process, policy, or procedure to reduce harm or negative consequences of the current process, policy, or procedure.

Another example of the distinction comes from the current probes into “intelligence failures” which may have contributed to the success of the 9-11 terrorist attacks. These probes are openly seeking to reform the rules governing the way American intelligence agencies gather and disseminate intelligence information. Simultaneously, the new Department of Homeland Security is being touted as the largest Federal reorganization since the National Security Act of 1947. The new Department of Homeland Security is a structural reorganization of existing agencies to better coordinate their related activities (processes)—a move with effectiveness and efficiency in mind.

### Research Questions

This study asks three research questions: Why was defense reorganization on the decision agenda; why was defense reorganization on the decision agenda in 1986; and

does the policy streams approach to agenda setting and policy formulation tell us anything about defense reorganization policy? Of these three questions, the first one to be answered is the third one posed—does the policy streams approach to agenda setting and policy formulation tell us anything about defense reorganization policy? Answering this question first will answer the first two (if the model fits) and illuminate three points specific to defense policy. First, what is (are) the driver(s) for defense reorganization policy? Second, what are the mechanisms for change in problems, policies, and politics (Kingdon's three streams)? Understanding the mechanisms for change will aid in understanding, if not controlling, the advent of future change, which is the third point. How can decision-makers know when the time for an idea has come?

#### Significance of the Goldwater-Nichols Act

The GNA succeeded where other attempts at defense reorganization had failed. The literature reveals a nearly continuous flow of studies, reports, and proposals calling for defense reorganization or reform since 1941. World War II delayed serious consideration of defense reorganization proposals until the heated debates before the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA) (Clarefield, 1999, pp. 4-12; Jones, 1984, p. 276); (see also Millett & Maslowski, 1994, pp. 503-508). The NSA unified the former independent and cabinet-level War and Navy Departments under the National Military Establishment (NME), headed by a civilian Secretary of Defense. The compromises incorporated into the NSA were so great as to make the NME unmanageable, according to the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal. Ironically, it was Forrestal, as Secretary of the Navy, who led the opposition to unification and the NSA in general, and who won many compromises he later bemoaned (Clarfield, 1999,

p. 59). Forrestal quickly proposed changes that became the first of the only three measures prior to the GNA that survived the political process to become law: The 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947; Reorganization Plan No. 6 (1953); and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (Gunderson, 1997; Lederman, 1999; Locher, 2002b; Ward, 1993; Weiner, 1999). Each of these reorganization efforts was hotly contested and fell considerably short of the goals the reorganization advocates had set. The 1953 and 1958 efforts were led by President Eisenhower, who was unable to secure the reorganization of the Department of Defense he sought and felt was so desperately needed for the good of the nation. As Locher reports, the absence of any serious defense reorganization efforts after 1958, despite their demonstrated need, is largely attributed to the defeats handed to Eisenhower—a leader with unmatched credentials to this day (2002b, p. 29). The absence of any serious defense reorganization efforts in the 28 years prior to the GNA make it important to study—why the GNA arose to the decision agenda and passed when it did.

Major reorganizations of cabinet-level departments are scarce for good reasons. Reorganization is a destabilizing event (at least in the short term) which can wreak havoc on the processes, effectiveness, and efficiency of large bureaucracies with many “moving pieces” such as the DOD. Major organizational change is also expensive; people and equipment may have to be relocated and the DOD, like most organizations, has organizational inertia that prefers the status quo. As such, defense reorganization is obtained only through hard-fought political battles (Clarfield, 1999; Goldwater, 1988; Kitfield, 1995; Lederman, 1999; Locher, 2002a). For these reasons, this study asks why the GNA happened at all. Yet calls for change continue (Adolph, Stiles, & Hitt, 1995;

Chiarelli, 1993; Locher, 2001; Thompson & Jones, 1994), making the GNA a public policy worthy of study as a point of departure for understanding why and when the next defense reorganization policy might occur.

### Literature Overview

The events and debates that culminated with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act mark a specific point in history for close examination of defense policy making to determine if recent policy process theory offers any explanations for how an idea's time has come. Past policy making studies have focused on well defined social issues and stages of policy while theory-driven defense policymaking studies are conspicuous by their scarcity. There are exceptions, but they tend to be narrowly focused on the politics of making defense policy (e.g. Hilsman, 1993).

This study begins by examining literatures in three fields of study: political science, public administration; and policy process theory. In the American experience, the most important work in political science is arguably the *Federalist Papers* (Rossiter, 1961, p. vii). Written by James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton, the *Federalist Papers* deal directly with the issues facing the newly founded United States. *Federalist #10* deals specifically with pluralism in a republican democracy and pluralism figures significantly in political theory, policy process approaches, and Kingdon's policy streams model. Thus, the *Federalist Papers* provides both an anchor for political theory and a common baseline to integrate the ideas from more recent works.

Growing out of political science is the field of public administration. Woodrow Wilson began churning the debate of defining public administration and separating it from politics in an 1887 essay. Wilson suggested that politics and administration were to



be separate endeavors, and that a dichotomy existed for the public administrator. This dichotomy is defined by concurrent competing demands for service from the administrator. On one side, the public demands public servants who administer public policy free of political ideology or bias. On the other, senior public administrators serve by political appointment. The dichotomy occurs when the administration of policy conflicts with the current political context such as when the administrator allows political ideology to affect the execution of his duties. Much has been written about this dichotomy in the last 50 years and the elements of this struggle will emerge in the data of this study.

Public administration is a multidisciplinary field that includes organization theory, administrative theory, and decision making. Familiarity with the “ideal type” (Weber, 1922/1946 in Shafritz & Hyde, 1997, pp.37-43) organization provides a foundation for understanding the structural aims of the GNA while the “principles of administration” (Gulick, 1937) and their nemesis “the proverbs of administration” (Simon, 1946) help understand the functional aims of the GNA. Finally, decision making models such as “satisficing” (Simon, 1976) and “incrementalism” (Lindblom, 1959) illuminate decision processes of individual policy participants as well as institutions. With the concepts of pluralism, organization, and decision making in mind, the policy process literature is examined.

Wayne Parsons (1995) identifies six policy process approaches: the “stagist” approach (a.k.a. stages approach), as well as pluralist-elitist, neo-Marxist, sub-system, policy discourse, and institutionalism approaches (pp. 39-40). The stages model of public policy is the most basic; while institutionalism is the newest and least well

developed, according to Parsons. Conceptually, the stages model breaks the policy process into discrete segments that can be examined and understood for what they bring to the process as a whole, but the stages are not independent. They are linked in a continuous policy development process. Pluralism incorporates the functions of the stages model but focuses on a policy process model based on advancing interests (Truman, 1993) or controlling conflict (Schattschneider, 1970). The policy streams and punctuated equilibrium models considered for this study fall into Parsons' sub-systems approach category focusing on policy networks and policy communities in forming agenda setting and policy formulation models.

#### Methodology Overview

The next step is to develop a research design for the study. Using Robert Yin's (1994) case study methodology, the study first breaks down the policy streams model into components for use as the framework for evaluating the fit of the data to the policy streams model. Next, the study examines the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) by classifying data according to the components of Kingdon's model. The data are then analyzed for their fit with the model. If the policy streams model explains the data, the first two questions of this study—why GNA and why GNA in 1986—may be addressed from the mechanisms of Kingdon's model.

The sources of data include primary documents from the Government Printing Office (House and Senate reports, hearings, and debates) and other primary documents obtained from a former House Armed Services Committee (HASC) staff member, Arch Barrett. Informal interviews conducted by the writer with leading actors in the process are also included. Other sources include primary and secondary studies of defense

policy, government organization, organization theory, political theory, personal histories and memoirs, and journal accounts of events surrounding the GNA debates.

In summary, the intent of the study is to use case study methodology to evaluate the fit of John Kingdon's model with defense reorganization policy in the events leading to the passage of the GNA. From the fit of the model to the data the original research questions may perhaps be answered.

### Findings Overview

Using primary sources, biographies, memoirs, government documents, and interviews, this study finds that there are many points of contact between the policy streams model and the agenda rise of defense reorganization that culminated with the GNA. The data analysis is reported using a framework that records general observations of the data followed by specific observations and analysis according to the components, elements, and criteria from Kingdon's model developed in chapter III. A simple coding system of positive, negative, or null was used to evaluate the fit of the data to the components, elements, and criteria. These codes were assigned based on the text of the actions described and the context of the situation being described. For example, expressions describing a policy window were frequently encountered in the contextual documentation of policy entrepreneurs' activities in coupling policy alternatives to problems, resulting in a positive assessment for coupling. These data are summarized in tables and discussed in narrative. In general, there are many areas where the data fit the policy streams model very well. However, there are areas where the fit is questionable or does not exist. Furthermore, some assumptions made by Kingdon in the development of the policy streams approach raise serious questions.

Before proceeding with the study, some general observations of the findings, theory, data content, and sources are in order. Before questions of insight can be addressed, this study first requires the examination of the fit between the model and the data. Since the question of whether the model fits the data is not an unequivocal "yes," insights drawn from the results by using the model are necessarily limited. Second, theoretical groundwork for this study reveals that Kingdon studied transportation and health care policies from 1976 to 1979 with the results published in 1984. Therefore, Kingdon's work was completed before the firestorms of the GNA debates began and his research can be considered free of bias from the defense reorganization debates. Third, the policy processes of Congress changed greatly in 1981. These changes impact the actions of participants in the policy process but do not impact the theory or logic behind Kingdon's model.

Substantive findings of the GNA are limited to a single conclusion: the push for defense reorganization is not new and the GNA did not fully relieve past pressures for change. Bill Nichols stated on September 11, 1986 that the GNA was the embodiment of Eisenhower's dream for unification that had been rejected by Congress in the 1950s and could now be reported as "mission accomplished" (Locher, 1996, p. 17). However, pressures for greater unification in joint war fighting and administration remain. Just as there is the long-term presence of pressure for change, there is a long-term and active record of participation in defense reorganization by several participants, led by James Locher.

James Locher emerged as a key actor inside the policy process during the GNA debates. He was the working senior Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) staff

member during the GNA debates and proved to be a key figure in shepherding the GNA through the Congressional gauntlet. Locher and his group were intent on succeeding with “an idea whose time had come” against incredible odds (Locher, 1985, 2002a). Locher is also the central authority cited in nearly every recent study of the GNA (e.g. Getz, 1998, Gunderson, 1997, Lederman, 1999, Weiner, 1998). As part of his SASC duties, Locher authored the 645-page SASC report, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, commonly referred to as the Locher Report. In addition, Locher has written articles for military journals (e.g. 1996; 2001), and published his own 450-page account of the passage of the GNA (Locher, 2002b). More than this, Locher provided interviews to Weiner, Getz, and this writer. This researcher’s interviews with Locher were informal telephone and email discussions to clarify details from his published works and identify data sources.

On the other side of Congress, Arch Barrett held similar duties with the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). Barrett is also a reorganization expert and widely cited in the literature for his work completing defense reorganization studies that were abandoned during the Carter administration. During his tenure on the HASC, the House passed defense reorganization bills in 1982, 1983, and 1985 while the Senate debates dragged on for months. Thus, it was the Senate that provided the greatest obstacles to passage of defense reorganization legislation.

Two notes concerning two of the Locher sources—Locher 2002a and Locher 2002b. First, James Locher, with the permission of Texas A&M Press, graciously provided the writer a copy of the manuscript for *Victory on the Potomac* approximately one year before the book was published to facilitate the timely completion of this study.

While both resources have the same chapter text, both resources are cited separately in this study due to the placement of this researcher's notes in the manuscript and use of the published work's index to cross reference details (there is no index in the manuscript). The extensive notes made by this researcher in the manuscript on the fit between Locher's descriptions and Kingdon's model were not readily transferred to the published version due to pagination differences. Similarly, the published version is cited when used to cross reference information from other sources or to amplify points in the discussion. Second, both resources proved to be invaluable due to Locher's extensive personal experience, apolitical approach, and his access to controlled records and memoranda. These qualities make *Victory* a compendium of information not readily available to other researchers. For example, in the published work Locher reports that he, as a former SASC staff member present at certain meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had difficulty gaining access to official records from such meetings (Locher, 2002b, p. xiv). This detail is not present in the manuscript.

### *Contending Explanations: General Theory and GNA Studies*

Recent general theories of agenda setting and alternative specification as well as GNA-specific post-graduate studies offer various explanations for the passage of the GNA. Post-graduate studies include works by Sharon Weiner (1998), Greg Gunderson (1997), Colleen Getz (1998) and Bryan Ward (1993). Weiner reports that Congress took action to reverse its erosion of defense policy control due to changes in the political environment and specifically within Congress. Similarly, Gunderson (1997) cites changes in the political environment that shifted Congress' traditional deference to the executive in broad matters of defense policy to one of Congressional policy initiative.

Getz (1998) suggests that Congress enacted the GNA because it was good public policy. Ward offers three explanations for the passage of the GNA—foreign policy based on domestic concerns; foreign policy based on external concerns; and as consolidation of executive authority (1993, chapter 1). Ward concludes that the GNA passed due to external concerns rather than domestic pressures (1993, p. 338). James Locher's (2002a and 2002b) study does not cite a theory-based explanation for the passage of the GNA. His is a detailed explanation of the political maneuvers and the merit of the legislation drawn from his experience as the senior staff member working for Senator Goldwater, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and Senator Sam Nunn, the ranking minority member of the SASC, during the GNA debates. Locher would probably agree with Getz that the GNA is good public policy.

Evident in all of these studies are changes in the political environment. These changes in the political environment notwithstanding, the tension between military centralization and civilian control of the military formed the battle lines in the reorganization debate. Reorganization advocates sought to strengthen control over a diffuse military by centralizing the senior command and staff functions; reorganization opponents feared that centralization would lessen civilian control over an increasingly powerful and coordinated military. History records that this concern is well founded in the events of the Newburgh Conspiracy. In 1783, General George Washington quelled military discontent that threatened to boil over into a military coup after the Continental Congress revealed plans to disband large portions of the militia without back-pay in order to cut expenses—even though many of the men had not been paid for extended periods of up to six years (Flexner in *Defense Organization*, p. 29; Millett & Maslowski, pp. 88-89).

Fears of a strong, centrally controlled military linger today (Jones, 1982a). For example, after from American involvement against Germany in WWII such fears thwarted the first unification proposal by General Marshall—a general staff construct where the military is commanded and controlled by a single military officer who reports to the chief executive (president). To many, centralization threatens civilian control of the military rather than enhancing control. These issues were hotly contested during the GNA debates, if for no other reasons than there were no assurances that the reorganization provisions of the GNA would not upset this delicate balance (Gunderson, 1997, p. 372; McNaughton & Sperry, 1994, p. 219).

Providing a broader perspective of why the GNA passed are agenda setting and alternative specification theories. Leading contenders from published theory-based work include Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones' punctuated equilibrium model and John Kingdon's policy streams approach. Both of these models are built upon the stages approach and they both focus on agenda setting and policy formulation. Both are potentially useful because they deal with or address the critical matter of timing, as well as the agenda setting and policy formulation questions posed in the purpose of this study. Either of these models would serve the study's interests.

Kingdon's model was selected for three reasons. First, the policy streams model is compelling when comparing history to theory. Read together, obvious similarities between the events in *Victory on the Potomac* (Locher, 2002a) and the theory in *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Kingdon, 1995) demand further investigation, especially in light of the complete independence of Kingdon's and Locher's work. Second, Kingdon suggests that the policy streams model is a generally useful model for



policy studies and it has not been previously applied to any defense-related policy studies. In other words, Kingdon's policy streams approach is ripe for extension to a new policy area. So Kingdon provides a means to the ends of understanding why defense organization was on the decision agenda and why it was on any agenda in 1986 at the same time testing an extant theory on a new area of policy. As Baumgartner and Leech point out, there is a need for research that tests the transferability of theory in order to grow the body of knowledge rather than just growing the body of literature (1998, p. 22). Finally, at the core of Baumgartner and Jones' model is Kingdon's policy streams model. The punctuated equilibrium model is the conclusion of Baumgartner and Jones starting from a foundation with many bricks from the policy streams model. This study seeks to analyze the utility of Kingdon's model as a means to understand why defense reorganization figured so prominently in the government's decision agenda and why it did so when it did independent of other interpretations of the underlying agenda setting theory.

### *Limitations of the Study*

The research for this study, while extensive, cannot be claimed to be exhaustive. However, the recurrence in the literature of primary sources on the passage of the GNA indicates that the majority of primary sources has been covered. A second limitation is the nature of the study. Case study methodology is typically done by active observation of a case in progress over an extended period of time (Yin, 1994, p. 10; see also Stake, 1994, pp. 21, 44). This researcher has been on active duty since the GNA debates began, but as a young officer political observation and documentation were not part of my duties. Nonetheless, 20 years of military service has offered unique opportunities and

insights that are appropriate for historical case study research as developed by Robert Yin.

The GNA of 1986 cannot be studied in isolation from the NSA of 1947, the 1949 amendment, Reorganization Plan No. 6, and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. These acts and amendments are joined by a host of internal and external defense reorganization studies from every administration since Truman. In short, the volume of information from independent research efforts, Congressional hearings, Blue Ribbon Panels, and first-hand accounts is enormous. By talking with the principals involved in the passage of the GNA, the research was focused on key hearings and studies. Additional sources helped identify support and challenges to the positions published in these public records and first-hand accounts to assess the veracity of the evidence. However, in the end, the volume of data was synthesized and reduced to a usable level using the best judgment possible due to the non-standard presentation of data. In short, this research is based on the informed judgment and evaluation of disparate data. With this groundwork, the journey through the literature, methodology, and findings begins.

## II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

*Blessed is the man who finds wisdom, and the man who gains  
understanding—for its profit is better than the profit of silver,  
and its gain than fine gold.*

Proverbs 3:13-14

### *Introduction*

The literature for this study is divided into three broad groups—political science, public administration, and the policy process. The policy process includes broad theory of the entire policy process and specialized theory focused on the agenda setting and alternative specification stages. John Kingdon draws primarily on works from the fields of political science and public administration to develop his policy streams model. The policy streams model is one of several prominent agenda setting models based on the stages model of the policy process. Similarly, the stages model is but one of several approaches to the policy process, which is a component of the public administration and political science literatures that form the foundation of this literature review. From this broad base we examine the policy process and agenda setting literatures. Finally, an examination of Kingdon's literature review clarifies how Kingdon perceived the literature. It is important to work from a basic framework such as this since the literature is vast in each of these areas and the purpose of this literature review is to understand the theoretical base of the policy streams model, not create new theory.

*Political Science*

Political science offers a large body of literature on theories of governance and political behavior. The relevant literatures from these groups for this study concern democratic governance as practiced in the United States, usually described as a form of pluralism, and political communication. Pluralism is an important concept because competing interests were in tension when the United States was founded and competing interests are in tension today. This tension is part and parcel of the individual freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. While theories of democratic governance trace their roots to ancient Greek and Roman ideas of representative government, there is no need here to build the body of pluralism thought from these ancient governments. Instead, it is sufficient to examine pluralism in the United States by beginning with James Madison's writings found in *The Federalist Papers*.

## James Madison

Clinton Rossiter wrote: "*The Federalist* is the most important work in political science that has ever been written, or is likely to be written, in the United States" (Rossiter, 1961, p. vii). *The Federalist Papers* are a series of eighty-five "letters to the public" that appeared in newspapers in New York City from October 27, 1787, until August 16, 1788, written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the pseudonym "Publius" (Rossiter, 1961, p. viii). What makes *The Federalist Papers* so important is their nearly universal acceptance as authoritative commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. Although *The Federalist Papers* were published in newspapers, published collections soon appeared and served as "debaters' handbooks" throughout the nation, especially in the key states of Virginia and New York. However,

historians agree that the Federalist Papers were aimed at “a select audience of reasonable, responsible, and established men” who were already convinced of the need for a new form of government to replace the central government formed under the Articles of Confederation (Rossiter, 1961, p. xi). Although these influential men were convinced of the need for a new government, they did not agree on the form and function of the new central government. Thus, the installments of *The Federalist Papers* continued in an effort to explain the value of the Constitution over the Articles of Confederation.

The heart of the ratification debate questioned how to implement the Constitution, which called for the sharing of power to govern, between populations with vastly different interests and concerns. The large, populous, industrialized states generally faced off against the smaller, agricultural states. Each state wanted to independently control its destiny while at the same time forming a union to control aggregate destiny. The result of these debates is the well-known checks-and-balances system of power shared between three branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial. This sharing of power intentionally fragmented the government to preclude the inordinate and inappropriate exercise of power by any one individual, including the president. In other words, the system was designed to address the ever-present tension between the will of the majority and the rights of the minority.

Madison addresses this tension—the role of “faction” in a republican democracy—in *Federalist #10*. In modern language, faction is most commonly seen in pluralism, and it has been said that the study of American politics is the study of pluralism. In *Federalist #10* Madison defines a faction as a number of citizens, either a minority or majority, united by a common passion or interest deemed by others as

adverse to their individual rights as citizens or the rights and aggregate interests of the whole community (Rossiter, 1961, p. 78). In short, a faction is any group of citizens who hold a like opinion on an issue when at least one citizen holds a different opinion. So viewed, it is easy to understand why the study of American politics is the study of pluralism. One of the few things all Americans agree on is their right to disagree, and thus faction is endemic to American society.

The concern then, as well as now, is over policy decisions resulting from the inputs into the policy process from one faction rather than another. The minority fears the sheer numbers of the majority—mob rule—and the majority fears being ruled by a minority, which, by definition, holds the less popular view of an issue. Furthermore, taken to the extreme, “democratic” rule by the minority—the few or by one person—transforms democracy into an aristocracy, monarchy, or totalitarian state. Thus, both the minority and majority prefer the rule of law and justice over the tyranny and injustice from mob rule or a totalitarian government.

How are factions to be dealt with and their views considered equitably at the federal level? Madison posits that there are two cures for “the mischiefs of faction”—either remove the cause of the faction or control the effects (Rossiter, 1961, p. 78). To remove the cause of faction Madison suggests one must destroy the liberty which creates faction or impose the same interests, passions, and opinions upon all citizens. However, for all citizens to have the same opinion is as impracticable as the removal of liberty is unwise, according to Madison. Here he takes the stance that human reasoning is fallible and imperfect. Moreover, as long as people are free to exercise their reasoning and judgment, there will be differences of opinion (Rossiter, 1961, p. 78). Madison continues

his argument and determines that human nature is the root cause of faction. Thus, the only way to remove faction would be to remove all humans—another impracticable solution. In the end, Madison concludes faction is a fact of life that cannot be avoided. The only solution remaining is to control the effects of faction (Rossiter, 1961 p. 80). It is in controlling the effects of faction that American pluralism was born.

American pluralism is the sense of freedom to pursue interests in the unique framework of American government, but the issue remains, how to “secure the public good and private rights” at the same time while also protecting the majority from the “sinister views” of a minority (Rossiter, 1961, p. 80). Even more important is how to protect the minority from the “sinister views” of the majority. Madison’s solution employed the unique opportunities facing the fledgling nation. First, the new nation would be a republic where government functions are conducted by a group of select, elected members, rather than a pure democracy. This arrangement dilutes the power of any one individual to dominate the government. Further, the government’s span of control could grow commensurate with the geographic and population growth of the nation, again diluting the power of any one individual to dominate the government (Rossiter, 1961, p. 82). In other words, controlling the effects of faction is achieved by expanding the sphere of control beyond the means of a small faction or single person’s control. As a further means of limiting the power of a single faction or individual, Madison addresses the proper size of the government. The government must be comprised of neither too few nor too many representatives. With too few, the ability of one person or a small faction to dominate increases. With too many, the “confusion of a multitude” would prevent any effective governance (Rossiter, 1961, p. 82). The contrast

between the conduct of business in the Senate, with 100 members, and the House, with 435 members, makes Madison's point clear. It is perhaps fortunate that House membership was limited to 435 due to the physical limits of the capitol building.

Madison developed lasting notions of democratic pluralism and published them in the *Federalist Papers* in an effort to move the fledgling United States toward adopting a new and lasting government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Madison may be judged as successful since the government adopted is essentially the government that stands today. However, a government with the ability to accommodate the interests of factions while it maintains effectiveness and efficiency in governance remains in tension. This tension is the dynamic of interest group activity in contemporary American policymaking.

#### David Truman

The contemporary voice of pluralism in American politics is found in David Truman's (1951) *The Governmental Process*. His primary objective was to examine the role of interest groups and understand their interaction with the formal institutions of American politics, and he credits Arthur F. Bentley's (1908) *The Process of Government* for the foundation of his study (Truman, 1993, pp. ix, 505). Truman's work further engrains the idea that the study of American politics is the study of pluralism. Pluralism—interest groups—is how American politics works.

Truman defines interest groups as "any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the



shared attitudes" (1993, p. 33). From this definition his assessment of the Federalists' activities is insightful:

The entire effort of which *The Federalist* was a part was one of the most skillful and important examples of pressure group activity in American history. The State ratifying conventions were handled by the Federalists with a skill that might well be the envy of a modern lobbyist. It is easy to overlook the fact that "unless the Federalists had been shrewd in manipulation as they were sound in theory, their arguments could not have prevailed." (Truman, 1993, p. 5)

Thus, Truman provides a clear linkage from Madison to modern political thought on interest groups and their role in American politics, but Truman is significant for additional reasons.

Truman's work is significant because there is a relative void in interest group literature prior to the publication of *The Governmental Process* and an increased attention to interest groups afterwards (Truman, 1993, p. xxviii). From Madison to Truman, John C. Calhoun's (1853) *A Disquisition on Government* and Arthur F. Bentley's (1908) work are cited as the most prominent works on group theory (Shafritz, 1985, p. 276; Truman, 1993, p. 509). The literature void is due, in part, to the classical assumptions of human behavior as either an economic man or political man. The economic/political man model assumes the individual use of rational choice to maximize individual advantage. As such, the economic/political man could not significantly impact the outcomes for the whole (Truman, 1993, p. viii). These assumptions were appealing because of the safety from dominance by any one individual they imbued to the political system. Truman observes

that group behavior was treated “as pathology rather than as evidence that the underlying theory did not account for the observed facts” (Truman, 1993, p. viii). Thus, Truman shifts the unit of analysis from the individual to the group.

The characterization of interest groups as pathology was reinforced by yellow journalism:

We have had no dearth of muckraking exposés designed to rouse a presumably ignorant citizenry by revealing the allegedly evil activities of “lobbies” and “special interests.” The end of such tracts has not yet been seen and undoubtedly will not soon appear. They perform a political function themselves that is likely to continue indefinitely. (1993, p. vii)

Truman was correct; interest groups to this day are commonly considered an anathema. Yet Truman states that political interest groups and nonpolitical interest groups are different only in their combination of interests and with whom they interact. The origins, structure, and operations of both types of groups are shared (Truman, 1993, p. ix). Concerning origins, Truman’s position is that “man becomes characteristically human only in association with other men” (1993, p. 15). He explains that humans inherently seek group affiliation and acceptance, even at the price of conformity. This is the origin of an interest group. Of the structure and operations there are many facets, but the basic objective of the interest group is to obtain access to decision makers (Truman, 1993, pp. 264-265). Political interest groups seek access to policy makers, typically in the legislature, which Truman describes as a highly dynamic interaction with changing influences (1993, chapter 11, and p. 350).

*The Governmental Process* is also significant because it sought to discover the roles of the interest group in American politics, both formal and informal, “whether or not such activities fit the specifications of the legal blueprints, and lines of power and influence are not fully recorded in statutes and constitutions” (Truman, 1993 pp. x-xi). This is tied to the central tenet of his book, namely, that interest groups are essential to American politics. Truman notes that there are several “insufficiently explored areas” of interest group interaction that includes the role of the mass media—an area that grows significantly by the time Kingdon conducts his study.

Finally, Truman’s work is significant because of three enduring characteristics he observed in the literature between the first (1951) and second (1971) editions of *The Governmental Process* (1993, p. xxv). He observed that the research still treated interest groups as inherently pathological behavior; that interest group research had frequently produced descriptive, non-theoretical studies; and that researchers had given interest groups “a monopoly of political initiative” and thus denigrated the roles of government actors as merely “referees of group conflict, registers of group demands, or ratifiers of the outcomes of intergroup contests” (Truman, 1993, p. xxv). These observations notwithstanding, Truman sees the interest group as the right and proper vehicle for American representative democracy; however, E. E. Schattschneider argues that interest groups do not fairly represent all the interests that need to be represented to the government.

E. E. Schattschneider

*The Semisovereign People* (Schattschneider, 1975) was originally published in 1960 and adds a significantly different view of the interest group role in American politics. The work is full of pithy and insightful commentary that challenges the basic

notions of Truman's interest group theory. Two of Truman's tenets—the basic need for humans to form groups and the basic need for groups to seek access to decision makers—imply that all people, regardless of socio-economic status, may be participants in interest groups in a pure pluralist environment. Schattschneider (1975) counters group theory with a pluralist-elitist model of American democracy where the role of government is to manage conflict.

Schattschneider's argument builds from basic ideas of human association to develop a model of pluralism where conflict and bias are built in by necessity. The pluralist-elitist argument begins with an understanding of the role of conflict. In short, politics is the socialization of conflict where the winners seek to minimize the scope of conflict and the losers seek to expand the scope of conflict (Schattschneider, 1975, pp. 2-3). Second, people tend to associate within their socio-economic strata which challenges "the proposition that special-interest groups are a universal form of political organization reflecting *all* interests" [emphasis in the original] (p. 34). In other words, not everyone organizes to voice their interests which summarizes Schattschneider's famous denunciation of pluralism: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent" (pp. 34-35). Ironically, this "flaw" enables the American political system to function since stalemate could result if all interests were mobilized (p. 34).

This leads to the conclusion that people must choose to organize to voice their interests and that the political system must choose which interests will be heard—the management of conflict: "All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because *organization*

*is the mobilization of bias*. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out” [emphasis in the original] (Schattschneider, 1975, p. 69). However important the issues may be, “*the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power*” [emphasis in the original] (p. 66).

There are two further points from Schattschneider that relate to pluralism and John Kingdon’s policy streams model. First, Schattschneider argues that the assumption that the public authority is merely a gatekeeper for conflict is sorely mistaken. The presence of public order suggests that some interests have been organized in and others organized out (Schattschneider, 1975, p. 40). This is similar to the critique made by Truman referring to government actors as merely “referees of group conflict.”

The second observation regards the political game and whose game is played. Schattschneider concludes that “*Whoever decides what the game is about decides also who can get into the game*” [emphasis in the original] (1975, p. 102). The game figures prominently in Kingdon’s political process stream, but he provides us little insight into its rules or meaning. Schattschneider, however, provides us with three positions: the relationship between interest groups and political parties is that the party reigns supreme; “*there is no political substitute for victory in an election;*” and “*the substitution of conflicts is the most devastating kind of political strategy*” [emphasis in the original] (pp. 56, 57, and 71). Schattschneider makes a good case that stimulates thought about the processes in Kingdon’s political process stream. To the third position, a strategy of conflict substitution works at the limits of the political system to manage conflicts. The use of the family farm to shape the debate that actually benefits big agri-business is a classic example of this strategy. The impact of policy outcomes such as this was the

focus of Lowi's (1964) policy taxonomy in a scathing statement of the state of political theory as reflected by the group theories of Truman and Schattschneider.

Theodore J. Lowi

Commenting on the state of political theory in a 1964 book review, Theodore J. Lowi subjects Madison's, Truman's, and Schattschneider's notions of pluralism to intense criticism after initially luring the reader with seemingly high praise:

No theory or approach has ever come closer to defining and unifying the field of political science than pluralism, perhaps because it fitted so nicely both the outlook of revered Federalist #10 and the observables of the New Deal. (p. 678)

The main trouble with all these approaches is that they do not generate related propositions that can be tested by research and experience. Moreover, the findings of studies based upon any one of them are not cumulative. Finally, in the absence of logical relations between "theory" and the propositions, the "theory" becomes self-directing and self-supportive. This is why I have employed the term "theory" only with grave reservations and quotation marks. (p. 681)

From the ashes of these "non-theories of power in America" Lowi posits his own theory based on a three-point argument: Expectations determine the type of relationships among people; governmental outputs or policies determine expectations in politics; and the type of policy determines the political relationship such that every policy type is associated with a specific political relationship (1964, p. 688). Thus, "*policies determine politics*"

and policy types—distribution, regulation, and redistribution—are derived from the expectations of a policy's impact (p. 689; 1972, p. 299).

Lowi further defines policy types as "areas of policy or government activity" and he contends that they "constitute real arenas of power" (1964, p. 689). He then defines each of these areas of policy, beginning with distributive policy. Distributive policies are specific and individual in impact by distributing a good, service, or commodity in sequentially smaller units that are "more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule" (p. 690). Lowi cites defense procurement and R&D as typical of this policy type (p. 690). Regulatory policies, on the other hand, are not capable of disaggregating and dispersion like distributive policy, although regulatory policies are also specific and individual in impact (p. 690). Regulatory policies include the rules promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Department of Transportation (DOT), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and other government agencies that limit access, set rules for use, and define standards for the production of goods and services. Redistributive policies impact broad groups of people and focus on equal possession rather than equal treatment—a shifting of goods, services, or commodities from the "haves" to the "have-nots" (p. 691). Welfare programs, such as unemployment compensation or Medicaid, are commonly cited as redistributive.

The intended use of these policy types was to understand the context of policy activity and therefore to make better use of the quantitative data that was being collected on policy case studies. However, Lowi clearly states that each policy type would have different political relationships and associated policy process (1964, p. 689). This would confound this study from the outset unless defense policy is of the same policy type as

those used in Kingdon's model. Lowi also states that his policy types focus on the short term since all policies "may be considered redistributive" in the long run (p. 690).

Initially, Lowi's typology was widely accepted and used but it was soon criticized for being simplistic (Parsons, 1995, p. 132). In response, a fourth policy type—

"constituent" policy issues—the setting-up or reorganization of institutions" was added (Lowi, 1972, p. 300). Constituent policy issues would seemingly be an ideal category for the study at hand due to the reorganization focus of the GNA; however, this policy type was also challenged as being too simple and "methodologically suspect" (Parsons, 1995, p. 132). This study concurs with Parsons' assessment—Lowi's policy type model is too simple for productive policy analysis, but it has merit for another reason.

Evaluating Lowi's issue arenas model as being too simple and "methodologically suspect" diverts attention from the central tenet of Lowi's argument—the distrust of interest groups and interest group theory. This conclusion is not drawn solely from the opening indictments quoted above, but from an examination of Lowi's 1979 work, *The End of Liberalism*:

The problems of pluralist theory are of more than academic interest. They are directly and indirectly responsible for some of the most costly attributes of modern government: (1) the atrophy of institutions of popular control; (2) the maintenance of old and the creation of new structures of privilege; and (3) conservatism in several senses of the word. (pp. 58-59)

Support for these points comes from the view of interest groups as not being representative of the populace. Lowi cites the surrender of policy formulation to interest groups as the surrender of political responsibility from the government to a select group



of the governed, bypassing the “will of the people” philosophy of democracy. These select groups then become part of the “new structures of privilege.” Lowi expounds on Truman’s observation that power relationships are “highly resistant to change” and that “the ‘old line’ agency is highly inflexible” (Lowi, 1979, pp. 60-61; Truman, 1951, pp. 467-468). Such resistance and inflexibility is one sense of conservatism that Lowi refers to, namely, maintenance of the status quo. Lowi closes this second indictment of pluralism with the conclusion that interest group liberalism destroys the “established relationships and expectations in a republic” by destroying the substance and procedure that give republican government meaning and leaving us with a mechanistic process of government in its place (1979, p. 63). Therefore, it is Lowi’s normative expectations of a republic and the role of interests that shaped his issue arenas model.

#### Frank Baumgartner & Beth Leech

Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech (1998) document the rise and fall of pluralism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and plot a course for its resurgence in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Their book, *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science*, thoroughly reviews the literature and summarizes the state of pluralism today. *Basic Interests* is based on the work of Jack Walker who held interest groups activities “as among the fundamental means by which the most basic elements of the political process unfolded” (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, p. xi). As such, interest groups are described as “a mixed” blessing, being at once purveyors of privilege and representatives of diverse interests. The tone is clearly a positive one regarding the role of interest groups, yet they are also cautious. They neither push pluralism to the limits of Truman’s work, nor bane it as Lowi and Schattschneider.

The objective of *Basic Interests* is to “discuss the importance of groups to an understanding of politics,” placing the group neither in the center or the periphery (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, p. xix). They accomplish this by first reviewing a very broad and significant portion of pluralism literature, summarizing the progress and regress of the field. While they find “areas of advance,” such as the categorization of the field into “demand aggregation” (how groups mobilize) and “group impact” (political activity and effect) studies (Cigler & Loomis, 1995), they also note significant “areas of avoidance” and “areas of confusion” (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, pp. 7-13). They posit that contemporary political science students can hardly be expected to understand pluralism if scholars of Truman’s and Lowi’s caliber could not “generate positive conclusions despite the investment of tremendous energies” (p. 13). They conclude that although significant work is being done, the body of pluralist literature “grows but does not accumulate” due to theoretical, comparability, and scope issues (p. 17). In other words, valuable research is conducted but the studies do not share a coherent theoretical basis or common scope of inquiry, and thus the results are not comparable.

As will also be seen in the analysis of Kingdon’s model, *Basic Interests* finds that the definitions of basic terms are not agreed upon across studies. If the interest group literature struggles for common definitions of basic terms such as “interest” and “interest group,” how are newcomers expected to advance the field? Their discussions of influence and issues were particularly interesting for this study. Regarding influence, Baumgartner and Leech (1998) note that

Never have scholars been able to organize a systemic study that would demonstrate the influence of any particular lobbyist when controlling for

all rival factors that might also have affected the decision, however. Scholars continue to design their research projects around a premise that they will be able to “explain” votes or decisions by isolating all the forces acting on the decision makers, even though the process has not worked in the past. (p. 36)

Baumgartner and Leech carry this discussion further and conclude that if influence is defined narrowly, within the confines of a single decision process, it is only exercised in the final stage of the decision process where most academics agree that influence is least likely to have any effect (p. 38). With respect to issues, they note that issues are difficult to identify, may be aggregated in different ways, and are redefined as they move up and down the agenda hierarchy (p. 40). These terms are significant to this study since influence plays a major persuasive and substantive role in Kingdon’s policy and political process streams, respectively, and issues (conditions and problems) are the central focus in the problem process stream. Baumgartner and Leech conclude that group theory research should be conducted with a mind toward accumulating comparable findings rather than discovering new ones (p. 42).

As to the state of group theory studies, Baumgartner and Leech describe the action-reaction cycle of scholarly work where one body of literature sparks “a reaction to and often against the work of a previous generation of scholars” (1998, p. 46). Pluralism (group approach) was a response to the formal or legalistic approach; Schattschneider was a response to the group approach; and Lowi was rebellion against them all, seeking a normative policy-based approach.

As did Lowi, Mancur Olson, Jr. challenged the assumptions of group theory with *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, published in 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action* dealt a “fatal blow” to group theory by using a testable, deductive approach (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, p. 67). Olson demonstrated what Schattschneider called the “flaw in the pluralist heaven” that all potential groups would not have an equal chance to organize and compete as Truman described (p. 67). Olson reasoned that large groups seeking only collective benefits were disadvantaged compared to small, business oriented groups that could mobilize and organize for action more effectively. “The group struggle would never be fair. Differential intensities of preference would be reinforced, not lessened, through the group system....Some interests would always be more equal than others” (p. 67). “Fair” is nearly impossible to define in the context of Olson’s argument—the losers always feel the process is unfair. But are they seeking fairness in opportunity for access (inputs) or fairness in policy outcomes (outputs)? Despite the quandary of what constitutes “fairness,” group theory survived, perhaps because the presence of groups in politics could not be fully explained by Olson, nor could they be ignored and minimized as merely pathology (Truman, 1993, p. xxv).

### *Public Administration*

The multi-disciplinary nature of public administration precludes a tidy heading or organization of work by fields. Many of the authors discussed above and those discussed in subsequent sections may also be discussed under the public administration heading. The works discussed in this section are thus a catch-all of general concepts and specific points that do not fit neatly into other categories of this review. However, each of the

works discussed adds something to our understanding of the role of the administrator in the policy process, bureaucracy, models of decision making, and other topics.

#### Paul Appleby & Woodrow Wilson

Paul Appleby, while the Dean of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, published *Policy and Administration* in 1949. His objective was to provide a foundation for public administration practitioners that would enable them to better serve in government. Appleby's perspective in *Policy and Administration* is of significant importance to public administrators in the operation of democratic government. Appleby states that the "intermingling of policy and administration in our government is not new" and that government today operates much the same as it did at its founding, only larger (1949, p. 24). Furthermore, administration is policy-making, but it is not the sole organ of government or of policy making (p. 170). Thus, the significance of public administrators was their role as actors in the middle of the policy process.

Describing administrators as policy actors ran counter to the conventional wisdom of the time that espoused the separation of administration from politics according to Woodrow Wilson's famous politics-administration dichotomy:

Most important to be observed is the truth already so much and so fortunately insisted upon by our civil-service reformers; namely, that administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices. (Wilson, 1887; Quoted from Shafritz & Hyde, 1997, p. 20)

Wilson's perspective in this declaration was to ensure the effective implementation of policy by separating administration of policy from formulation of policy or politics. One difficulty with Wilson's perspective is its separation of implementation of policy from the concept of policy—the manner in which a public program is implemented is how the public views a policy. In other words, “policy” is more than just the paper or statement of how things will be done. To the public, policy is how the paper or statement of how things will be done actually are done. Thus, Wilson is correct in his view, but incomplete. Similarly, Appleby's view is correct, if not overstated.

Before *Policy and Administration*, Appleby collaborated with Arnold Brecht (Appleby & Brecht, 1941) to author “Organization for overhead management.” This article is significant because it embodies several themes that were major issues in defense reorganization debates such as centralization/decentralization of control, unity of effort, specialization/division of labor, and span of control. Centralization relates to the issue of civilian control of the military and the concentration of decision-making authority; unity of effort corresponds to a tenet of warfare—the coordinated and integrated employment of force for a common goal—and illuminates the failures of military operations in Iran, Grenada, and Lebanon; specialization maps to the fight over military roles and missions—which Service will dominate military operations in the air (all the Services have aircraft), on the ground (the Navy provides sealift for the Marines and the Army), or in Special Operations (again, all the Services have a stake); span of control refers to the number of subordinates a supervisor can adequately track and direct—a direct jab at the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and central to arguments that initiated the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The point here is not to elaborate on these themes, but to

highlight that they are not new. Public administrators had been discussing the underlying issues for many years before the defense reorganization debates of the 1980's, and their ideas can be traced back to the work of Max Weber.

#### Max Weber

Max Weber describes the "ideal type" bureaucracy as one where the bureaucrats are modeled as rational actors within a rational and logical organizational structure (Weber, 1922/1946 in Shafritz & Hyde, 1997, pp.37-43). Bureaucrats are selflessly dedicated to their work within this highly ordered structure. In this model Weber addresses the concrete and subjective nature of social behavior. The bureaucratic structure defines the concrete relationships while the rational actor model attempts to account for the subjective nature of social activity. The "ideal type" bureaucracy is thus a normative view of how organizations should be, but are not commonly found in practice. It depends on who one asks if the structure of an organization is rational and logical—a fact central to the defense reorganization debates—and the activity of bureaucrats is not always that of the rational actor. Therefore, Weber provides a normative, if mechanistic, model of bureaucracy that serves as the foundation for much of the organization theory literature (either in advancing or denouncing hierarchical organizations).

#### James Q. Wilson

James Q. Wilson (1989) provides descriptive analysis of organizations that are unique in presentation. For example, Wilson declares that "organization matters" despite his observation that "only two groups of people deny that organization matters: economists and everybody else. To many economists, government organizations are like firms: black boxes that convert...inputs into outputs" and with everybody else it is the

people that matter, not the organization (1989, pp. 23-24). Wilson continues his analysis of the participants and context of bureaucracy to conclude with an examination of organizational change.

Organizational change is described in three components—problems, rules, and markets. Wilson discusses problems in terms of their character—accountability, equity, fiscal integrity, and efficiency. Imbedded within each of these characteristics is a basis of value. On the value basis, Wilson argues that the governed must choose between goals and constraints as government organizations seek to accomplish assigned tasks (1989, p. 331). By this he means that constraints are more clearly defined and measurable, whereas goals may be less well-grounded. The tension between the two is deciding how much flexibility to allow bureaucrats in the prosecution of tasks: low flexibility corresponds to a highly constrained environment; high flexibility corresponds to a goal oriented environment (Wilson, 1989, chapter 17, and p. 332). Thus, the value choice between goals and constraints either empowers or inhibits action.

Rules and discretion are discussed in terms of the “ideal type” bureaucracy and Theodore Lowi’s denunciation of interest group activity. Rules, to Wilson, follow the Weberian ideal as “an institutional method for applying general rules to specific cases, thereby making the actions of government fair and predictable” (1989, pp. 334-335). To this he adds that discretion by bureaucrats serves to advance interest group influence which degrades the credibility of the democratic ideal—the argument made by Lowi against the influence of interest groups in administration (p. 335).

“Markets” is a term not normally considered in discussions of public organizations. If there were a market, a private organization (firm) would commence



operations to generate income. Wilson suggests that the markets for government are areas that cannot generate a profit but must be accomplished, such as functions that provide universal and indivisible benefits (1989, p. 346). This model of collective action and inaction is consistent with Mancur Olson's. Wilson's example of a government market under this structure is national defense—everyone benefits and it cannot be divided so there is no incentive for private industry or individuals to participate.

Wilson's work provides additional insight into the problems, rules, and markets associated with bureaucracies. More importantly, he adds concepts to consider in understanding change within a public organization.

#### Charles Lindblom

"Incrementalism" from "The Science of 'Muddling Through'" is well-known in the public administration and political science literatures. In his article, Lindblom argues that there has been insufficient study of the decision-making process used by public administrators despite the exhortations of the extant literature for administrators to make more methodical decisions (1959, p. 79).

Using an analysis of two decision-making methods, root and branch, Lindblom (1959) explains how the demands for responsive public decisions preclude the use of the root method due to its rational-comprehensive procedures. The logic of the root method is impeccable, but the time requirements are too great for quick and responsive action. Thus, the branch method—successive limited comparisons—is the method of choice. Where the root method attempts to clarify values, objectives, means, and ends, the branch method requires no such action. The root method also requires extensive analysis and a heavy reliance on theory where the branch method severely limits analysis and the need

for theory (p. 81). Thus, the branch method allows more rapid decisions using successive limited comparisons rather than a single slow and extensively researched root analysis to determine a solution.

In practice, the successive limited comparisons are made by comparing proposals to extant policies and programs, thus changes are incremental rather than new from the ground up. Lindblom's incrementalism describes policy change as occurring in small, incremental steps rather than large, abrupt changes. Budget levels for agencies show a high correlation using this theory—each year's budget being incrementally different from the previous year's. As a tool in public administration and public policy, incrementalism suggests that the policy process is not a ground-up process each time, but that new policies are developed by incrementally adjusting—changing—existing policies.

In *The Policy-Making Process*, Lindblom and Edward Woodhouse (1993) update the state of the art of incrementalism. They note that comprehensive, analytical decision making is still sought by some but that successive limited comparisons are the norm for several reasons. First, the complexity of the world has increased and the cognitive ability of humans remains modest (p. 5). Nonetheless, constituencies still expect public policy “to be well informed and well analyzed, perhaps even correct or scientific” while also being fully democratic (openly debated) (p. 7). This tension between being well-informed and fully democratic creates policy maker demand for specialized studies and inputs from experts (interest groups) (p. 24). Lowi and Schattschneider would argue that this tendency runs counter to democracy. While great progress has been made in social science research and the costs and benefits of policies, there has been little understanding developed that would allow policy makers to compare the relative costs and benefits of

policy choices—just one of several fallibilities of the policy process (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993, p. 17). Lindblom and Woodhouse conclude that “analytical policy making is inevitably limited—and must allow room for politics—to the degree that” politics is fallible, cannot completely resolve conflicts, is not timely or cheap, and does not establish policy priorities very well (p. 22). Thus, the concepts of incrementalism are brought into the modern vernacular but the central tenet remains—people are limited in their ability to process data, thus the analysis of policy must be limited.

### Luther Gulick

Except for Woodrow Wilson, Luther Gulick is perhaps the most prominent public administration theorist discussed here. He served several United States presidents and his works are still analyzed and debated today. Brian Fry (1989) provides some initial analysis of Gulick’s work in the context of its impact on public administration that set the stage for further analysis of Gulick’s seminal work with Luther Urwick, the *Papers on the Science of Administration* (1937). Like Appleby, Gulick staunchly held that the role of an administrator is also one of being a policy actor, and that it was not only impractical but also undesirable to separate politics from administration (Fry, 1989, p. 80). Of Gulick’s many contributions, only two are considered here—the principles of administration and the functions of the executive. Together, these notions suggest a means to organize, coordinate the efforts of a large public organization, and prepare for the changes that will inevitably come. Central to Gulick’s work is the concept of efficiency in government (Fry, 1989, p. 73). To this end he offered principles of administration.

The principles of administration come from an article of the same name published in 1925 and then republished in 1937 as an essay, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in the *Papers on the Science of Administration*. All of the principles will not be addressed, but the focus will be on those that apply to understanding the issues in the GNA debates. The entering argument for Gulick's discussion is the operation of a large organization. In order to achieve organizational objectives, Gulick declares several principles within two areas: the division of work and the coordination of work. As it concerns the GNA debates, there is little argument on the division of work or specialization; however, serious conflicts arose in the coordination of work. Gulick suggests that work may be coordinated by organization or by the "dominance of an idea" (1937, p. 450).

The coordination of work may be accomplished through hierarchy and limiting the span of control—the number of subordinates each supervisor monitors (Gulick, 1937, p. 451). Or coordination may be achieved through the principle of "one master." In military jargon "one master" is unity of command, which was a central issue in the GNA debate. The unity of command issue was based on civilian control of the military and the inherent distrust of a strong, standing military force under unified leadership during peacetime.

Technical efficiency is a third principle to achieve coordination and it is also a second contentious area of the GNA debates. Gulick states

that any organizational structure which brings together in a single unit work divisions which are non-homogeneous in work, in technology, or in purpose will encounter the danger of friction and inefficiency; and...that a

unit based on a given specialization cannot be given technical direction by a layman. (1937, p. 454)

The joint warfare doctrine of the United States brings non-homogeneous work divisions, the Services, into a single work unit, which is led by a member from only one of the Services and is thus seen as a “layman” by some. As a final point on coordination, Gulick warns *caveamus expertum*—beware of the experts. A layman knows he is not an expert and will more readily seek outside assistance, but experts are slower to admit their shortfalls or limitations, according to Gulick (1937, p. 454).

Other insights stem from Gulick’s famous mnemonic, POSDCORB, for the functions of the executive—the head of the organization’s structure. POSDCORB stands for the activities of the executive: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting (1937, p. 457). During the GNA debates, the validity of these activities was not in question, but their execution was challenged. Were the military operational failures of the period due to failures of senior leaders to execute these functions? For our purposes here it is sufficient to understand that these are the functions that may be operating within the components of Kingdon’s policy streams model.

### Herbert Simon

Herbert Simon (1946) refuted the principles approach to administration posited by Gulick as well as those of Wilson (1887) and Weber (1946) with the publication of his “Proverbs of Administration” (see Shafritz, 1985, pp. 437, 497). The following year, *Administrative Behavior*, expanded his attack on conventional decision-making processes and is a seminal work that stands in stark opposition to principles approaches. In “Proverbs,” Simon examined four “accepted administrative principles” and questioned

the validity of each with an emphasis on the human element of social behavior in contrast to the emphasis on concrete behavior (actions) found in Gulick's principles of administration (Simon, 1946). While Simon acknowledges the importance of administrative principles, his basic thesis is that they are too mechanical and do not allow for individual, independent action. In terms of the concrete and subjective meanings of social behavior, Simon's theory actually overstates the role of the hierarchy and principles of administration as controls on concrete social behavior by coloring them as shackles on the subjective nature of social behavior. Simon offers no substitute for the principles he deposes—no underlying rationale or unifying concept to focus the efforts of personnel in an organization. He leaves it for the reader to infer that each individual's judgment in a situation dictates the resultant social behavior. In other words, he offers a theory of relativism to respond to the need for subjective meaning in social behaviors. In fact, if "Proverbs" is read alongside *Administrative Behavior*, one gains an understanding of Simon's underlying challenge to understand and separate facts from values (or at least understand their connections) (Simon, 1976, p. 46 and chapter 3).

Consistent with this fact-value struggle that Simon deals with is the concept of satisficing behavior. According to Simon (1976), satisficing is part of administrative theory which is "the theory of intended and bounded rationality—of the behavior of human beings who *satisfice* because they have not the wits to *maximize*" [emphasis in the original] (p. xxviii). This is not to condemn satisficing, but rather to highlight the limitations of human reasoning in his construct of rational choice (p. xxix).

At the core of Simon's theory of administrative behavior are the concepts of economic man, who maximizes decisions through rational choice, and administrative

man, who satisfices decisions to accommodate the limitations of human rationality (1976, p. xxix). Economic man examines all the information to arrive at a rational decision, analogous to Lindblom's root decision-making model, whereas administrative man recognizes that the world is too complex to analyze comprehensively, so he simplifies the world and chooses to assume that most of the complexities of the world do not impact the decision (Simon, 1976, pp. xxix-xxx). This is similar to Lindblom's successive limited comparison or branch model of decision making. The significance of satisficing is its ability to make sense out of complex decision-making processes. Administrative man is free to choose from a pool of alternatives that may not be all possible alternatives, but administrative man recognizes his limitations for comprehensive analysis and develops "rules of thumb" to make decisions with limited information and alternatives (p. xxx).

#### Frederick Mosher

From the theoretical there is a shift to the practitioner's perspective with Mosher's (1967) examination of public agency reorganization case studies and analysis. Rather than defining a specific model or taxonomy, Mosher describes the characteristics of public organizations undergoing change. Mosher groups his analysis into three broad areas: organizational purpose as a system of tensions; why organizations change, the goals of the change, and the process of change; and participation in reorganization—who decides that reorganization will occur and the extent of the reorganization?

Similar to the later findings of Baumgartner and Leech (1998), Mosher found much of the recent study of organizational change was based on varying units of analysis, assumptions, and theory. The results from previous studies were either too specific or too general, defying testing, generalization, and application (Mosher, 1967, p. 475).

Of interest are several observations made by Mosher. "Public administrative organizations are characteristically established, and their purposes defined, either in broad and general or in narrow and specific terms, outside the organizations themselves" (1967, p. 486). This is certainly the case between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress—Congress defines the DOD. "The organizational purposes of governmental organizations are therefore presumed to be the satisfaction or elimination of needs felt or anticipated outside the organizations themselves" (p. 486). Although some DOD reorganization was internally offered by Secretary Weinberger, these were seen as diversionary efforts to reduce tension from Congressional reorganization actors. "Organizational purposes are multiple in sizable public organizations; and they are complex" (p. 486). This aptly describes the DOD—it is large, complex, and has many organizational purposes (national defense, research, diplomacy, international relief).

Mosher describes organizational change as either incremental or episodic (reorganization), depending on the context (1967, p. 493). Contextual elements include organizational obsolescence, growth, needs, problems, and changes in technology or personnel qualifications (pp. 493-497). Again, arguments could be made for any of these elements being present during the GNA debates. The response to these elements during reorganization is described as a series of stages that mirrors the stages model of the policy process; namely, ignition (problems), studies (policy formulation or alternative specification), decisions (policy selection), implementation, and evaluation (p. 512). In summary, Mosher's work is a methodical and complete analysis of governmental reorganizations that provides insight into components of Kingdon's (1995) policy streams. Mosher's reorganization process mimics the stages model of public policy



analysis and a descriptive framework to understand the processes within the components of Kingdon's model.

### *The Policy Process and Agenda Setting Theory*

Shifting to a policy focus, the policy process is described in many ways from the simple inputs-process-outputs model (Easton, 1957) and Harold Lasswell's stages model to the more complex sub-system approaches, among others (see Parsons, 1995, p. 39). The works discussed below represent but a sample of the numerous models available to study the policy process, beginning with David Easton's "black box" model of the political system.

#### David Easton

David Easton's "black box" or systems model of the political system is well-known. The black box model was first introduced in 1957; Easton continued to develop the idea for many years and produced a series of books elaborating on the basic "black box" model (see Easton 1965a, 1965b, and 1967). Any of these works could serve as a basis to understand the black box concepts—concepts that have parallels in John Kingdon's policy streams approach. Easton arranges his ideas differently than Kingdon, but the elements that compose Kingdon's policy streams model are present in Easton's description of the "black box" political system. For the purposes here, it is sufficient to examine the original publication of the black box model, but first there must be an understanding of the motive behind the model.

In 1951 Easton wrote "The Decline of Modern Political Theory." In it, Easton lamented the state of contemporary political thought, claiming that it was living "parasitically on ideas a century old" and that there was little hope of "the development

of new political syntheses" (1951, p. 36). His objective with this statement was to argue for the development of systematic political theory that encompassed the inseparable facets of factual information and value sets. Easton envisioned a grand political theory born of facts and tempered by values (1951, pp. 36-40). Easton continues his argument by lambasting contemporary political theorists for being historicists—focusing on historical perspectives of political theory rather than establishing a normative view. In short, Easton declared that political theory of the day was stuck in the past with no vision for the future. With each passing day the historical interpretations of political theory moved further and further away from the "practical affairs in political life" and normative theory (1951, p.43).

Underlying Easton's arguments are two propositions: the need for a grand, general political theory that can be systematically investigated, and the inseparability of facts and values in social research. Easton's underlying argument holds that systematic theory is only possible in the presence of a known, acknowledged value set. Values determine the issues researched and the issues on the decision agenda, thereby enabling political theory to address practical political affairs. However, without acknowledging the presence of a specific value set, Easton claims that political theorists have defaulted into relative values and stripped away known reference points (1951, p. 44). In so doing, the development of systemic theory is stymied since the interpretation of the facts and the empirical conclusions drawn are inseparable from and shaped by the value set (p. 45).

In his discourse on the sad state of political theory of the time, Easton repeatedly used the terms "ordered" and "systematic" in association with the type of political theory needed. With his focus on an ordered, systematic political theory, Easton proposed his

own political theory model—the “black box”—based on a systems analysis framework a few years after his “The decline of modern political theory” article.

In “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems” David Easton (1957) unveiled an early picture of his “black box” process model of political theory. He then elaborates on the themes from this article in a series of books, the second one titled *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Easton, 1965). While the 1957 article contains the simplest depiction of his model, the 1965 text greatly amplifies the details of the inner workings of the processes. In the basic model, Easton incorporates the elements that are seen in nearly all grand-political theories from his time forward. These elements are the environment, the inputs—demands and support, the political system where policy decisions are made, and outputs—political decisions and public policies. The entire system is tempered by a feedback loop from the outputs to reenter the system through the inputs. These same elements remain in his later works, although greatly amplified and expanded.

Easton’s quest was to develop a model of political theory that could quantify political behavior so that it could be studied scientifically. In Easton’s words

the specific research tasks...would be to identify the inputs and the forces that shape and change them, to trace the processes through which they are transformed into outputs, to describe the general conditions under which such processes can be maintained, and to establish the relationship between outputs and succeeding inputs of the system. (1957, p. 386)

In short, Easton’s 1957 model encompasses inputs from personnel interactions (demands and support), politics (the system), and policies in an effort to model political behavior.

Inputs to the system come from support of the members who also place demands on the system. Support for the system is required for the system to function and produce authoritative decisions (Easton, 1957, p. 387). Without such cooperation, members would tend to support only the system that produced outcomes they favored. Since no system is likely to produce outcomes that all members favor, mutual cooperation or anarchy are the only alternatives. While support keeps the system functioning, demands are the reason for the system to exist. "The reason why a political system emerges in a society at all—that is, why men engage in political activity—is that demands are being made by persons or groups in society that cannot all be fully satisfied" (p. 387).

Demands on the system are also the first step in the stages approach, typically in the form of problems. This begs one to inquire how demands rise to the attention of the system and how each demand assumes its particular character (Easton, 1957, p. 387). This involves the problem definition and the agenda-setting questions that have become prominent in more recent literature (e.g., Kingdon, 1995; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) and steps in the stages approach.

Easton also differentiates between internal and external demands (1957, pp. 387-388). This differentiation is a key concept within later agenda-setting models (Kingdon, 1995; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). External demands make up the systemic agenda—the agenda held by the media and the public at large. Internal demands result from members seeking to alter the political and power relationships that emerge and may be manifest in modification of political leader recruitment and other political process changes (Easton, 1957, pp. 388-389). Internal demands are not categorized by Kingdon's model as an agenda but are described in his political process stream (1995, Ch. 7).

Easton next asks, "How are demands transformed into issues?" (1957, p. 389). In Kingdon's terms, this question asks how a condition becomes a problem and, like Kingdon, Easton asks how the problem rises on the decision agenda for serious consideration. Easton answers his own question by explaining that demands become issues through the "political skills" and "access" of policy entrepreneurs to policy makers, as well as an understanding of their target "publics" (p. 389).

In elaborating on the role of support for the system, Easton describes the roles of policy entrepreneurs as they operate in "the domain of support" (1957, pp. 390-393). This domain includes the political community, the "rules of the game," and the government. Support for the system is also generated by the outputs of the system and the "politicization" of the members (pp. 395-399). Outputs are the policy decisions of the system. These decisions produce satisfaction in some number of the members, so support is generated by the policy outputs. Likewise, the politicization of the members entails the political maturing of the members and embodies concepts of *quid pro quo* and common understanding among the members of expectations from the system.

As a whole, Easton's ideas were an early attempt to organize and study the multi-variable environment of the political system. The model is named the "black box" model due to the indeterminate processes that convert inputs into outputs—demands into policies. He incorporates political skill, power relationships, and rules of the game as functioning parts of the system, although their precise impact is unknown. In the end, Easton's model provides a means to organize the components of the policy process but tells little about the specifics of how they interact or how processes start.

Roger Cobb & Charles Elder

Roger Cobb and Charles Elder's 1972 study of the agenda process figures prominently in both John Kingdon's 1984 study, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy*, and Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones' 1993 work *Agendas and Instabilities in American Politics*. Cobb and Elder focus on conflict expansion in the political system as they develop a model to understand how issues are created, how they emerge onto the systemic agenda, and how they rise through the governmental agenda to the decision agenda (Parsons, 1995, pp. 127-130; see also Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Cobb & Elder, 1983; Kingdon, 1994). Several of the concepts developed by Cobb and Elder are carried forward, in some cases intact, to Kingdon. For example, Cobb and Elder posit that issues may be created by: group perception of unfairness in resource distribution; groups seeking advantage; unforeseen events; and those seeking to make good public policy (see Parsons, 1995, p. 127). Kingdon describes the motives of policy makers as: satisfying their constituents; improving their political reputation; and the formation of "good public policy" (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 38-39). The similarities to the Cobb and Elder "issue creation" list are unmistakable. Cobb and Elder also focus on the role of the media, which Kingdon downplays (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 60, 67), but Baumgartner and Jones weigh more heavily in their analysis (1993, p. 103 & chapter 6). Thus, Cobb and Elder lay the foundation for later important studies and form a bridge from earlier pluralism models to more current agenda setting models.

Michael Cohen, James March, & Johan Olsen

Another bridge model used by Kingdon is the "garbage can model of institutional choice" developed by Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen (1972) in a journal

article of the same name. Many of the components and ideas of the garbage can model are carried forward by Kingdon into his policy streams model. The garbage can model has four basic variables that are considered as a function of time: streams of problems, solutions, choices, and energy from participants. These relate nicely with the components of Kingdon's version—participants and process streams of problems, policies, and politics (1995), where choices combine with solutions to map to Kingdon's policy primeval soup. It is important to note that the context of the garbage can model discussion places the problem stream chronologically ahead of their other streams—a construct that is important to the application of Kingdon's model to the data in this study (Cohen et al., 1972, pp. 2-3). Further application of the garbage can model to Kingdon's policy streams approach is discussed in the review of Kingdon's model.

Cohen et al., provide further insight into this core basis of the policy streams model. They found eight implications of the garbage can model for decision processes, several which would support incrementalism or satisficing behavior discussions. All eight are not discussed here, but an examination of several will provide insights into the utility of the model. First, the model describes decisions characterized by flight or oversight more often than for problem resolution. In other words, the model is used more when a decision cannot be avoided or when management is heavily involved in oversight of subordinate decisions (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 9). Similarly, the process described by the model is sensitive to loading—large numbers of decisions, important decisions, or both (p. 9). Coupling is noted in the model as policy makers attach themselves to problems and track with them through the choice process (pp. 9-10). A fourth finding characterizes problems in terms of problem activity, problem latency, and decision time.

Problem activity is the amount of time problems are linked to choices without resolving the problem; problem latency is the amount of time problems stay active but are not associated with a solution choice; and decision time is defined by the endurance of choices (some are fleeting) (p. 10).

From this discussion, the authors continue with further findings that relate the process as highly interactive, that important problems tend to get more attention sooner than unimportant problems, that important choices tend not to solve problems as well as unimportant choices, and that the inability to choose occurs most frequently in the extremes—the most important and least important choices (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 11). Cohen, March, and Olsen conclude, “It is clear that the garbage can process does not resolve problems well” (p. 16). This may appear disheartening, but Kingdon does not use the garbage can model as a decision model to resolve problems; rather, he uses it to formulate a model of how issues arise to the attention of decision makers. From this perspective, the findings have insight into the model that Kingdon builds.

Frank Baumgartner & Bryan Jones

*Agendas and Instabilities in American Politics* by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993) provides a robust theory of agenda setting along lines very similar to Kingdon’s policy streams approach. The index cites John Kingdon 15 times, Roger Cobb is cited 12 times, and Charles Elder has 9 citations. Kingdon, Cobb, and Elder are also listed in the preface credits as reviewers of the manuscript. The point is that the punctuated equilibrium model of *Agendas and Instabilities in American Politics* bears many similarities to the work of Kingdon, Cobb, Elder; and Cobb and Elder are cited frequently in Kingdon’s *Agenda, Alternatives, and Public Policy*. The other prominent



theorist found in Baumgartner and Jones' work is E. E. Schattschneider, who also garnered 15 citations (spanning more pages than Kingdon's). The integration of these writers provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the utility of Kingdon's model in the light of understanding the work that preceded his (Cobb & Elder) and that which follows (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).

The agenda-setting model of *Agendas and Instabilities* characterizes the policy process as one with long periods of stability "punctuated" by dramatic policy change during periods of instability—hence, the "punctuated equilibria" label (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, pp. 3-4). *Agendas and Instabilities* approaches agenda setting and policy formulation from an institutional view considering how policy issues are portrayed (policy image) and the institutional venues for change. The objective of the study is to understand the issue definition process. The authors view issue definition as central to political and economic resource allocation in American politics. In the American political system, resources are allocated according to the "attention by its government and private elites" (p. 24).

The punctuated equilibrium model is compelling because of its broad theoretical base and methodology. Baumgartner and Jones incorporate a Madison-Truman type of interest group activity as well as Schattschneider's and Lowi's concerns about the biased representation of economic class in interests groups (the flaw in the pluralist heaven). They also consider a number of other theory-based factors that may impact the attention of government officials and private elites. Their methodology examined several policy areas over an extended period of time (90 years), using both a cross-sectional and longitudinal approach (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, chapter 3). This methodology avoids

the pitfalls of single topic and short duration studies and embodies Richard Rose's approach for learning across time and space (1993).

### John Kingdon

The policy streams model is based on the traditional stages model of the policy process and has five major components—the problem, policy, and politics process streams; a policy window; and participants. The model employs an intertwined and complex taxonomy for the purpose of examining agenda setting in a pluralist political system. For example, Kingdon identifies three different agendas and uses two sets of taxonomy in his discussion. In short, Kingdon's model depicts the flow of problems, solutions, and political factors as largely separate streams until they are coupled by participants in what is perceived as a window of opportunity or a policy window. In this policy window a policy alternative is seen to have an opportunity of being enacted.

Kingdon's model simultaneously contains elements of "order and disorder" in an effort to accommodate the complexity of human political interaction (Mucciaroni, 1992, p. 460). The content of the policy streams model is detailed in chapter III so it will not be elaborated here. However, it is important to understand the basis of the model from the origin of ideas (as Kingdon sees it) and its foundation in the literature. Kingdon begins with a discussion of the origin of ideas. He then presents his interpretation of the rational-comprehensive and incrementalism decision-making models before homing in on the "garbage can" model of organizational decision making from which his policy streams model is derived.

### *Origins*

At the outset, Kingdon foreshadows his conclusions on origins by opening with the following statement: "A concentration on the origins of initiatives does not make for very complete theory about agenda setting or alternative specification" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 71). With this statement Kingdon does not completely dismiss the importance of origins, but he does minimize the uniqueness of specific ideas. Central to Kingdon's view are three concerns related to ideas. The first, ideas can come from anywhere, implies that policy makers, interest groups, and government officials are *not* the only sources for ideas. He furthermore states that finding the source of an idea leads to infinite regression and is, therefore, less important than the fact that the idea exists. Third, he posits that no single group of participants consistently leads the others in idea generation.

*Ideas can come from anywhere.*

Echoing the sentiments of his respondents, Kingdon states that ideas come from unlimited sources, but the source is not as important as the receptivity of the target—policy and decision makers in government (1995, p. 71) who may be more receptive to an idea because of the context that generated the new idea. Kingdon's emphasis is on understanding change, not in determining source: "The key to understanding policy change is not where the idea came from but what made it take hold and grow. It *is* critical that an idea starts somewhere, and that it becomes diffused in the community of people who deal with a given policy domain" (p. 72).

*Infinite regress.*

The theme that stresses the importance of the idea over its source is brought into focus with an argument of infinite regress. "When one starts to trace the history of a proposal or concern back through time, there is no logical place to stop the process" (Kingdon, 1995, p.73). To Kingdon, proposals do not have a point of origin—there is no logical place to stop the process of looking further back. However, Kingdon continues, "You'll always find that things have their start somewhere else. People don't sit down and think up whole new approaches in a flash of insight. They borrow from somewhere else" (p. 73). This is not a surprising conclusion from a social scientist since much of social science theory (if not all) is formed as Kingdon describes—threads and ideas are borrowed and combined into new formulations. Some consider this perspective one of "new wine in old bottles" since it minimizes the importance of an originating source for an idea.

*Nobody leads anybody else.*

Kingdon originally designed his study to "track the movement of items from one category of respondents to another in the policy community" in order to discern subject area leaders (1995, p. 73). If a pattern of items appeared early in interviews from a number of respondents from the same participant category, then those participants might be subject area leaders. However, "it turns out that there are no leaders, at least not consistently across many possible subjects" (p. 73). Kingdon's empirical analysis reveals that

[T]opics do not seem to move around in these policy communities from one type of participant to another with any regular pattern. No category of

participant consistently discusses subjects ahead of others, and no category participates disproportionately when the subject is hot. When subjects hit the agenda, they seem to hit all participants roughly equally. Whole communities are affected simultaneously across the board. (p. 76)

Thus, no one community leads the others, and by extension, no one participant group leads the others in idea generation.

*Combinations and fertile soil.*

Kingdon attempts to build his case for the complexity of agenda setting and alternative specification by describing the convergence of many factors to move an item onto the systemic agenda and onward to the decision agenda. The fragmented structure of American government is cited as a primary factor moving items up and down the agenda hierarchy. In Kingdon's words, "The founders deliberately designed a constitutional system to be fragmented, incapable of being dominated by any one actor" (1995, p. 76). This statement reflects the political theory foundations laid in *The Federalist Papers*. Thus, the fragmented design of American government and the interests of many participants cause ideas to combine and seek "fertile soil." In sum, Kingdon is focused on understanding the joint effect of multiple variables coming together at once with an emphasis on why ideas take root and flourish rather than the source of the ideas (p. 77).

*Comprehensive, Rational Decision Making*

Rational-comprehensive decision making is a methodical and complete assessment of factors and alternatives in order to select the best course of action (Shafritz, 1985, p. 460). In practice, decision makers provided with a clearly defined problem

would set down a list of measurable goals and alternatives to achieve them to resolve the problem. They would compare the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of each alternative and select the one with the least cost that offers the greatest benefits. However, human cognitive abilities are not up to this level of decision making: "The ability of human beings to process information is more limited than such a comprehensive approach would prescribe" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 78). Kingdon does not go into depth but cites studies by March and Simon [*Organization*, 1958], Charles Lindblom ['The Science of Muddling Through', 1959], and Aaron Wildavsky [*The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, 1979] that more closely resemble reality. The stages model emerges in the discussion as a compromise of the ideal to approximate reality, but Kingdon states: "neat stages do not describe these processes very well" (1995, p. 78). While there are times that decision-making processes closely resemble the rational comprehensive model, taken as a whole, "a rational comprehensive model does not describe very well the processes under investigation in this book" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 79).

### *Incrementalism*

Lindblom's response to writings which implied "that a rational-comprehensive model either is or should be used in governmental policy making" was incrementalism made popular in his "Science of 'Muddling Through'" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 79).

Incrementalism suggests that issues are not addressed from a blank sheet of paper, but rather they are addressed by incremental adjustments to current policies. The benefits of such an approach are several. Marginal—incremental—changes do not require drastic changes at the implementation end of public policy, but rather more minor adjustments to the status quo. Similarly, goal development is less complicated and more rapid. The

status quo can also be compared more readily with minor changes as described by these new, incrementally different goals. Finally, minor adjustments lend themselves to programs that are manageable for implementation. Rather than budget from the ground up each year, federal agencies use last year's budget as a baseline and make adjustments. Areas that need more funding because of greater expenses than expected have their budgets moved upward while programs that did not need or use all of the funds allotted in the previous year have their budgets reduced (p. 79). Kingdon discounts the operation of incrementalism in his model (p. 79). However, incremental change can significantly shape outcomes in the long-term—a concept Kingdon does not address.

For example, the federal highway funds originally paid only for new construction of highways and left the expense of maintenance up to the states. Over time, as the new highways began to deteriorate and need greater maintenance funding, the federal government gradually redefined the term "construction" to include activities more traditionally known as maintenance, such as replacement, rehabilitation, resurfacing, and bridge repair. Each addition was made incrementally, rather than all at once. This is the positive side of the "slippery slope" of government action. However, Kingdon concludes that incrementalism does not "describe agenda change" very well—based on his empirical results. An incremental approach would imply a gradual growth of interest in change for an agenda item rather than the sudden interest noted in the interviews and case studies (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 80-83). Kingdon does not discount the presence of incremental processes, but he does not provide sufficient longitudinal data to support his conclusion that "sudden spikes" in interest are incremental (see Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, for an example of longitudinal policy analysis). Using a very broad definition of

incremental change specific to his data, Kingdon found that 71 percent of the changes were non-incremental:

If we were to call a change nonincremental if either it is 40 percent or higher or it takes place over one year, 53 of the 75 variables (71 percent) would be classified as non-incremental changes. The reader can invert other definitions to suit his or her taste. (p. 82)

Thus, neither a search for origins, comprehensive rational decision making, or incrementalism describes the processes observed by Kingdon.

#### *The Garbage Can Model*

Kingdon noted a similarity of his data to the general contours of the garbage can model proposed by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972). The garbage can model is the basis of Kingdon's model that he then alters to fit his observations of the federal government and the policy process (1995, p. 84). What follows is a synopsis of Kingdon's analysis of the garbage can model. It is important to understand Kingdon's analysis of the model here since it is the foundation of his policy streams model.

The garbage can model is based on an organized anarchy. In fact, the original study used universities as the organization of analysis since universities and organized anarchies share problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation (Kingdon, 1995, p. 84). Problematic preferences consider that people often fail to clearly define specific goals, sometimes intentionally so as to facilitate what is being sought. This "fuzzing over" of goals is a strategy used in politics to great advantage and serves to illuminate preferences over the long term through the actions of the participants (p. 84).



Unclear technology is not a high-tech, modern problem. Rather, unclear technology is the inability of an organized anarchy's members to understand their organization. "They may know their jobs, and the organization as a whole may get along rather well, but its members have only fragmentary and rudimentary understandings of why they are doing what they are doing and how their jobs fit into a more general picture of the organization" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 84). This lack of a shared general picture of the organization produces operations characterized by trial and error. In such a system it is easy to imagine personnel drifting into and out of decision-making billets depending on the success of their trials and the forgiveness of their errors. Thus, the participation in organized anarchies is "rather fluid" (p. 84). Kingdon continues the analogy to suggest that organized anarchy is how the federal government appears at face value.

People disagree about what they want government to accomplish, and often are obliged to act before they have the luxury of defining their preferences precisely. They often do not know how to accomplish what they want to accomplish, even if they can define their goals. People also do not necessarily understand the organization of which they are a part: the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing. Participation is definitely fluid. Even within a relatively hierarchical bureaucracy, some people take on an importance that is not commensurate with their formal role, and others are impotent despite considerable powers on paper (Kingdon, 1995, p 85).

The garbage can model then describes four separate streams that run through such organizations: problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. Each of these streams operates independently of the others: "As Cohen, March, and Olsen say, this kind of organization 'is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings

looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 85). There are also participants drifting in and out of decision-making billets, each with their own paradigm and set of ideas to match to problems. The “choice opportunity” is characterized as

A garbage can into which various kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated. The mix of garbage in a single can depends on the mix of cans available, on the labels attached to the alternative cans, on what garbage is currently being produced, and on the speed with which garbage is collected and removed from the scene. (p. 85).

The outcomes of this garbage can mixture depend on the contents of the cans (the problems, solutions, participants, and resources) and how the garbage is processed. In layman’s terms, these processes describe a model where the logic is “if it ain’t broke, find something that is” and then fix it with the tools you have.

At any rate, the logical structure of such a model is (1) the flow of fairly separate streams through the system, and (2) outcomes heavily dependent on the coupling of the streams—coupling of solutions to problems; interactions among participants; the fortuitous or purposeful absence of solutions, problems, or participants—in the choices (the garbage cans) that must be made (Kingdon, 1995, p. 86). Consistent with the review of the garbage can model above, the process does not appear to be rational, comprehensive, or incremental since “People work on problems only when a particular combination of problem, solution, and participants in a choice situation makes it

possible" (p. 85). However, Kingdon's interest in the Cohen et al. model is for its processes that describe the movement of issues to agendas, not as a decision making model per se. From this garbage can model Kingdon developed the policy streams model.

### *Conclusion*

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that Kingdon's model touches upon key concepts from political science and public administration as a foundation for an examination of the policy process and development of his agenda-setting model known as policy streams. Chapter III examines the policy streams model in detail following the flow and organization of Kingdon's 1994 edition of *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. The analysis includes not only the basic policy streams model, but also highlights areas of fuzzy definitions and ties the model to other theories discussed above. This is done in preparation for testing the model's applicability to a new policy area—defense reorganization as embodied in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

### III. THE POLICY STREAMS APPROACH

#### *Introduction to Policy Streams*

This study applies John Kingdon's (1995) policy streams model to defense organization policy by examining the events, activities, and debates that led to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA). However, Kingdon's model is not ready-made to study the policy process. Kingdon describes the policy streams model in some detail, but his theory contains gaps, vague elements, and under-defined terms that require work before it can be used.

In *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies* John Kingdon begins with one simple question, "How does an idea's time come?" In this context, an idea is a public policy and its time has come when the policy is passed into law. With this question in mind, Kingdon develops a theory of agenda setting and alternative selection, known as the policy streams model, that is based on the stages model of the policy process (Parsons, 1995, pp. 23-25, and 77-81) and the "garbage can" model of organizational choice (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972).

The policy streams model is based on the traditional stages model of the policy process and is commonly discussed in terms of four components—the problem, policy, and politics process streams, and the policy window. To this list is added a fifth component—participants. Kingdon devotes 50 of 230 pages to participants in his book; therefore participants are significant and considered as a fifth component in his model. The model employs an intertwined and complex taxonomy for the purpose of examining

agenda setting in a pluralist political system. For example, Kingdon identifies three different agendas and uses two sets of taxonomy in his discussion. In short, Kingdon's model depicts the flow of problems, solutions, and political factors as largely separate streams until they are coupled by participants in what is perceived as a window of opportunity or a policy window. In this policy window a policy alternative is seen to have an opportunity of being enacted. In Kingdon's words

The separate streams of problems, policies, and politics come together at certain critical times. Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favorable political forces. This coupling is most likely when policy windows—opportunities for pushing pet proposals or conception of problems—are open. (1995, p. 20)

From this word picture Kingdon develops supporting arguments and elements for each of the components. Before discussing these elements a brief discussion of the underlying policy theory—the stages model—is in order.

The stages model of the policy process is attributed to the combination of individual works from Harold Lasswell, Herbert Simon, and David Easton (Parsons, 1995, p. 24). Although the stages model has many forms, the central tenet is conceptualizing the policy process as “a cycle or sequence composed of analytically distinct sets of activities” (Cobb & Elder, 1981, p. 395). Wayne Parsons (1995, p. 77) depicts the stages process as a circle of processes—stages—in a continuous flow, beginning with the interjection of a problem. Participants in the policy process then define the problem, identify alternatives, and evaluate the policy options. From the

policy options, policy makers select an alternative to implement. Policy implementation is followed by evaluation to complete the first cycle of the model.

The stages model, by its name, implies that public policy proceeds through a series of discrete steps—from agenda setting to policy termination—in its life cycle. However, it is widely recognized that the public policy process in practice does not follow neat, sequential steps. Hence, the caveat of the stages approach—the stages are not discrete or necessarily sequential. If the policy evaluation stage determines that the policy is not addressing the problem as desired, the process repeats itself through the stages again. But if the problem is redefined during any of the subsequent stages, the process may restart itself without completing intervening stages or without stopping other stages already started, such as implementation. For example, the problem may have changed before implementation ever began, or new policy options may present themselves after implementation has begun. Thus, each stage can be thought of as being active in the policy process all the time. The stages model thus provides a means to analyze and discuss the complex and continuous policy processes within the life cycle of a public policy being executed by numerous participants.

With these remarks in mind, Kingdon's policy streams model focuses on the policy formation stage of the stages model where agenda setting and alternative specification typically occur, stopping short of the processes required to pass legislation. However, the enactment of a bill is Kingdon's measure of success for determining when "an idea's time has come." If a bill is passed, the three streams must have converged in a policy window, facilitated by the actions of participants, to enact new public policy.

Thus, Kingdon does not technically consider the enactment of legislation, nor does he consider implementation or evaluation in his model.

The purpose of Kingdon's model is to understand how the governmental agenda was set and why one alternative was selected over another, and yet others were not even considered. To pursue this line of inquiry, four general questions shaped Kingdon's study. "How do subjects come to officials' attention? How are the alternatives from which they choose generated? How is the governmental agenda set? Why does an idea's time come when it does?" (Kingdon, 1995, p. xi). After four years of research, including 247 interviews of participants from inside and outside of government, Kingdon concludes that public policy is the result of policy participants' efforts to couple the three streams—problems, policies, and politics—in a window of opportunity where they are then able to transform ideas into acceptable alternatives that become public policies.

Kingdon ended his original study (1984) with the challenge to extend the model to public policy arenas beyond the two examined in the original research—transportation and health care. For the second edition of *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy*, Kingdon extended his model to economic policy through two case studies—the Reagan administration budget of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986—as well as a new look at health care policy using the Clinton administration's health care reform efforts of 1993. Kingdon concluded the policy streams model of his 1984 edition to be "accurate and useful" as a "general theory of agenda setting, alternative specification, and policy making" (1995, pp. xiii, 221). Thus, the policy streams concepts were successfully expanded to a new policy area (economic policy) and examined across time (health care in the 1970's and 1990's), according to Kingdon (1995, p. 221).

Table 3.1: Primary Policy Streams Terms, Definitions, &amp; Synonyms

Term	Definition	Synonyms
Alternatives	The set of choices available for a specific issue on the decision agenda (Kingdon, 1995, p. 4)	Choices, proposals
Policy (1)	A specific alternative, choice, or proposal put forth for serious consideration in an authoritative decision process (see Parsons, 1995, pp. 13-14)	Bill, legislation, amendment, or "solution" (Kingdon)
Policy (2)	The combination of public law and the manner in which the law is implemented or the "attempt to define and structure a rational basis for action or inaction" (see Parsons, 1995, pp. 13-14).	"Policy" is not used with this meaning in this study.
Public policy	The alternative, choice, or proposal that is selected by an authoritative choice process (Shafritz, 1985, p. 452)	Public law
Public policy making	"a set of processes, including at least (1) the setting of the agenda, (2) the specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made, (3) an authoritative choice among those specified alternatives, as in a legislative vote or a presidential decision, and (4) the implementation of the decision" (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 2-3)	The policy process
Agenda	The set of all conceivable subjects or problems to which officials <i>could be</i> paying attention (Kingdon, 1995, p. 3)	Non-governmental or Systemic agenda
Governmental agenda	The set of all conceivable subjects or problems to which officials <i>are</i> paying attention. The governmental agenda is a subset of the systemic agenda. (Kingdon, 1995, p. 4)	Formal agenda Policy agenda
Decision agenda	The set of issues pending active decision by an authoritative choice process. The decision agenda is a subset of the governmental agenda (Kingdon, 1995, p. 4)	Choice opportunity (Cohen, March, & Olsen)

### General Terms and Definitions

Having laid the groundwork behind Kingdon's work, it is now appropriate to examine the terms and concepts that define the policy streams model in some detail. The policy streams model describes why an idea's time comes when it does by mapping the activities of participants in three processes—problem recognition, policy generation, and politics—and the coupling of these processes to create a policy window of opportunity for the serious consideration of a policy alternative by policy making officials. Within this general description of the policy streams model are a number of terms that require definition. Table 3.1 summarizes the primary terms and definitions that Kingdon uses in



his policy streams model alongside the synonyms that he also uses for each term. A discussion of these primary terms follows, beginning with public policy making.

### Public Policy Making

Kingdon defines public policy making as: "a set of processes, including at least (1) the setting of the agenda, (2) the specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made, (3) an authoritative choice among those specified alternatives, as in a legislative vote or a presidential decision, and (4) the implementation of the decision" (1995, pp. 2-3). The resemblance to the stages model is obvious. Kingdon's concern is only the first two processes: "We seek to understand why some subjects become prominent on the policy agenda and others do not, and why some alternatives for choice are seriously considered while others are neglected" (p. 3).

### Policy and Public Policy

Two additional terms with multiple meanings from the definition of "public policy making" are "policy" and "public policy." As used by Kingdon, "policy" is synonymous with "alternative" and "public policy" is the alternative that is selected by "an authoritative choice" process. This is consistent with definitions offered by Jay Shafritz (1985) in *The Facts on File Dictionary of Public Administration* (pp. 410, 452). In some usages policy emphasizes the actions taken to enforce a position over the statement of position. For example, when government makes an authoritative choice (enacts a legislative bill into law—a public policy) but does not implement or enact the law, the government is said to actually have a policy contrary to the law. As used in this study, "policy" refers to an alternative choice (legislative bill) or law and does not include consideration of implementation or enforcement.

Taking these definitions a bit further, alternatives are the set of choices available for a specific issue on the decision agenda (Kingdon, 1995, p. 4). Kingdon emphasizes that alternatives are separate from, but aligned with, issues on the decision agenda and he further breaks down alternatives into two sub-categories. Conceivable alternatives are the set of all ideas that can be intelligently constructed and conveyed to policy makers whereas the seriously considered alternatives are a subset of the conceivable alternatives. Before alternatives can be seriously considered, they must be culled from the list of conceivable alternatives by passing five tests—technical feasibility, value acceptability, tolerable cost, public acquiescence, and receptivity among elected decision makers (p. 4 and chapter 6).

### Agendas

Agenda is a commonly used term with multiple meanings. The public policy making definition above includes the terms “agenda” and “alternative” which require further clarification for use in this discussion. For Kingdon, the agenda is “the set of *all* conceivable subjects or problems to which officials *could* be paying attention” (emphasis added) (Kingdon, 1995, p. 3). This is referred to later as the non-governmental or “systemic” agenda using Cobb’s and Elder’s (1972) terminology. From the systemic agenda, the list of subjects or problems that government officials *do* pay attention to is the governmental or policy agenda (p. 4). Kingdon later refers to this as the “formal” agenda by again invoking the Cobb and Elder taxonomy. Kingdon identifies a subset of the governmental/policy/formal agenda as the decision agenda. The decision agenda is the list of problems or subjects on “the governmental agenda that are up for an active decision” by decision makers (p. 4).

In short, the distinction between the “agendas” Kingdon describes focuses on the cognitive activity of governmental decision-makers. The list of all conceivable issues is the systemic or non-governmental agenda, whereas the list of systemic agenda issues that garner the attention of government officials is the governmental/policy/formal agenda, and the list of issues pending decision by governmental officials is the decision agenda. The governmental agenda is not homogeneous throughout the branches, agencies, and levels of government. Each branch, agency, or level of government may have focus on different items in a shared governmental agenda or have widely differing formal agendas (Kingdon, 1995, p. 3).

### *Policy Streams’ Components and Elements*

The policy streams model is commonly discussed in terms of four components—the problem, policy, and politics process streams, and the policy window. To this list is added a fifth component—participants. Kingdon devotes 50 of 230 body-text pages to participants in his book; therefore participants are significant and considered as a fifth component in his model. Figure 3.1 represents one possible depiction of Kingdon’s model. Participants are present in all three streams.


### *The Problem Stream*

Kingdon does not provide a succinct definition of the problem stream but defines it in a lengthy discussion of terms that include conditions, problems, indicators, focusing events, crises, and symbols. As Kingdon puts it, conditions become problems “when we come to believe that we should do something about them” (1995, p. 109). Broadly interpreted, the problem stream is the collection of problems that policy makers believe they should address with public policy (Kingdon, 1995, chapter 5; Parsons, 1995, p. 193).

But if problems are conditions that someone feels should be addressed, then what drew attention to the condition and what criteria establish the condition as a problem?

Kingdon explains that policy makers notice conditions through mechanisms of indicators, focusing events, crises, or symbols.

*Figure 3.1: Policy Streams Model as Venn Diagram*



### *Indicators*

Indicators are generally statistical data that measure activity and occurrence of specific behaviors, such as automobile accident rates, disease rates, and the consumer price index. When the change in an indicator exceeds a threshold, attention is focused on the indicator. The threshold is determined by a value set that defines in advance how much is too much, too little, too far, etc. and thus warrants closer attention. Indicator measurements that do not exceed these thresholds are not attended to whereas indicators that do exceed thresholds draw attention. Thus, indicators have a numerical basis (ideally) and a value basis for interpretation of the numerical data (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 91-94).

Indicators do not exist in isolation; they are created for specific purposes and monitored by specific offices in the government. Paralleling these numerical indicators are additional feedback methods for monitoring the progress of policy to address conditions and solve problems. Systematic program monitoring from within, alongside, and outside analysis, academics and researchers provide one additional feedback channel. Complaints and casework loads may serve as another feedback channel and the direct observations of bureaucrats may serve as yet a third. Furthermore, the content of the feedback is broken into four categories: administrative misinterpretation of legislative intent; failure to meet stated or legislated goals; the rising cost of a program; and unintended consequences (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 102-103). Budgets are a special feedback category as government finances are always in the public's eye.

#### *Focusing Events, Crises, and Symbols*

Not everything is monitored with an indicator, nor is policy making comprised of things that can always be counted. Thus, some conditions require focusing events in the form of crises, disasters, and symbols to draw the attention of policy makers (Kingdon, 1995, p. 94). Of course, an event is only a crisis or a disaster when an event has been interpreted according to a value set, just as with indicators; however, Kingdon does not provide a description of the threshold between an event and a focusing event. He does offer two criteria, deduced from his interviews, to make the distinction between event and crisis. The first criterion is the visibility of the policy area. "The more visible the policy domain, the less important are crisis and disasters" (p. 95). The second criterion is the "basic unit" of the policy domain. For example, in health care the basic unit is the

doctor-patient relationship whereas in transportation the basic unit is the conveyance or system (such as buses, trains, aircraft, etc.) (pp. 95-96).

*Table 3.2: Event or Crisis Test*

	Small basic unit of policy area	Large basic unit of policy area
Low visibility of policy area (High sensitivity)	Event / Crisis	Crisis
High visibility for policy area (Low sensitivity)	Event	Event / Crisis

In sum, an event in a low-visibility policy domain where the basic unit is large will elevate to crisis or disaster status more quickly than events with smaller basic units in more visible policy domains. However, a great deal of gray remains in defining large and small basic units and the visibility of the policy domain. Table 3.2 summarizes Kingdon's focusing event or crisis logic. The three labels are increasing in strength from event to event/crisis to crisis as the probability of an event becoming a crisis increases according to the visibility and basic unit of the policy area (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 94-98).

Kingdon offers "variations on the focusing event" as additional criteria to account for some of this gray (1995, pp. 96-97). At one extreme is a major event—a media lead story—that blankets out other events on the agenda and demands attention. It is not a crisis, but could be an indicator of impending crisis or a symbol deemed important to the public. At the other end are "potential agenda items [that] languish in the background for lack of a crisis that would push them forward" (p. 96). White-collar corruption in the corporate world is one recent example. The Enron collapse in 2002 was stunning by the sheer size of the financial losses, but the need for government action was unclear since

much of the activity was already illegal. Government action, in the form of investigations and new legislation, soon followed amidst a background of public outcry and political posturing. The Enron collapse thus provides an example of a variation on the focusing event by bringing senior business executives to account for corporate actions. Subsequent public scrutiny revealed major financial irregularities at Tyco and WorldCom, converting the Enron collapse into a symbol of corporate greed. Similarly, the ongoing investigation and indictment against Martha Stewart for insider trading provides a household name as a symbol of greed among corporate executives.

### *Accompanying Factors*

Another set of criteria for evaluating focusing events, crises, disasters and symbols are the accompanying factors. These include the preexistent perception of a problem, "early warning," and proximity of events (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 98-99). Preexistent perceptions of a problem are not quantified, but are described as the existence of a problem "in the back of people's minds" (p. 98). When a focusing event brings attention to a policy domain, these perceptions latch on and may elevate the event to the governmental agenda. Likewise, a tragedy may occur that serves as a warning of deeper or more widespread problems—an early warning—or the tragedy is dismissed as a fluke. However, if a tragedy or focusing event is closely followed by another of similar composition, then the events cannot be dismissed as flukes so easily.

The above discussion essentially reveals how an event or condition rises to prominence and gains attention—attention sufficient to make someone believe something should be done to alter the condition. However, what criteria establish the condition as a problem has not been fully addressed.

Kingdon provides three criteria to establish why a condition is a problem (1995, pp. 110-112). The first criterion is the value set of the observer, such as one's political views (liberal or conservative), religious views, personal values, etc. and how those views are prioritized. However, this assumes that a condition exists in some form of isolation when reality suggests otherwise. Thus, the second criterion is the comparison of performance or relative performance of a program. If equality and equity are high-priority values, then program comparisons that reveal inequality and inequity will be defined as problems. Third, the label or category that is assigned to a problem impacts how the problem is received by others and perceived by the public.

The problem stream is the heart of the policy streams model, although Kingdon does not recognize it as such. From the context of his chapter on the problem stream it is apparent that conditions precede problems and problems—or “the fixing of attention” on a specific condition—is central to agenda setting, which is the basis for Kingdon's research (1995, p. 115). In sum, the problem stream is composed of those conditions that have been defined as problems by participants according to their values, comparisons, and classifications (p. 114). Additional conditions exist, but they have not garnered the attention of participants and are thus not defined as problems or included in Kingdon's problem stream.

### The Policy Stream: Policies and Primeval Soup

The second major component of the policy streams model is the policy stream—from which the complete model takes its name. As suggested by the closing of the previous section, Kingdon emphasizes the policy stream in his discussion. His word picture of a “policy primeval soup” invokes Darwinian theory and evolutionary time



scales inseparably linked to the brewing of policies. At the same time, policy “streams” invokes a picture of continuously flowing policy. Although Kingdon tends to use these concepts interchangeably, they are not the same. The policy primeval soup is analogous to a wellspring, using his word picture, where the policy stream is the stream that flows from the wellspring. With this considered, Kingdon explains the policy primeval soup in terms of four elements—policy communities, primeval soup, criteria for survival, and the short list of ideas (1995, chapter 6).

As with the problem stream, Kingdon does not provide a succinct definition of the policy stream but provides several paragraphs describing the elements in terms of various criteria. For Kingdon’s model, ideas exist in the minds of various policy making participants and these ideas “float around” among other participants in that policy area where ideas recombine and change (1995, p. 117). The continued survival of ideas depends upon overcoming obstacles (criteria for survival) in order to gain sufficient prominence to emerge on the short list of ideas as a contender for matching up with a problem from the problem stream (p. 117). The persistence of an idea also tends to “soften up” policy makers and “larger publics” to the general acceptance of the idea as policy (pp. 117, 127-128). With this basic conceptualization of the policy stream, an examination of each of these elements is needed, beginning with policy communities.

### *Policy Communities*

Policy communities are composed of policy “specialists” who share a common interest in a given policy area (Kingdon, 1995, p. 117). In the primeval soup analogy, these specialists are the substance of the primeval soup and include Congressional committee staff members, bureaucrats, academics, researchers, consultants, and interest

groups—all of which are among the categories of participants described by Kingdon at the outset of *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy* and described in detail under separate headings. The policy community is characterized by two main criteria beginning with a shared concern in one specific policy area such as health care or transportation (p. 117). From this shared concern, interactions and relationships develop between specialists which provide communications channels for ideas (p. 117).

Each policy community is further characterized by the degree of fragmentation within the community. Fragmentation reflects the integration of interests within the policy area. The degree of fragmentation within a policy community carries with it several consequences that can impact the policies of shared concern. These consequences include policy fragmentation whereby the successes of one policy sub-community come at the expense of another policy sub-community from the same policy area (Kingdon, 1995, p. 119). A second consequence of fragmentation is the development of different languages and paradigms within the general policy area, such that words have different meanings and perspectives are significantly shifted from one sub-area to the next (pp. 119-120). The third consequence is instability. Kingdon's argument suggests greater fragmentation results in greater paradigm variance, which leads to "greater susceptibility to crisis...[that] leaves the agenda free to shift from one time to another in a more volatile fashion" (pp. 120-121).

### *Primeval Soup*

The second element of the primeval soup is the broth which enables the flow of ideas within the policy community. Policy specialists "float" their ideas amongst each other, through discussions over lunch, publication in professional journals, reports from

special studies, etc. A select group of specialists within each community, labeled policy entrepreneurs, see incentives in the promotion of an idea and become important to its prominence. Policy entrepreneurs are idea advocates who distinguish themselves by “their willingness to invest their resources—time, energy reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope of a future return” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 122). The future return may be the promotion of personal interest, personal values, or the sheer thrill of “the game.” Kingdon’s personal interests map to James Q. Wilson’s (1973) “material” incentives of direct, personal, concrete gain while personal values align with Wilson’s (1973) “purposive” incentives, or ideology-based policy ideas (cited in Kingdon, 1995, p. 123).

As ideas float about the primeval soup, the shape and content of the ideas change. Kingdon dismisses the importance of the origin of the idea preferring to concentrate on its content, arguing that new policy ideas are the result of the recombination of previous ideas rather than the sudden emergence of an entirely new entity (1995, p. 124). This explains why “‘there is no new thing under the sun,’ at the very same time change and innovation are being observed” (p. 124). It is again important to state that how “idea” is defined determines what is and is not a new idea. Taken to the extreme, mankind has either never had a creative thought or everything is highly creative. Since we are all neither rocks nor Einstein truth must lie in between. New ideas are generated and old ideas reformulated. Kingdon does not account for this and truncates his definition of ideas to a short-term perspective that emphasizes reformulating ideas.

Once an idea has recombined sufficiently, Kingdon characterizes the strength of the idea, based on its content, as more important than the pressure of those promoting the idea. As Victor Hugo posits and Kingdon cites, “Greater than the tread of mighty armies

is an idea whose time has come" (1995, p. 1). Even when an idea's time does come, it must overcome several additional hurdles. The idea must become part of the "intellectual puzzle" that relates to the politics of policy making and it must also capture the interest of a decision making audience through the natural appeal of the subject matter to decision makers. In the process of promoting an idea and looking for interest, two caveats are noted. First, the policy entrepreneurs who advocate for a policy tend to oversell a policy, perhaps in preemption of the tendency for honesty to kill an idea (i.e. admitting a policy should work, but it might not) (p. 127). The second caveat is to beware of the novelty of the subject to wear off, causing the idea to lose its luster and appeal (p. 127).

The final characteristic of the primeval soup is the softening up of the policy decision makers and those that influence them. The soup analogy here is particularly direct. Just as a simmering broth softens the substance of the soup, policy entrepreneurs push and prod the ideas they have selected in order to gain awareness and acceptance, even if the politics do not support the idea currently, the intention is to make the idea viable when the policy makers see the need (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 128-129). In other words, softening makes the policy soup more digestible to policy makers.

#### *Criteria for Survival*

Closely associated with the softening up of policy decision makers are several "criteria for survival," which comprise the third element of the primeval soup. Before an idea can rise to prominence, it must survive against intense scrutiny and competing ideas. Kingdon identifies three criteria for survival in this environment of scrutiny and competition—technical feasibility, value acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints.

The technical feasibility criterion is most closely associated with the implementation of the idea should it be passed into law (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 131-132). The thrust of this criterion is making sure the details have been thought through so that the idea can survive additional scrutiny during the formal legislative process of hearings, committee debates, and floor votes. This does not guarantee that a program implemented from the idea will work as advertised, only that a concerted effort was made to cover as many contingencies as possible ahead of time (p. 132).

The second criterion for survival of an idea is value acceptability, namely, the values embodied in the idea correlate with the values of the specialists that advocate the idea (Kingdon, 1995, p. 132-133). Several dimensions further describe value acceptability. These include the placement of the idea on the liberal—conservative spectrum, how the idea fits into proponents' views of the proper role of government, and concepts of equity and efficiency in public policy (p. 133). One view of policy efficiency describes it as a cost-benefit analysis of policy implementation (pp. 136-137). While policy efficiency is generally sold to the public in cost-benefit terms, one respondent noted, "For a politician, the costs are the benefits" (p. 137). This highlights the tension between doing what is right for the country (the long view) and what is right for the constituency (the short view) with an eye on re-election.

As two final criteria, Kingdon singles out two dimensions—budgetary constraints and public acceptance—and labels them "anticipation of future constraints" (1995, p. 137). These dimensions fit the description of technical feasibility above but are considered more important than other dimensions, perhaps because they may be "show stoppers" in the survival of an idea. Decision makers must weigh the costs of the

program and the perceptions of their constituency in deciding on a proposal. The costs and public acceptance dimension boil down to mathematics. "You need eight votes in subcommittee, fifteen in full committee, and fifty-one on the floor" in order to get a bill through the Senate (p. 139). If the cost of a program or the acceptance of the public to the idea is missing, the votes for a bill to survive the formal legislative process will likely not be there either (p. 139).

### *The Short List of Ideas*

The ideas that survive competition with other ideas and the scrutiny of survival criteria emerge as the product of the policy community on a "short list of ideas," the fourth and final element of the primeval soup component. The short list of ideas is described by three dimensions: the emerging consensus, "no new thing under the sun," and the importance of the available alternative.

The emerging consensus dimension is the result of the communication and sharing of ideas among policy specialists. In their interactions, two processes are occurring—awareness of what conditions are problems and agreement on what ideas constitute viable solutions for those problems (Kingdon, 1995, p. 139). Kingdon explains the mechanics of these processes as analogous to diffusion in science. The concentration of an idea tends to spread itself evenly throughout the policy community. Over time, more and more specialists become proponents of the idea and a bandwagon effect builds where interested, but not convinced, specialists enjoin their support for fear of being left behind. This type of coalition building is referred to as "tipping" in politics due to "goodies" to be obtained by participating specialists—and the exclusion of those that do not participate. Kingdon distinguishes this momentum building among specialists and

policy makers from public opinion consensus building by different mechanisms involved. The point here is that an idea gains a growing number of supporters because an idea has "something to recommend it, according to the criteria for survival" (p. 141).

Upon closer examination, the emerging consensus may be characterized as nothing new. Kingdon cites Old Testament Scripture to make his point on this dimension of the short list of ideas: "There is no new thing under the sun" (Ecclesiastes 1:9). What this implies is that a "new" idea is actually a new combination of old ideas that are well-known within the policy community. This perspective depends on the time horizon used by the observer. Kingdon also addresses this in his discussion on the source of ideas and infinite regression, wherein he concludes that the source of an idea is less important than its content (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 72-73). This dimension is consistent with his description of the recombination of ideas in the primeval soup. The focus here is the recognition of elements within every packaged idea so that over time none of the elements is new, only their combination and presentation as a packaged set (pp. 141-142).

The final dimension of the short list of ideas is the importance of having an available alternative. Kingdon posits here that the policy, or solution, pre-dates the problem to which it is mated. "Normally, before a subject can attain a solid position on a decision agenda, a viable alternative is available for decision makers to consider. It is not enough that there is a problem, even quite a pressing problem. There also is generally a solution ready to go, already softened up, already worked out" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 142). This is a controversial position on Kingdon's part which will be addressed in the application of the model to defense policy.

### Political Stream

The third stream component of the policy streams model is the political stream. The political stream is described as independently flowing alongside the problem and policy streams and being composed of several elements, such as the national mood, organized political forces, turnover in government, and others. The political stream is composed of these political elements, but Kingdon uses the term "political" in its "intra-Washington" sense, that is, a more narrow definition of political than provided by the political science field. As used by Kingdon, "political" describes specific "electoral, partisan, or pressure group factors" (1995, p. 145). He specifically identifies the reactions of politicians to voter reactions, ideological-based offensives against the opposite political party, and courting the support of key interest groups as "political" activities that describe the types of factors he defines as political. The central idea of the political stream is to include the dynamic of political factors into the policy making process, rather having only the policy and problem streams joining with public policy as an end result (p. 146).

#### *The National Mood*

The national mood is the first of several political elements in the political stream. The national mood is variously described as "the climate in the country, changes in public opinion, or broad social movements" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 146). The point is that a large body of the population is "thinking along certain common lines" and that changes in these common lines of thought are "discernable." The importance of the national mood is its power on shaping "policy agendas and policy outcomes" (p. 146). The national mood imparts influence on policy agendas by being part of the "fertile ground" for the



growth of ideas (p. 147). This suggests that the national mood promotes some ideas to a “higher agenda status,” but the national mood may also keep some ideas suppressed or even excluded from the agenda (p. 147).

The operation of the national mood is more complex than the name implies (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 148-149). First, the national mood does not necessarily reside in the mass public but rather in the voices of organized forces who purportedly represent a larger body of the public, and thereby the national mood. The mood is sensed by the nature of public officials’ work—they seek information that tells them what others are thinking. In the case of elected officials, they seek information about what their constituents are thinking, form their sense of the mood and pass it on to others. In the case of non-elected bureaucrats, they tend to sense the national mood from elected politicians. Although the operation of the national mood is not specific, Kingdon found that “people in and around government believe quite firmly that something like a national mood has important policy consequences” by impacting elections, party platforms, and the receptivity of ideas by decision makers (p. 149). In short, the national mood is apparently something that public servants know when they see it and can sense its changes—both by unspecified criteria.

#### *Organized Political Forces*

The second element of the political stream is the balance of organized political forces. Organized political forces are “standard stock in trade for political scientists” as this element focuses on pressure from interest groups, the mobilization of electorates, and the actions of political elites (Kingdon, 1995, p. 150). Interest groups and other participants are discussed below in detail, but that discussion focuses on “who” and

“what” questions. The political stream provides the place for questions and answers of “how people in and around government perceive and react to various organized activities” (p. 150).

Inherent in this part of the discussion is an understanding of the role of “consensus and conflict among organized groups” and its impact upon other participants. Two old adages describe this understanding: “What ever direction the wind is blowing” and “the squeaky wheel gets the grease” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 150). The point is that people in and around government are seeking the balance point of support and opposition between competing interests (p. 151). Here again Kingdon does not identify criteria to evaluate this element beyond the feelings of the participants and general observations such as, “if too many people get angry, it’s not worth it” (p. 151).

Consensus and conflict imply the presence of a constituency concerned with an issue. However, additional issues exist that do not have a “natural constituency.” As discussed under the interest group section below, organization of interests takes time, money, and an understanding of political processes in the “intra-Washington” sense. Some issues may impact groups largely comprised of person without these resources, hence, no natural constituency for the issue. Kingdon acknowledges this, at the same time describing the efforts of decision makers to determine the consensus and conflict balance point in organized interests and the political price that would be paid “if they were to take on a well-organized, vocal opposition” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 153).

#### *Government in the Political Stream*

Just as there are government participants, so must there be events within government that constitute political events that introduce government into the political

stream. The participants that produce these events and effects are discussed in detail below. In this section, the important considerations are on the turnover of key personnel in government and questions of jurisdiction between actors.

Key personnel in government cause agenda change in one of two ways, according to Kingdon (1995, p. 153). Incumbents either raise new items onto the governmental and decision agendas or the incumbents are replaced by new key personnel who push a different set of issues and agendas.

Jurisdictions between actors (agencies, departments, branches, or key individuals) may cause agenda change through a variety of means. First, the Constitution, laws, and regulations define jurisdictions. When those defining documents are changed, jurisdictions change. Congressional committee chairmen may also interpret their jurisdiction broadly or narrowly to suit political needs. A third means is the character of an organization, regardless of statutory jurisdiction, to pursue certain issues when they are defined as part of their statutory mission—such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) seeks to control federal outlays across a wide range of policy areas. The point here is the role of jurisdiction in fostering agenda change. Kingdon concludes that jurisdictional battles may stalemate or promote an issue, thus reinforcing the trend imbued by other forces already acting on the issue (1995, p. 158).

#### *Consensus Building in the Political Stream*

Consensus building was first discussed as an element in the policy stream under “the emerging consensus,” however, consensus building in the two streams operates differently. In the policy stream, consensus building emphasizes persuasion as ideas float around the policy primeval soup. In the political stream, consensus building emphasizes

bargaining (Kingdon, 1995, p. 159). Where persuasion relies on discourse and the content of ideas, bargaining relies upon "concessions in return for support" and fear of exclusion from benefits (pp. 160-161).

Bandwagons and tipping were also discussed in the policy stream and just as with consensus building the concept is the same even though the processes differ. In the policy stream, an idea picks up momentum based on its merits and contents. In the political stream, an idea picks up momentum based on the coalition of support that is built through bargaining (Kingdon, 1995, p. 161). Within this bargaining construct, even an idea's opponents will submit proposals to shape outcomes or compromise their position when the cost of adherence to an original position is too high (p. 161). This is one mechanism that leads to the opening of a policy window, discussed below. The focus here is on the rolling bandwagon. Once the wagon is moving, participation increases as participants seek to be included in benefits or avoid being excluded from benefits (p. 162).

#### *The Political Stream in the Large Scheme of Things*

The political stream embodies the maneuvering and bargaining that intrigue political scientists and madden the general public. But it is within this stream that the pulse of the nation and the "balance of forces" impacting an issue are weighed by decision makers. Kingdon notes here that in determining the balance of forces, the forces are not all equally weighted. This, in turn, supports one of Kingdon's earlier positions that the "distinction between the agenda and the alternatives is useful" (1995, p. 164). In the first sense, forces may promote an issue to high status on the agenda or keep it off

altogether. In the second sense, the balance of forces works to shape the outcome by shaping the alternatives seriously considered on the decision agenda.

### Policy Window

The policy window is the fourth component of the policy streams model.

Kingdon opens his discussion of policy windows with the following comment, extracted from an interview with an interest group analyst.

When you lobby for something, what you have to do is put together your coalition, you have to gear up, you have to get your political forces in line, and then you sit there and wait for the fortuitous event....As I see it, people who are trying to advocate change are like surfers waiting for the big wave. You have to get out there, you have to be ready to go, you have to be ready to paddle. If you're not ready to paddle when the big wave comes along, you're not going to ride it in. (Kingdon, 1995, p. 165)

This comment captures Kingdon's concept of the interaction of the separate components discussed to this point in a critical point in time during the agenda setting and alternative specification process. It is here where an idea will become a policy or just "yesterday's news." Kingdon explains that policy windows occur, in part, because policy advocates act when the "fortuitous event" floats by in the problem stream or they sense the balance of forces in the political stream is in their favor. But this is just one element of the policy window component. Policy window elements include what policy windows are and why they open, coupling of streams, policy entrepreneurs, the occurrence of windows, and spillovers.

*What Policy Windows are and Why They Open*

In the broadest sense, a policy window is an opportunity for action on issues that have survived and risen from the systemic and governmental agendas to the decision agenda. Policy entrepreneurs must act to prioritize the decision agenda so that action on their proposal may be taken. This begs the question of what criteria are used to prioritize the decision agenda and the answers are political, again in the intra-Washington vernacular. One consideration for elevating the priority of an issue on the decision agenda relates to the amount of effort required for passage versus the payoff for the effort expended. As such, "soft targets"—those with little opposition and that offer quick success—are usually moved high on the list (Kingdon, 1995, p. 167). Soft targets may also be related to the real target and begin political movement towards acceptance. A second consideration is the political costs for the opposing camps. When the costs of losing outweigh the costs of compromise, then participants are far more likely to strike a bargain (p. 167). Thus, political corners are a second means to induce a policy window to open. The test of an open window may be assessed by constructing a two-by-two matrix comparing the probability of action versus the motivation to bargain. Alternatively, the characterization of the positions held—extreme or moderate—might be used. If there is a good chance of action on a measure (a sensing of the political climate) then policy entrepreneurs are more likely to invest time, talent, and resources. They are also more likely to bargain if they perceive the measure has a serious chance of legislative action (p. 167). An interpretation of Kingdon's policy window test might look like the grid in Table 3.3.

*Table 3.3: Policy Window Test*

	Low motivation to bargain (Extreme position)	High motivation to bargain (Moderate position)
High probability for action	Possible Policy Window	Policy Window
Low probability for action	No window	No window

The political nature of these explanations leads to the interaction of the streams and the opportunities that stream coupling creates. To begin, the problem and political streams impart greater influence on agendas whereas the policy stream is more closely related to the shape of alternatives, according to Kingdon (1995, p. 168). This leads to Kingdon's conclusion that the opening of a policy window is more closely tied to the problem or political streams. Problems capture the attention of policy makers and public mood may demand action—action that is shaped by the alternatives available in the policy stream (p. 168). For example, changes in the political stream that may open a policy window are the change of administration or in the distribution of seats in Congress according to ideological lines. These changes are sudden and induce uncertainty into the policy process, and uncertainty enables a policy window.

Similarly, the change of senior officials on committees due to election results (shift in majority party) or due to other movements of personnel induce uncertainty and may create a policy window. When these personnel shifts occur, a policy window may indeed open, but the goals and desired outcomes are unspecified (Kingdon, 1995, p. 168). In a dynamic environment with numerous participants, the need for quick action is

obvious—policy windows do not remain open indefinitely. Kingdon cites four situations that may induce an open policy window to close.

The first reason a policy window may close is that decision makers may have already acted on the issue in some manner and are awaiting feedback on the effect of the action. Thus, even if the issue appears “red hot” it may be put on hold until feedback can be evaluated (Kingdon, 1995, p. 169). Similarly, if no action has been taken, a decision not to decide is still a decision and the costs for advocates may exceed the payouts if they were to pursue the issue further (p. 169). A third reason is the passing of a crisis. If the call for action is due to a crisis and the crisis resolves itself in a satisfactory manner before action can be taken, then no action is needed (p. 169). In other words, the need for action is overcome by events that no longer call for action. A final impetus that may close a policy window is change of personnel (p. 169). Just as a change of administration or senior leadership may open a window, it also closes windows. Taken a step further, Kingdon notes that the movement of Congressional staffers may close out activity on a proposal, not because it was not worthwhile but because the staffer may move on and be working on other issues. Thus, the loss of the policy entrepreneur behind the scenes may close a policy window.

Policy windows are not always marked in obvious ways, such as the change of administration or Congressional seat distributions. The point here is that the presence of a policy window is a perception that exists in the participants (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 170-172). The implication is the importance of strategy and planning in agenda setting and alternative specification. There may be much disagreement among participants, even those on the same side of an issue, as to the presence of a policy window due to the



complex nature of the problems, policies, and politics (p. 171). In short, differences in perceptions matter and timing matters. "Savvy politicians often speak of the importance of timing.... [T]he proposal must be worked out beforehand, and must surface and be pushed when the window is open" (p. 172). From this it is clear that policy windows open when factors in the three streams are simultaneously conducive to action. This coupling of the problem, policy, and political streams is the next topic for analysis.

### *Coupling*

Kingdon's construct of coupling is controversial. In traditional problem solving models the problem precedes the alternatives discussed. In the policy streams model, Kingdon posits that ideas are always present in some form in the policy primeval soup. Through recombination and the interaction of participants in the soup, ideas are honed but they are not yet mated to a problem. Kingdon suggests that this solution before the problem sequence exists and persists because policy advocates keep their policy hopes alive by adapting their ideas to whatever is "hot" in their policy area. Thus, policy entrepreneurs are continuously coupling solutions to problems.

### *Problem windows and political windows.*

The driving factor in providing what an open policy window calls for depends on what opened the window in the first place (Kingdon, 1995, p. 173). Problem windows and political windows serve as the first link in the coupling process. When problems rise on the governmental agenda, policy makers "reach into the policy stream for an alternative that can reasonably be seen as a solution. If politicians adopt a given theme for their administration...they reach into the policy stream for proposals" (p. 174). Thus, either the problem stream or the political stream may be the source calling for a policy.

*Seizing opportunities.*

Policy entrepreneurs and advocates are continuously scanning the political landscape looking for problem-political couplings. When they detect a coupling of the problem and political streams, they “rush to take advantage” of the linking.

Opportunities are again subject to political strategy, however. Just as proponents rush in, so do opponents. In some cases, opponents may attempt to overload the window with more solutions than can be addressed and thereby derail serious consideration of alternatives they oppose (Kingdon, 1995, p. 176). Overloading of this sort is common and to be expected, according to Kingdon, since the number of solutions exceeds the number of problems.

Another part of the strategy is to analyze the level of resource commitment brought to bear by other participants (Kingdon, 1995, p. 177). Just as in military conflict, political conflict entails maneuver warfare. Maneuver, in turn, encompasses the attempt to control the movement and action of the adversary. In the policy streams context, this may involve actions to prevent the opening of a window between the problem and political streams because the policy that may emerge may be viewed as worse than the status quo (p. 178). The colloquial expressions of “opening Pandora’s box” or “opening a can of worms” captures the essence of this dimension of strategy. The point is that the presence of problems or needs of politicians do not automatically open problem or political windows. Political strategy dictates consideration of what comes next and the perceived ability to control outcomes. When the risk of outcomes is too great, the status quo is preferred.

*The general importance of coupling.*

Coupling is important, but as the above discussion has shown, the presence of problem and political windows is insufficient to create a policy window. As Kingdon states, “problems or politics by themselves can structure the *governmental* agenda. But the probability of an item rising on the *decision* agenda is dramatically increased if all three streams—problems, policies, and politics—are joined” (emphasis in the original) (Kingdon, 1995, p. 178). Furthermore, the timing of a single stream with the “right” problem, policy, or politics is insufficient (p. 178). As has been shown, windows between the problem and policy or problem and political streams are the first step towards action, but a linkage among the three is critical to moving an agenda item up on the decision agenda for meaningful and serious consideration. If any of the problem, policy, or political components is missing, then “the subject’s place on the decision agenda is fleeting” (p. 178). Fleeting or not, issues require the attention of policy entrepreneurs to link missing components and create the conditions for a policy window (p. 178).

*Policy Entrepreneurs*

Policy entrepreneurs are policy advocates “who are willing to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, money—to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 179). While “future gains” may provide policy entrepreneurs with incentives, it is their “softening up” and preparation activities that make them indispensable for the policy streams model.

*Entrepreneurs' qualities.*

The qualities that distinguish a policy entrepreneur from other policy participants include a claim to a hearing, political connectivity, and persistence (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 180-181). The claim to a hearing may stem from subject matter expertise, position as representing the voices of many others, or being a decision maker in the policy process. Political connectivity spreads the net a bit farther to encompass those who have none of the claims to a hearing but are closely affiliated with those that do and their inputs are seriously considered by their political affiliates. However, Kingdon argues that persistence is the most important quality of a successful policy entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1995, p. 181). Again, similar to military conflict, persistence is the ability to wear down the opposition and control the engagement on terms of your choosing. While persistence is important, alone it is insufficient but is "disarmingly important" when added to the other qualities of an entrepreneur (p. 181).

*Entrepreneurs and coupling.*

Just as the qualities of the entrepreneur must be coupled for the entrepreneur to be successful, entrepreneurs must actively seek to couple the problem, policy, and political streams (Kingdon, 1995, p. 181). Part of this coupling is pushing ideas, but it also entails lying in wait as stated by the opening citation for the policy window discussion. To affect coupling, Kingdon adds a fourth quality to those above as characteristic of a successful policy entrepreneur—readiness. Without the prior development of ideas, definition of problems, and softening up of politicians, a policy window will open and close before action can be taken (p. 181). Summing up the importance of entrepreneurs to the policy streams model and the coupling process in particular, Kingdon writes

During the pursuit of their personal purposes, entrepreneurs perform the function for the system of coupling the previously separate streams. They hook solutions, proposals to political momentum, and political events to policy problems. If a policy entrepreneur is attaching a proposal to a change in the political stream, for example, a problem is also found for which the proposal is a solution, thus linking problem, policy and politics. Or if a solution is attached to a prominent problem, the entrepreneur also attempts to enlist political allies, again joining the three streams. Without the presence of an entrepreneur, the linking of the streams may not take place. Good ideas lie fallow for lack of an advocate. Problems are unsolved for lack of a solution. Political events are not capitalized for lack of inventive and developed proposals. (p. 182)

*Implications.*

From this description the central importance of the policy entrepreneur is evident, but it also carries several important implications for understanding the policy processes described by the policy streams model. The first implication is the distinction between personality and structure. The issue here is the argument over which is important to understanding social change, and Kingdon's reply is that they both are—personality matters and so does structure (1995, p. 182). The second implication is the dual role of promotion—through both advocacy and brokerage (p. 183). Both roles are important to consensus building, but both limit effects depending on the audience. Advocacy is focused on the policy stream to generate widespread support for an idea among the experts. Brokerage is focused on the political stream where the decision makers must

consider the consequences of support or opposition in the larger picture of the agenda they each pursue. A third implication is the need for creativity on the part of the entrepreneur. The process described by Kingdon is self-described as free-form (p. 183). As such, the requirement for policy entrepreneurs to think on their feet, adjust what they have to fit what they can get, and shape the perspectives of decision makers is crucial. In other words, the process is not mechanical and no specific outcomes are guaranteed. The final implication cited by Kingdon is that policy entrepreneurs are clever to the extreme (1995, p. 183). The policy process is complex. Only those with the vision to see connections among problems, policies, and politics with the qualities of the entrepreneur are likely to be able to pave a path that couples problems, policies, and politics in a window of opportunity.

#### *Occurrence of Windows*

The role of policy entrepreneurs in coupling the problem, policy, and politics streams is but one of the determinants of the occurrence of policy windows. Kingdon describes three elements that further describe the occurrence of windows—competition for a place on the agenda, predictable events, and unpredictable windows.

#### *Competition for a place on the agenda.*

Competition for a place on the agenda refers more to system limitations than to the content of the issue. Kingdon states that many worthy issues are never seriously considered on the decision agenda because they cannot be considered on the governmental agenda due to system limitations (1995, p. 184). These limitations include the press of other issues, time, expertise, and human cognitive capacity. The press of issues states the observation that there is no shortage of problems for consideration and

the agenda process whittles the list down in size from the systemic to the decision agenda. This reduction in the number of issues is due largely to the limited capacity of the policy making system to deal with multiple issues simultaneously. Congressional committees are made up of real people and each problem-policy-politics coupling must be individually considered, usually in sub-committee first, then full committee, and then floor debate and vote. If the issue survives this gauntlet, it must be repeated in the other house, and then again in conference committee to resolve any differences. A further limitation is the available expertise on the subject matter involved in the policy. While Congress maintains extensive staffs, the high degree of specialization in American society suggests that having an expert on every aspect of American life on Congressional staffs is not practicable. "There is a pipeline for these things, and there's only so much you can put through it at once" according to one of Kingdon's respondents (p. 184). Finally, there are strategic considerations that increase competition for a place on the agenda.

The political resources available to participants and policy entrepreneurs are limited and closely guarded—"even presidents find they can wear out their welcome" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 184). Participants are also aware of the danger of overloading the system. When overloaded, the system develops a certain momentum of its own and defies efforts and may jeopardize pending action on other decision agenda items (p. 185). Much as an overloaded vehicle requires more control finesse to avert disaster, the policy processes must not be overloaded. A final strategy is the concept of zero-sum policy where there are only winners and losers. Kingdon suggests that the system is not so limited as to create a zero-sum atmosphere—multiple benefits are permissible from

action in a single policy window. From competition for a place on the agenda, Kingdon describes two types of windows—predictable and unpredictable.

*Predictable windows.*

Predictable windows occur due to the scheduling of events on the government calendar. In some cases a policy is reviewed at regular intervals, in other cases special political events—like the state of the union address—predictably open policy windows. Of note to this study, Kingdon includes “reform cycles” in his discussion of predictable windows. The budget cycle also creates windows on a predictable basis. Although less predictable than scheduled events, the political importance of claiming credit for significant change is a powerful force for politicians. Incremental changes in extant policy do not create the drama of major changes or the shepherding of a new policy. “Thus politicians find it difficult to tolerate the fallow periods for very long” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 188). The presence of a fallow period and an eager politician are the ingredients for this type of predictable window.

*Unpredictable windows.*

Unpredictable windows are the catch-all for unpredictability in the model. While the political processes modeled, taken as a whole, are not “rolls of the dice,” they are susceptible to randomness and chance. Kingdon’s position is that if one of the factors of the model depends on chance, then the entire process depends on chance (1995, p. 190). Examples of the chance element include senatorial courtesy, shifting party alliance, and power management by decision makers. Two additional factors contribute to the creation of unpredictable windows. First, the policy entrepreneur may not be held in high political regard and thus not able to generate consensus through bargaining. Second, the issue



needs to have leveragability—some aspect of the issue must be able to be “held hostage” by the entrepreneur to entice support. Budget dollars are frequently used as one such lever.

### *Spillovers*

A final impetus for a policy window is spillover from another policy window (Kingdon, 1995, p. 190). By this Kingdon is referring to political momentum that “sometimes establishes a principle that will guide future decisions within a policy arena. At other times, a precedent spills over from one arena into an adjacent one” (p. 190). By establishing a principle in this manner, new avenues of policy are opened as old paradigms are replaced by new ones (p. 191). Spillovers may also be used as a strategy, much like the use of “soft targets” being selected first in order to generate political movement in the direction advocates seek to push the bandwagon. As used by Kingdon, this type of spillover segments a broad policy area into manageable pieces where change can be approached piecemeal rather than all at once (pp. 192-193). Kingdon cites policy experience, cashing in on success, coalition restructuring, and issue categorization as important dimensions of the spillover strategy.

Policy experience uses the passage of one policy as the model for another in a related field within the same policy arena. Likewise, politicians eagerly seek the opportunity to claim credit as innovators by introducing new policies—based on the positive history of another policy—in abundance and thereby cash in on the prior policy’s success. As discussed in the political stream, the flow of influence is closely tied with the power to bargain, and the power to bargain causes coalitions to reform and rethink strategy in either supporting or opposing proposals. In the preceding paragraph the

piecemeal approach to using spillover was discussed. Its logical opposite is the grouping of similar problems into a broader category to provide substantive weight to an issue to get it the serious attention advocates desire. Overall, spillovers can be very powerful in a issue-rich environment. However, when it appears that an issue and associated spillovers have run their course, the spillover effect ceases until new information changes the status quo (Kingdon, 1995, p. 194).

### Participants

Although participants are discussed in some detail as active players in the other four policy streams components, Kingdon does not identify participants as a separate component of the model. This study does identify participants as a separate component of the policy streams model.

Participants are broadly described first as those on the inside of government and those on the outside of government, “but not just looking in.” From this first categorization, two further levels of participant categories are identified. These levels identify participants first by professional association and then by specialties within those professional associations. This taxonomy is not Kingdon’s but serves to explain the participant hierarchy evident from the context of his work. Broadly construed from Kingdon’s discussion, participants in the policy streams model include virtually everyone, either as an individual or as a member of a group. This conception is important because it integrates interest group theories of politics into the model and provides a means to discuss the importance of participants—they are the source of agenda items and alternatives (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 15-16). Participant categories are also an indicator of some fuzzy definitions that begin to cloud the understanding of the policy streams model

since most participants do not neatly fit into only one category and the boundaries between categories are gray.

*Participants on the Inside of Government*

Government officials are participants on the inside of government and include the administration, civil servants, and Capitol Hill (Kingdon, 1995, p. 21). Within the administration are the president, the staff of the White House and Executive Office of the President, and senior political appointees. The civil servants include all the non-political appointees and the political appointees who are not in the top billet of their organization (i.e. undersecretaries in the Department of Defense). The Capitol Hill participants include the members of Congress and Congressional staffers. Kingdon identifies specific roles, resources, and responsibilities in the policy process associated with each of these groups.

*The administration.*

As the old political proverb goes, "The president proposes and the Congress disposes" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 23). Imbedded within this proverb are several implications. First, the policy agenda may be dominated by the president since presidential issues generally rate "first place in [Congress'] queue," but the president "is unable to dominate the alternatives that are seriously considered" by Congress, nor can he determine the final outcome of the debate (pp. 23-24). Reflecting the significant role of the president and his administration in the agenda setting process, the administration was coded by Kingdon's study as an important influence on the agenda in 94 percent of the interviews and 22 of 23 case studies—the highest of any participant group (p. 22).

The presidency is unique in the impact the office may exert on the policy process. No single participant is as consistently identified as an important actor in the policy process as the president (Kingdon, 1995, p. 23). The president's effect on the policy process favors agenda setting rather than "the alternatives that are seriously considered" (p. 23). This is consistent with the processes of government defined by the Constitution and the political proverb above. Kingdon identifies three reasons for the "president's preeminent position in agenda setting." These include institutional resources, organizational structure, and the unique ability to command public attention (pp. 24-25).

One of the most obvious resources is the power of the president to veto bills passed by Congress and thereby block (at least temporarily) the enactment of a specific policy into law (Kingdon, 1995, p. 24). However, it is the threat of a veto and the likelihood of Congressional override that are of more interest when applying Kingdon's model to understand actual policy debates. The execution of the veto is an overt display of political power that may be seen as a last resort for the president. Likewise, voting to override a presidential veto carries political baggage for the members of Congress. Similarly, the president holds the power to hire and fire political appointees, with the caveat of "the advice and consent of the Senate" for certain high-ranking government positions (p. 24). Again, these actions carry political consequences that are part of understanding Kingdon's political stream applied to policy studies and agenda setting.

The administration is also unique among the other branches of government in having organizational unity—a single, defined head—at the top of the executive branch hierarchy (Kingdon, 1995, p. 24). The president is also the head of his political party, giving unity to partisan political efforts if that strategy is deemed appropriate. However,

the most visible resource of the administration and the president in particular is the ability for the president to command an audience and the attention of the populace from “the bully pulpit” (p. 25). Senators and representatives may carry national attention on certain issues, but they do not carry the impact and weight that the presidency brings to the discussion. “The bully pulpit” is unique to the presidency and is closely integrated with the media as a participant—it is the media that decides what is broadcast. Thus, “the bully pulpit” is generally used with reserve so as not to diminish impact when it is needed (p. 25).

Closely associated with the president are the executive branch staff (White House and Executive Office of the President) and political appointees. Kingdon’s assessment of the staff as participants is that the president’s priorities are their priorities (1995, p. 26). Political appointees, on the other hand, are much more active in the policy process with a strong role in idea generation and placement alongside working the president’s priorities. However, political appointees’ priorities may drift from those of the president due to “agency capture” or workarounds by their staffs of career civil servants in their efforts to maintain the status quo (p. 28).

*By contrast: civil servants.*

Conventional wisdom suggests that career civil servants should be the source of many new ideas since they have the time and the expertise in specific policy areas. However, Kingdon found that the conventional wisdom was incorrect—those who initiate new policies are likely to be the political appointees (Kingdon, 1995, p. 30). Kingdon suggests that the greater importance of political appointees is understood by clarifying the processes central to his study—agenda setting, alternative specification,

and implementation (p. 31). Political appointees set the agenda of what the civil servants will work on, but the civil servants have greater impact on their responses to specified agenda items in the alternatives they elevate and the manner in which they implement policy. This occurs because the real power of a bureaucracy resides in the administration and implementation of a current policy, according to Kingdon (p. 31). As a result, political appointees tend to have more impact on the agenda and civil servants have greater impact on the content of alternatives and the manner of implementation (p. 31).

At the disposal of bureaucrats are three resources to support their activities in the agenda, alternative, and implementation processes. These resources are longevity, expertise, and professional relationships. These relationships, commonly known as “iron triangles,” have three elements—bureaucrats, Congressional committees, and interest groups. They are considered “iron triangles” because “their interests dovetail nicely and because they are alleged to be impenetrable from the outside and uncontrollable by the president, political appointees, or legislators not on the committees in question” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 33). This allows the bureaucrats to maintain the status quo by using relationships to leak information prematurely that will thwart opposition or bolster their own position. This “game” may influence what is talked about, but there is no control over what happens next. Savvy bureaucrats know when and how to play this political card, but Kingdon does not identify a means to quantify the occurrence of this behavior nor the importance of the behavior on agenda setting or alternative specification (or implementation).

*Capitol Hill.*

The Congress presents a mixed bag of participants. There are 535 members, each with a different set of agendas. Each member has a full-time personal staff and serves on two or more committees. Each committee is likewise served by a dedicated, professional staff. Despite this apparent divergence of agendas, Capitol Hill participants are uniquely situated to affect the policy process. Congress is coded as important in 91 percent of the interviews—second only to the administration (Kingdon, 1995, p. 34). What makes Congress unique is its ability to impact both the content of the agenda and the content of alternatives (p. 35). This unique position is empowered by several resources (pp. 36-38). The first resource is the legal authority vested in Congress by the Constitution. Congress also enjoys media access that is second only to the presidency. Third, members generally possess a well developed capability to blend information from many sources into a useable and cohesive whole. This is enabled by diverse technical expertise within each member's staff since the technical issues outnumber the members many times over. A final resource is longevity. Members of Congress and their staffs serve longer than the administration and on par with career civil servants in some cases. Longevity is due to the slightly circular argument based on the high incumbency reelection rates—over 90 percent in the House recently. Once a candidate is elected, incumbency is a powerful force that favors members who desire to stay.

Kingdon cites three goals of Capitol Hill participation that serve as incentives for political service—constituency satisfaction, political reputation, and making good public policy (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 38-40). These goals may be served simultaneously and in unexpected ways. For example, a member may push legislation that pleases his

constituency and may also enhance his political reputation. This need to be taken seriously also encourages a degree of specialization among members of Congress as they stake out “policy turf.” Members are known to attach themselves to issue areas and push policies just to be able to add a notch to their political belt—clout that can be leveraged later. Furthermore, the policy may also be good public policy. Good public policy may be from genuine interest in the topic with either a pro- or contra- perspective; or a member may be a political ideologue of the left or right and an advocate for the party planks on policy issues because they are planks. In either case, committees tend to be populated by those with interests that fall under the jurisdiction of that committee (p. 40).

As mentioned above, Congressional staffs are significant participants in the policy process. Kingdon notes some debate about how important these staffs are, but they no doubt have an impact (1995, pp. 40-41). For example, the members’ ability to blend information about complex issues into a comprehensible whole is balanced by the presence of technical and area expertise on their staffs and the ability to assign a staff member to full time duty on a particular legislative task—such as drafting detailed legislation. Kingdon points out, “it is generally up to committee staff to draft legislation, negotiate the details of the agreements among the interested parties, arrange for hearing witness lists, and write speeches and briefing materials for the members” (p. 41). Staffers are also known to “sell their boss” on an idea—a direct input to the governmental and decision agendas (if the idea is elevated to the decision agenda by the member).

Having laid a foundation that supports the idea that elected officials are important, Kingdon then reflects on “the place of elected officials” (1995, p. 43). This reflection is noted here because of the underlying themes it brings into the discussion, namely the



general theory of governance that produces public policy. Kingdon cites three bodies of literature that paint the picture of elected officials in dramatically different colors. The first body emphasizes the importance of elected officials who are held accountable, through elections, for their decisions (p. 43). This is the dominant mode of instruction on American democracy that has become both normative and the prevailing "picture of empirical reality" (p. 43).

In stark contrast, he suggests that some research portrays "public policy as the product of nongovernmental actors and processes in which elected officials are either of minor importance or are manipulated by powerful people accountable only to themselves" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 43). This describes a theory of governance by power elites; Kingdon cites C.W. Mills' (1956) *The Power Elite* as his reference. A third group emphasizes interest groups (Madison, Truman) or group conflict (Schattschneider) as the central force in American politics.

Kingdon posits that such theories portray elected officials in a role that is "diminished from the democratic ideal" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 43). The difficulty is in determining how far from the ideal their role is diminished. Kingdon does not dispute that elected officials fulfill a role of importance in agenda setting, alternative specification, and implementation at a level lower than the democratic ideal. He states emphatically that this "conclusion obtains primarily because *nobody* dominates these processes" [emphasis in the original] (pp. 43-44). These points make the case "for differentiating among the various policy processes—agenda setting, alternative specification, choice, and implementation—all the more persuasive....No one set of actors dominates the process, but elected politicians and their appointees come closer

than any other" (p. 44). Having established the importance of those inside of government, Kingdon then turns his attention to actors outside of government, "but not just looking in."

*Outside Government, "But Not Just Looking In"*

Participants outside of government "but not just looking in" include interest groups; academics, researchers, and consultants; the media; elections-related participants; and public opinion (see Kingdon, 1995, chapter 3). However, drawing a line defining who is inside and who is outside of government is impossible. The source of financial compensation test fails on several counts as does the party in power. Actors and information flow regularly between government positions (elected and appointed) and private positions that interact closely with and advise government officials. Similarly, common values and worldviews may form bridges for communication between those inside of government and those outside, according to Kingdon. In the end, Kingdon concludes that accountability separates the two groups. Government participants have formal decision making authority and rules of accountability while those outside of government do not have authority and are not held to the same accountability standard—but even this distinction is "blurred in practice" (pp. 45-46).

From a mathematical perspective, the first criterion—either inside or outside government—is simple. One cannot be the subset of the other. However, once the second criterion—not just looking in—is added, it presupposes a degree of political interest and activity among those outside of government that may not prove to be accurate without closer examination. The point that Kingdon is trying to make is that the line between inside and outside of government is not clear and this allows channels of

communication to flourish across whatever line of demarcation might be construed. Truman (1951) and Douglass Cater (1964) argue that the inside-outside distinction is impossible to define beyond each participant knowing when they are inside or outside. However, this blurring of the lines enables the communication needed within the problem, policy, and politics streams to allow actors to define the problem, generate alternatives, and develop support while awaiting a policy window.

*Interest groups.*

Interest groups are broken into five types—business and industry, professional, labor, public interest, and governmental officials as lobbyists (Kingdon, 1995, p. 47). These categories are fuzzy and subjective, as Kingdon found while coding his interviews, but they served as a measure to start an analysis of interest group impact. As a whole, interest groups were coded important or very important in 84 percent of Kingdon's interviews—ranking third behind the administration (94 percent) and members of Congress (91 percent).

Related to the typology of interest groups is the activity pursued by the group and the resources the group has available. Activity may be categorized by the policy process targeted—agenda setting or alternative specification—or by the character of the activity—positive or negative (Kingdon, 1995, p. 48). Positive activity is “promoting new courses of government action” while negative activity is “seeking to block changes in public policy” and “it is clear that a substantial portion of interest group effort is devoted to negative, blocking activities” (pp. 48-49). A third type of activity is squawking. In order to be heard by government officials, some interest groups have learned that their issues rise on the agenda when they squawk loudly (p. 49).

The resources groups have available may include electoral advantages, disproportionate impact, group cohesion, and group-leader cohesion (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 51-53). Electoral advantages address the ability of an interest group with a large, nationwide membership to energize its members to vote and thereby impact the outcome of elections. Disproportionate impact refers to small groups whose actions may have widespread and even nationwide impacts. Groups with small memberships that work in key sectors of the economy, such as dockworkers, would fall into this category. Finally, the cohesion of the group and between the leader and the group needs little explanation—a house divided against itself cannot stand.

One additional interest group resource cited by Kingdon is the degree of organization. Organized interests are heard because they are organized to be heard. David Truman (1951) would argue the organization of interests—pluralism—is the core of American democracy. It has been said that if there were no interest groups the government would have to create them in order for interests to be represented and brought to the attention of government officials—a crude model of agenda setting and alternative specification. E. E. Schattschneider counters the pluralist argument declaring, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” (1975, pp. 34-35). This well-known statement highlights his observation that interests exist in all people, but not all people have the time, talent, or funding to organize and be heard. Interviewees in Kingdon’s research noted the existence of this flaw in the transportation policy area. “No opinion leader rides a bus, the way they ride airlines. Busing is grubby business, and grubby people ride the buses” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 53).

*Academics, researchers, and consultants.*

Academics, researchers, and consultants collectively form the next most important set of participants outside of government behind the administration, Capitol Hill, and interest groups (Kingdon, 1995, p. 53). Quantitatively, this group was coded somewhat important or very important in 66 percent of Kingdon's interviews (p. 54). This group was more active in offering alternatives rather than setting the agenda, due in large part to agenda setting activities being dominated by other groups and participants (p. 55). Once the agenda was set, however, government officials "cast about" looking for alternatives to the issues before them and the academics, researchers, and consultants generate alternatives that politicians can use in the short term. Such was the genesis of transportation deregulation and managed health care alternatives in Kingdon's study. However, the importance of academics, researchers, and consultants is not in the short term.

In the longer term, the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the policy in addressing the problem may stimulate further research by this group. Research, in turn, begets journal articles and books that stimulate thinking and discussion among decision makers. One respondent commented that academic books open the door to testimony before Congress that may lead to government-sponsored research or consultation with key decision makers, as well as inroads to prominent academic and researcher networks and Congressional committee and executive branch staffers (Kingdon, 1995, p. 56). In short, academic research that gets noticed and read may have a long-term effect on the way problems are construed and the types of solutions that are seriously considered. The degree of this impact is difficult to ascertain, according to Kingdon, due to three factors

that shape both this element of the participant component and the intellectual paradigm of the policy streams model as a whole. These three factors relate to the source of ideas, infinite regression in locating the origin of a concept, and the lack of issue leadership. These factors are discussed more fully later in this chapter.

*The media.*

Kingdon identifies four roles the media fills that may impact the policy process. The media may act as a communicator among members of a policy community; the media may magnify attention on an issue that started elsewhere; the media may impact public opinion (although the magnitude of the impact is highly debatable); and the media may vary in importance from one participant to another. In a broader sense, the debate over the role of the media in agenda setting and alternative specification is captured in the Fox News slogan—"We report, you decide." Does the mass media report what the public thinks or does the public form its opinion based on what the media reports? Kingdon concludes that the media report on current events in government—the agenda and alternatives have already been decided—rather than having a large impact on setting the agenda or specifying alternatives (Kingdon, 1995, p. 59). This conclusion is certainly debatable, but what is clear is that the relationship between the media, the public, and the government is complex.

This complexity may be less complex under certain conditions. Kingdon found the media have an important impact on governmental agendas in four ways (1995, pp. 59-61). The most obvious impact occurs as a result of what the media is—a communications channel. Participants inside and outside of government use the media to convey messages to others in their policy community and to elevate issues to decision makers.

News articles that appear “above the fold” of the newspaper are widely considered as the important issues that will tell a story and sell newspapers. Above the fold articles capture consumers’ attention and thus capture government officials’ attention. A second means of influence is the magnification of attention by increased coverage of the issue. The context of Kingdon’s point here suggests that issues are shaped and structured by the media, but the media do not create the issue. The third means of media impact is the indirect approach achieved through the persuasion effect on public opinion. Each of the preceding media impacts assume that certain government officials are concerned with media coverage—which is Kingdon’s final point. The impact of the media varies with each participant according to their role in the policy process, the importance they place on the issue, and their need for media coverage to execute their position on the issue (i.e., as one of many means to an end) (p. 61).

*Elections-related participants.*

Kingdon describes elections-related participants as campaigners and political parties. Campaigners are the volunteers and paid workers who support individual candidates whereas the participants that Kingdon labels “political parties” include people who work full time for the party, party strategists and consultants, and others that labor for partisan motives. The elements of this group, central in Kingdon’s discussion, include campaign promises to campaign workers, contributors, and the general constituency (1995, p. 61). However, campaign promises do not affect the agenda simply because they were made. Rather, they are important because some significant part of the politician’s electoral coalition remembers the promise and attempts to hold him to it, even accusing him of welshing and threatening desertion in the next campaign if he does not

deliver (p. 63). As Kingdon puts it, "The mass public's awareness of the campaign issues is not as critical to politicians as the satisfaction of the activist leaders that promises have been kept" (p. 63).

The power of the political party to affect policy agendas is overstated according to the context of Kingdon's discussion (1995, pp. 63-64). The real power of the party is the vehicle it provides for interest groups to be heard—where change advocates can attempt to get a hearing and possibly a plank in the platform. However, the ability of the platform to shape policy after the election is minimal. Although not stated by Kingdon, it appears this is because politicians get elected and serve whereas political parties are the means to organize the candidates and simplify the voting process with bloc votes. At any rate, Kingdon concludes from the interviews that parties play only a minor role.

#### *Public opinion.*

The final participant "group" is public opinion. Public opinion is the target of decision makers to gain support and the target of elections-related participants who seek to get their candidates into public office by shaping public opinion. Kingdon uses "public opinion" to describe the opinion of the public as a whole, as expressed in various polls and surveys. However, public opinion is not monolithic but is composed of the opinions of many smaller groups. These smaller groups, called "relevant publics" by Kingdon, may be energized on an issue to help move it from the systemic agenda to the governmental and decision agendas, in turn, by shaping the broader public opinion on the issue (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 16, 65-67). Just like interest groups, "Public opinion may sometimes direct government *to* do something, but it more often constrains government *from* doing something" (p. 65). Perhaps decision makers understand this complex



relationship, or perhaps they know that it is sometimes more prudent to debate alternatives and consider policies in obscurity with experts first, then go to the public with a problem-solution match.

People like presidents, senators, and cabinet secretaries have their own goals, their own proposals, their own agendas. These officials may attempt to mobilize the public in support of their objectives, but on many occasions they will choose not to. When they do mobilize expanded publics, furthermore, it may be more in pursuit of passage than for agenda setting. Presidents sometimes set the agenda, for instance, then mobilize the public to pass their legislative proposals. (p. 67)

#### *Participant Summary*

After two full chapters of discussion on participants, Kingdon leaves us with some general observations. Concerning interest groups, of all the participants outside of government, interest groups were consistently scored as being the most important in agenda setting and alternative specification. Although much of their efforts are in blocking activities, interest groups expend considerable efforts in shaping discussion of alternatives by inserting their preferred solutions into the policy stream after the agenda has been set. Although groups with greater resources (time, talent, money, membership, cohesion, and political leverage) tend to be more effective in their efforts than groups with lesser resources, politics matters so that resources may not carry the day (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 67-68).

Concerning academics, researchers, and consultants, Kingdon concludes that this group has more impact on alternative specification and long term policy direction than on

short term policy and agenda setting (Kingdon, 1995, p. 68). This is due to their expertise and focused analysis of specific areas over time rather than the attention that comes to the news of the day. In contrast to the academics, researchers, and consultants, the elections-related participants and public opinion affect governmental agendas more than the specification of alternatives (p. 68). Regarding the media, their greatest impacts are indirect. The media shape public opinion on an issue, which is sensed by politicians in their roles in setting agendas. However, public opinion tends to define more of what is possible rather than to promote a specific alternative. Kingdon also found that the media tend to magnify rather than originate events (p. 68).

Kingdon concludes that agenda setting studies that suggest one participant group leads in agenda setting and alternative specification while the others follow are accurate, but incomplete (1995, p. 68). Instead, he prefers to reformulate the categories of the participant groups into visible and hidden clusters of actors. These are not necessarily unique sets, according to Kingdon, but the distinctions are enough to be "meaningful." Visible clusters of participants include the president, high-level appointees, leaders in Congress, the media, and some elections-related personnel (DNC & RNC chairs, etc.). Hidden clusters of participants include specialists such as academics, researchers, career bureaucrats, congressional staffers, and administrative appointees (not top-level). Kingdon's research repeatedly found the agenda affected more by the visible cluster and alternative specification by the hidden cluster (p. 69). Kingdon emphasizes that these distinctions are tendencies, not absolutes, and are driven by the resources needed and incentives offered.

The incentives in the visible arena are quite different [from the incentives in the hidden arena]. Senators and representatives are not known for being shrinking violets. Publicity gives them a boost, in terms of the reelection and in terms of any ambitions for higher office they might harbor. It is a very rare member of Congress who delves deeply into policy detail. Rather, the member is more likely to set the general direction and leave details to the staffers, who then consult with bureaucrats, interest groups representatives, researchers, and other specialists. Similarly, presidents are involved in the highly public arena from the beginning. The broad-brush approach of such actors—presidents, cabinet secretaries, prominent members of Congress, parties, and media—is much better suited to agenda setting than to the generation of alternatives. The appeals in the visible cluster would be made to such desiderata as the potential for public support, electoral consequences of doing one thing rather than another, and incentives for political career advancement, rather than things like the technical quality of a proposal. (p. 70)

### *Conclusion*

The policy streams model is comprehensive and covers the multitude of variables that must be considered in any policy formation study. Many specialized areas are touched by the model—the use of symbols in politics, political voting behavior, the role of the media, power in Washington, administrative behavior, organization theory, and a host of others. No attempt is made at this juncture to validate all of these specialized studies. Rather, the intent is to break the policy streams model into component parts and

evaluate the fit of those parts using case study methodology to defense policy. It is hoped that the preceding analysis will be useful in applying the policy streams model to defense. Every attempt has been made to keep the analysis methodical so as to minimize subjective judgments. What follows now is a discussion of the case study methodology and design used for this study, followed by the application of the model to the defense policy, specifically, the rise of defense organization on the agendas that culminated with Public Law 99-433, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (United States, 1986b).

## IV. METHODOLOGY

### *Introduction*

The term “case study” is widely misconceived and used to describe techniques that are very different from one another. For example, case study is often used for classroom educational studies that lead students to a desired learning objective—this is role playing—and the study of individual medical records where data are stored for record keeping in “case” files. Case study research is not related to either of these “case studies” according to Robert Yin (1994, p. 2). Case study research is a rigorous and scientific means to study complex issues that do not lend themselves to classic experimental methods. The essence of scientific case study research is drawing lessons of “how” and “why” from contemporary issues (Ellram, 1996, pp. 6-7; Yin, 1994, p. 6). This chapter explains what can be accomplished with case study research and describes the case study design for this study.

### *The Case Study*

Robert K. Yin is one of today’s leading authorities on case study research. Yin defines case study research as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994, p. 13). By this definition, the case study method is ideally suited for this study since the boundary between the phenomenon (high status on the government’s decision agenda) and the context (the

policy making process) are not clearly defined. However, this lack of separation between the phenomenon and the context creates tension among some researchers about the scientific merit of case study research. Yin's formulation of case study research addresses this tension.

Classic experimental research designs control inputs and observe corresponding outputs in order to discern relationships between independent and dependent variables. In the controlled environment of the laboratory, researchers change one independent variable at a time to observe the effect on the dependent variable. By this process scientists can establish causal relationships that may lead to the development of theories and models.

Case study research also seeks to understand the particular outcomes of an event; however, case study research generally does so without exerting control on the inputs—the independent variables. Instead, case study methods arrive at theories and models by high quality analysis of data—both quantitative and qualitative—to determine the relationships between independent and dependent variables.

Herein lays a source of friction between experimental and case study researchers, namely, the experimental paradigm that independent variables must be controlled in order to establish relationships between variables. Some experimental researchers would also argue that qualitative research (the case study method) is not as rigorous as classic experimental research. To this Yin replies that many social scientists misunderstand both the scientific nature of the case study method and the scientific nature of the case study product (1994, p. 12). Babbie supports Yin's view, stating that although case study research is qualitative in nature, the volume of data collected must be categorized,

summarized, and analyzed as any quantitative researcher would (1992, p. 309).

Elizabethann O'Sullivan and Gary Russel go even further stating that with careful analysis of data, case studies may "produce reasonable estimates of an independent variable's effect on a dependent variable. Thus, [case studies] may suggest causality" (1999, p. 24). As such, qualitative case study research may involve quantitative research methods—data handling and analysis—as well as qualitative methods of inference and interpretation.

Thus, case study research clearly deals with facts, but what about the conclusions regarding human behavior? Is human behavior reducible to facts and numbers? Most people would agree that this is not the situation and therefore case study research conclusions regarding human behavior are fiction, at least in part. However, this is where the purpose of case study research shows itself best. By examining human behavior without controlling for independent variables, the researcher can, over time, observe patterns of behavior. Although these patterns do not predict the frequency of behavior occurrence, they can inform researchers about possible behaviors that have not yet occurred and provide some explanation for observed behaviors that other methods did not predict (Babbie, 1992, p. 306; Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 1991, p. 7; Gall, Borg, & Gall, 1996, p. 585; Yin, 1994, chapter 5).

This leads to the philosophical difference between experimental and case study researchers: "Quantitative researchers have pressed for explanation and control; qualitative researchers have pressed for understanding the complex interrelationships among all that exists" (Stake, 1995, p. 37). In other words, case study research questions guide the researcher to find unanticipated patterns and expected relationships while

experimental research questions seek answers for expected patterns and unanticipated relationships (Stake, 1995, p. 41). Thus, the conclusions drawn from any research study depend upon how they are viewed. The quantitative researcher stands close and seeks measurable data to explain and control; the qualitative researcher stands back and seeks patterns of behavior that appear as fiction to those whose perspective is not sufficiently broad. Yin highlights the similarities between quantitative and qualitative approaches (1994, p. 10). First, case study and experimental results may be generalized into broad theoretical propositions but not to the subject population. Second, case studies and the single experiment do not represent a statistical sample but the researchers' goal is to expand theories through analytic generalization rather than to predict frequencies through statistical generalizations.

### What Are Case Study Research Methods?

Case study research does not have a single, definitive method, "checklist," or standard set of procedures to execute. To the researcher who prefers a boundless experience, this may sound appealing, but it can lead to missteps and wasted effort. To the researcher who prefers structure and process, it may appear to be a void. However, the review of case study literature reveals common elements that must be considered before conducting case study research. Theorists may disagree on precise order or terminology, and others would argue that there is no definitive case study process to order or list (Stake, 1995, p. 77; Tesch, 1990, p. 4); however, they would all agree that planning the case study is a good start.

Part of every research plan should be the consideration of the type of research to be conducted and the determining factor is not the type of research that the researcher is



most comfortable with but the object being studied (Stake, 1994, p. 236), the objective of the study, capabilities of the researchers, and the nature of the cause-effect processes hypothesized (Bennett, 1997). Once the case study method has been determined to be appropriate, the first challenge is to develop good research questions (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995). Yin (1994, p. 7) and Stake (1995, p. 20) suggest that good research questions are the most important part of case study research development. Good questions provide a boundary for the research so good questions are a necessity. However, Miles and Huberman (1984) state that "nothing is more important than making a proper selection of cases" (quoted in Stake, 1994, p. 234). Putting these two imperatives together reveals that case selection defines which "playing field" the researcher will use while research questions define the boundaries of the field.

Several authors (Edwards, 1998; MacNealy, 1997; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994) discuss research planning and protocols at different stages of their conceptual process for conducting case study research. To this writer, the plan and protocol are as significant as the first two considerations. However, as Stake notes with "intrinsic" case studies, the case is chosen for the researcher by virtue of the interest the case generates, either in the researcher or the researcher's supervisor. Planning the entire research effort is important to maintain order and control over the work processes during the research period, to include a field plan of action for resource allocation and "what if" procedures (Yin, 1994, p. 64).

Research protocols should also consider researcher training needed to conduct the research. Yin (1994) suggests that specific training seminars be offered and a pilot study conducted. As the name implies, a pilot study is a full test and evaluation of the case

study to see if it “flies.” It is not a “dress rehearsal.” A failure in flight is more analogous to a failure in the pilot study—they are traumatic events that require significant changes or improvements to correct the failure. Yin notes that the pilot study may be more difficult and costly than the actual study but that it lacks certain rigor due to the nature of case selection. The pilot study case is chosen more for convenience than academic interest.

Each of the case study authorities examined discussed some form of a data collection process of various methods and techniques. Depending on the study, case study research may include interviews, which are emphasized by some authors because interviews emphasize the human element of the study, a central tenet of case study research. Babbie (1992) lists eight human element factors as “appropriate kinds of focuses for field research” that include relationships, groups, organizations, meanings, and roles (p. 286). These factors all center on the interaction of humans. Black and Champion (1976) stress the importance of discovering the psychological descriptions of people in specified settings, again a human element focus (p. 90).

Balancing the focus on the human element are other data sources that include historical documents, archival records, and direct observation by case-study researchers. These data sources provide a stable, documented record to balance with interview data and provide the foundation for subjective analysis. They also provide a basis that can be referred to by other researchers to either confirm or challenge the analysis provided by the original researcher. Data sources then form a bridge to the heart of research—analysis and conclusions in the final report.

Following data collection, the consensus is for data analysis and report construction. The important points to remember here are that although presented as steps in this essay, these elements of the case study method are not purely sequential nor independent (Stake, 1995, p. 51). In other words, the process is continuous and cyclical. The research questions are continuously evaluated, data collected and analyzed from the start, and a vision for the final report kept clearly in sight. Through the continuous iteration of these case study steps, the case study attains a flexible character and remains focused toward its research objectives.

Finally, several key considerations of case study research must be discussed. First, the importance of triangulation of data, methods, researchers, and theories cannot be stressed enough. Triangulation provides for corroboration of data, methods, researcher observations, and theories to control for reliability and validity concerns (Stake, chapter 7; Yin, 1995, p. 78). Second, the quality of the research effort is determined by the quality of data—not any other factor (Edwards, 1998). The 2000 presidential election controversy in Florida serves as a potent reminder of the need for quality data inputs into data collection and analysis systems. Third, case study research is a human activity—conducted by people, for people, on people. The quality of the report will require quality data inputs and thoughtful introspection on the part of the researcher. With these things in mind, the case study will be of the greatest use in a wide variety of applications.

### Employing Case Study Research

At this point it may seem impossible to employ the case study method—the process starts all at once, is continuous and iterative. It also relies on observations

interpretations of the researcher and apparently flies in the face of quantitative research and analysis methods. Abraham Maslow posits that true scientific research should not be limited to "mechanistic science" but should include the totality of the case in the research question (cited in Tesch, 1990, p. 11). It is this totality of the case that makes case study research useful and distinctive. The utility is apparent in complex situations that cannot be transported to a "scientifically controlled" environment, or have "scientifically controlled conditions" transposed to the situation. However, it is this uncontrolled nature that requires honed interpretive skills that makes case study research distinctive among all research methods (Stake, 1995, p. 8). Furthermore, it is the interpretive skills that lead to generalization of results or theory building (Babbie, 1992, p. 285; Davey, 1991; Edwards, 1998; O'Sullivan & Rassel, 1999).

#### Strengths and Weaknesses of the Case Study Method

Inherent in every research method are strengths and weaknesses. Some are always present; others depend on the application of the method. For example, researcher bias is a possibility that has to be considered as a weakness in all research. However, if the case study relies on historical and archival documents with fewer interviews or data from participant-observer roles, then the threat of researcher bias may be minimized in two ways. First, historical documents provide a range of perspectives and second, they minimize inputs from a participant-observer researcher who has "gone native" and become part of the study subject rather than remaining neutral while observing (Babbie, 1992, p. 306; Stake, 1995, p. 46).

In general, the strengths of case study research are theory building through analysis, a holistic perspective, and an ability to triangulate data (Yin, 1994, pp. 10, 91;

Stake, 1995, chapter 7); utility in complex, multi-variant environments (Feagin et al., 1991, pp. 6-7; Yin, 1994, p. 13); effectiveness for studying nuances of behavior and processes over time (Babbie, 1992, p. 305); details of the particular (Stake, 1994, p. 238 and 1995, p. 8); and the richness of detail and situational insight provided (Babbie, 1992, p. 305; Davey, 1991; Gall et al., 1996, p. 585). All are strong considerations for selecting case study research where appropriate. In sum, these strengths contribute to the most commonly cited strength of the case study research method—flexibility (Yin, 1994, p. 52). Flexibility (a.k.a. “emergent quality”) allows the researcher to customize the study as a continuous, iterative process as events dictate. However, flexibility leads to a weakness as well, known as study shift. Study shift occurs when the fundamental research questions, design, unit of analysis, etc. are changed to fit the case(s) selected for study (Yin, 1994, p. 52). Flexibility allows for changes that are consistent with the initial research plan concept whereas study shift occurs when the researcher loses sight of the research questions, objectives, and design—types of weaknesses that may impact case study research.

Researchers may also lose sight of the research questions, objectives, or design if they “go native.” When a researcher goes native he or she impacts the study’s results as a participant rather than remaining an objective observer (Babbie, 1992; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). Any resultant theory of a case study where the researcher “goes native” will be suspect and may not be readily generalized to the population as a whole (Black & Champion, 1976; Edwards, 1998; Gall et al., 1996; MacNealy, 1997; Yin, 1994). Numerous authors also offer time, resource, and financial issues as limitations or weaknesses. For example, case study research requires the full attention of the researcher

in order to capture data whereas laboratory studies typically have automated data capture processes as part of the study. Resources may also be a factor that limits case study research. Historical documents are subject to bias and editing that may be unknown to the case study researcher. Scientific studies conducted under controlled conditions minimize the input of bias into the data by focusing on statistics rather than impressions as is required by case study. Finally, Stake (1994) raises an easily overlooked issue—how does a researcher know when enough data has been collected? Thus, the subjective nature of case study research extends from interpreting the data to include interpreting when enough data has been collected. This is clearly a problem for inexperienced researchers. There are also a host of weaknesses cited by many that are weaknesses of any endeavor poorly attempted. These include lack of rigor, vulnerability to reliability and validity concerns, “token” literature review, and poor general research skills (documentation, organization, pacing, and language). However, these weaknesses can be overcome to produce rigorous, relevant research.

### Summary

From this discussion it should be clear that case study research is the study of people in complex situations with multiple variables that the researcher has little or no control over. While the prospect of studying a complex and dynamic case may appear daunting, this study has built a solid research plan that includes refined research questions and objectives. Not every aspect of the case study method has been covered, but the purposes, design, strengths, and weaknesses have been covered sufficiently so that the reader can evaluate the merits of the data presented more knowledgeably.

Also clear from this discussion is the utility of case study research for the application of Kingdon's policy streams model to defense policy. Kingdon's model asks "how" and "why" questions regarding agenda setting and alternative specification. Case study research is designed to answer these kinds of questions. The case chosen for this study, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, is a contemporary issue, ideal for case study research. Finally, there was no control exerted on the sequence of events or outcomes by this study, nor could there have been. The policy making process is a complex process with multiple variables and numerous participants over which the researcher had no control—an ideal case for case study research. Armed with the detailed analysis of Kingdon's model and the general case study methodology above, the specific methodology for this study can now be explained.

### *Methodology Overview*

The purpose of this study is to make sense of why defense reorganization figured so prominently in the government's decision agenda and why it did so when it did. The events and debates that culminated with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act mark a specific point in history for close examination of defense policy making to determine if recent public policy making theory offers any explanations for how an idea's time has come. John Kingdon developed his policy streams model to answer just such a question. By applying Kingdon's model to defense policy, this study will also be able to address the question of whether the policy streams approach to agenda setting and policy formulation reveals anything about defense reorganization policy. Finally, if the fit between the policy streams model and agenda setting activity observed in the formulation

and passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act are deficient, then analysis of defense policy using Kingdon's model should suggest improvements to refine the model.

The relevant theory-based literatures for this study come from political science, public administration, and policy process studies with a focus on agenda setting. A second, large body of literature comes from academic researchers, think tanks, Congressional documents, interviews, and biographies. This second body of literature shares defense reorganization as a unifying theme.

Ideally, a case study would be designed and pilot tested before being conducted in the field where the researcher observes and documents events that are later cataloged and analyzed. However, as Yin discusses, the case study method is useful for historical research. Since the agenda setting that led to the Goldwater-Nichols debate and passage occurred more than twenty years ago, the "field" for this study is the literature and a limited number of interviews.

The field procedures used were driven by two considerations—verification and understanding. To address the first consideration, a number and variety of sources were used to include histories, biographies, memoirs, original documents and correspondence, interviews, and Congressional reports. To address the second consideration, the researcher continuously asked why—are there alternative reasons something is so?

### *Case study Design*

The case study design is "the logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of the study" (Yin, 1994, p. 18). For this study, the logic is to apply an agenda setting model to a significant policy event to determine two things: is the agenda setting model generally useful across policy areas;



and does the model tell us anything about why a policy comes about when it does? With this in mind, John Kingdon's research questions were adapted to this study.

The overarching question asks "Why does an idea's time come when it does?" From this, three distinct agenda setting and policy formulation questions are derived: "How do subjects come to officials' attention; how is the governmental agenda set; [and] how are alternatives from which they choose generated?" (Kingdon, 1995, p. xi). In other words, how do subjects garner attention, gain placement on an agenda (systemic, governmental, or decision), and how are solutions generated to pair with these subjects?

Consistent with these questions, two propositions are offered. First, Kingdon's policy streams model is a generally useful model for beginning to understand the complex interactions of the agenda setting and alternative specification stages of the policy process. Second, Kingdon's policy streams model is transferable from the policy areas of his original study to other policy areas, namely, defense reorganization. Rival propositions would argue the opposite of these statements.

The unit of analysis for this study is defense reorganization policy. The actions of individuals and outputs of institutions are considered, but only as a means to understand the appearance of issues on the agenda, their rise or fall, and a sense of why they appear, rise, or fall when they do. Institutions have formal rules for processes and informal rules for how the formal rules are construed and constructed by individuals. Specific for this study, defense policy is considered a reorganization policy when the focus of the policy is on structural reorganization, power distribution, or the creation and dissolution of major entities within the Department of Defense as these changes impact the war fighting capabilities of the United States.

The logic linking the data to the propositions is done primarily by pattern-matching of trends in the fit between theory and actual events. With the assumption that the policy process is a complex and dynamic interaction of many components, it is understood that conclusions are drawn and explained from logic rather than quantitative data. Further, much work has been completed in separate studies that examined individual components and elements of the policy streams model, but the relationship of these studies to each other at the policy level of analysis is unclear. Kingdon's model incorporates disparate fields studied at length. If Kingdon's model can be applied to the development and passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, then the model should be useful for understanding the relationships between these studies and the policy process in general.

An analysis of the policy streams model, breaking it down into components, elements, and criteria, is just one criterion for interpreting the findings. The other is research triangulation. Research triangulation involves using multiple data sources, investigators, theories, and methods in order to verify data, confirm observations, test models/theories, and evaluate research methods (Yin, 1994, p. 91). The purpose of triangulation in case study research is to provide confidence that the findings are meaningful and a reflection of some scientific truth rather than just a passing impression with an idea that fits the conditions in only one case. The objective of case study research, following Yin's philosophy, is to eliminate doubt and bring convergence to the study (p. 93). Triangulation helps reach this goal and this study was conducted using a research triangulation philosophy; however, the writer was the sole investigator.

From this foundation a study protocol was established to examine preliminary information from Public Law 99-433 (*The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*) and a Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) document (*Defense Organization: The Need for Change*). Additionally, three participants were identified as central actors in the passage of the GNA—General David C. Jones, the Hon. James Locher, III, and Dr. Arch Barrett. General Jones and Dr. Barrett were interviewed by this researcher; Mr. Locher provided information via email and a copy of the manuscript for his recently published book, *Victory on the Potomac* (2002a & 2002b, respectively) several months before it was published to facilitate this study. These men were also key participants in the appearance, rise, and passage of defense reorganization on the agenda. General Jones initiated the public debate on the need for defense reorganization while serving as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Barrett was the House Armed Service Committee staff expert on defense organization and charged with drafting House bills on the topic. James Locher was the senior SASC staff member and primary author of defense reorganization proposals offered in the Senate.

The perspectives of additional participants were obtained through official records, memoranda, biographies, and memoirs. Some of the GNA participants are deceased while others are busy high-ranking public and private officials. In order to develop a common understanding of events and processes, terms central to the discussion were defined. These definitions concern the agenda typology, reorganization versus reform, and the meaning of policy and public policy.

Goldwater-Nichols Act and Kingdon's policy streams model mesh? In other words, what are the similarities between the GNA and the model and does the policy

streams model fully explain these similarities? Likewise, what are the differences between the GNA and the model and what are the reasons for differences? Following this research design, a report plan consisting of six sections was devised: introduction and overview of research; literature review; analysis of Kingdon's policy streams model; methodology; findings; and the analysis and conclusions. This dissertation is the fulfillment of that plan and Table 4.1 summarizes Kingdon's model as it was applied to the Goldwater-Nichols act. The table is repeated as Table 5.2 at the end of the next chapter with a last column, assessments, added.

*Table 4.1: Policy Streams Components, Elements, & Criteria*

Components	Elements	Criteria
<b>Problem stream:</b> Problems are conditions we believe we should do something about—giving problems two elements, the event and a “perceptual, interpretative element” (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 109-110).	Indicators	Statistical data Feedback mechanisms
	Focusing Events	Visibility of policy area Basic unit of policy domain
	Symbols	Preexistent perception of a problem Early warning Proximity of events
<b>Policy stream:</b> Ideas of various participants are “floated around” between other participants where ideas recombine and change to overcome obstacles and emerge on the short list of ideas for serious consideration as the alternative choice for a problem from the problem stream (Kingdon, 1995, ch.6).	Policy communities	Shared concern in specific area Relationships between specialists for the exchange of ideas
	Primeval soup	Floating ideas Idea promotion incentives Idea advocacy Future return
	Criteria for survival	Technical feasibility Value acceptability Anticipation of future constraints (budgetary and public acceptance)
	Policy entrepreneurs & primeval soup	Emerging consensus “No new thing under the sun” Importance of available alternative

*Table 4.1: Policy Streams Components, Elements, & Criteria*

Components	Elements	Criteria
<b>Political stream:</b> The perception of and reaction to various organized activities (Kingdon, 1995, p. 150).	The national mood	The climate in the country Changes in public opinion Broad social movements
	Organized political forces	Pressure from interest groups The mobilization of electorates The actions of political elites
	Government processes	Personal agendas New personnel with new agendas Jurisdiction
	Consensus building	Emphasizes bargaining Concessions in return for support Concessions for fear of exclusion from benefits
	Political stream and the big picture	Maneuvering and bargaining Balance of forces vying for political power
<b>Policy Windows:</b> The coupling of the three streams—frequently limited by the ability to couple the political stream.	Coupling	Importance of coupling Seizing opportunities Problem windows Political windows
	Policy entrepreneurs	Qualities Entrepreneurs & coupling
	Occurrence of windows	Predictable windows Unpredictable windows Competition for place on agenda
	Spillovers	Related policy follows on the momentum of another
<b>Participants:</b> Participants include virtually everyone, either as an individual or as a member of a group. This conception integrates interest group theories and provides a means to discuss the importance of participants—they are the source of agenda items and alternatives (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 15-16).	Inside government	Administration Civil servants Capitol Hill
	Outside government	Interest groups Academics, researchers, consultants The media Elections-related participants

## V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

### *Review of the Purpose and Focus of This Study*

The purpose of this study is to make sense of why defense reorganization figured so prominently in the government's decision agenda and why it did so when it did with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). To investigate these questions, the study applies John Kingdon's (1995) policy streams model to the debates and events preceding the passage of the GNA. In addition to making sense of defense reorganization agenda setting and alternative specification concerning the GNA, this study first tests the transferability of Kingdon's model to defense reorganization policy.

### *Transferability and the Unit of Analysis*

The policy streams model uses policy alternatives in one policy area as the unit of analysis. Kingdon examines two policy areas—health and transportation—in *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. Within each policy area he focused on the agenda status of specific policy alternatives as they appeared, rose, or disappeared from the government's agenda. Kingdon study provides rich detail in the agenda movement of specific policy alternatives via the 247 interviews he conducted for his study. However, in his analysis Kingdon always returns to a focus on policy alternatives—not participants or institutions. Therefore, policy alternatives must continue as the unit of analysis in any study that applies the policy streams model. In this study, the debate and passage of the GNA, the policy alternative selected to enact defense reorganization, is examined.

This study views a policy alternative as being analogous to a medicine ball. Many participants are required to raise a medicine ball into play where even more participants attempt to influence the direction of travel of the ball towards a goal or to force opponents to drop the ball. In either case, victory is defined by the perspective of the participant—scoring a goal against the opposition, preventing the opposition from scoring, or forcing the opposition to drop the ball. This study examines the GNA in this macro sense to understand why the ball (defense reorganization) was put into play when it was and how it moved towards the goal—from a policy alternative to law at one end versus maintenance of the status quo on the other.

It is important to keep this medicine ball perspective of a policy alternative in mind as the events leading up to the passage of the GNA tell an intriguing story concerning a topic of great importance—the organization of a nation's defense assets. In telling this story it is easy to become sidetracked in the details and actions of individuals and institutional outcomes, thereby losing sight of the purpose of this study—why defense reorganization figured so prominently in the government's decision agenda and why it did so when it did with the passage of the GNA. For this analysis, the actions of individuals and institutional outcomes are considered and discussed, but only as a means to understand the appearance of issues on the agenda, their rise or fall, and a sense of why they appear, rise, or fall when they do.

This is consistent with the approach taken by Kingdon. In his healthcare policy example, Kingdon follows the idea for managed healthcare back to Paul Ellwood, a well-known expert in healthcare based in Minnesota (Kingdon, 1995, p. 6). Although Ellwood's idea and the policy alternative that emerged were not the same, managed

healthcare was coupled to the nation's rising healthcare costs by a chance meeting between Ellwood and HEW Undersecretary John Veneman, according to Kingdon (p. 6). As Kingdon describes the agenda setting process for healthcare, these two participants played key roles, but they were not the focus of his discussion. Rather, Kingdon refers back to the components of the policy streams model to place the actions of participants and institutions in a larger context where the policy alternative is the unit of analysis.

For this study, details of the agenda-setting and policy-formulation process, such as the actions of Congressional committee members to forward or stall alternative progress are sometimes described, but the focus is always upon the policy alternative. Likewise, political maneuvering outside the committee in the labyrinth of House and Senate rules for debate and floor votes are important institutional actions since they decide which measures die and which ones will move further through toward a decision agenda. However, the precise rules and exact vote tallies are less important than why the measure garnered support or failed to do so. In other words, the focus is on understanding why policy alternatives appear and move up and down the agenda rather than recording vote tallies on policy proposals. In sum, the focus of this study is defense reorganization and the policy alternatives brought forward to this end are the unit of analysis, not the actions of participants or institutions.

### *Methods and Impressions*

Using primary sources, biographies, memoirs, government documents, and interviews, this study finds that there are many points of contact between the policy streams model and the agenda rise of defense reorganization that culminated in the passage of the GNA. The analysis to reach this interim conclusion is reported using a



framework that follows the outline of chapter III and records observations and analysis using selected components, elements, and criteria from Kingdon's policy streams model. A simple coding system of positive, negative, or null is used to describe the fit of the data to the five components of the model and their associated elements. Using this framework and the Venn diagram of Figure 3.1, the following discussion examines the five main components of the policy streams model, in turn, and discusses the data regarding defense reorganization and the passage of the GNA. Table 5.1 summarizes key events in the passage of the GNA chronologically.

*Table 5.1: Chronology of Defense Reorganization and Classification in Kingdon's Model*

Date	Event	Classification in Kingdon's model
1903	Elihu Root, Secretary of War, pushes for reorganization in the Department of War and gets passage of the General Staff Act of 1903 (Locher, 2002b, p. 17; Millett & Maslowski, 1994, p. 327).	Origins: Infinite regress Symbols: Early warning
1903	Elihu Root, Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy enter an agreement that creates the Army-Navy board for "all matters calling for cooperation of the two services" (Davis, V., 1972 quoted in Locher, 2002b, p. 17).	Origins: Infinite regress Symbols: Early warning
Feb. 9, 1942	First meeting of what became the JCS in what became known as "the tank" –the JCS conference room (Goldwater, 1988, pp. 335-336).	Government processes: Personal agendas and jurisdiction
Jul. 26, 1947	President Truman signs the National Security Act, which reorganized the War and Navy Departments and created the Department of the Air Force under the National Military Establishment). The act also created the Central Intelligence Agency (Balogh, Grisinger, & Zelikow, 2002, p. 134; Light, p. 242; Trask & Goldberg, 1997, p. 1).	Origins: Infinite regress Symbols: Early warning
Sep. 17, 1947	James Forrestal is sworn in as the first SECDEF (Trask & Goldberg, 1997, preface).	Participants on the inside of government. Policy entrepreneur.
Oct. 1948	President Truman establishes the first Hoover Commission. The Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of Government includes a panel to examine the DOD, specifically the shortcomings of the National Security Act of 1947 (Locher, 2002b, p. 26).	Policy entrepreneur, coupling, bandwagons and tipping
Oct. 1948	The Hoover Commission turns its attention to the National Military Establishment (NME) (Lederman, 1999, p. 18).	Policy entrepreneur, coupling, bandwagons and tipping
1949	The "revolt of the admirals" in response to SECDEF Louis Johnson's decisions to cancel the construction of the USS United States, the Navy's new aircraft carrier, in favor of the B-36 bomber aircraft for the Air Force (Clarfield, 1999, pp. 81-85).	Incrementalism & Focusing event

*Table 5.1: Chronology of Defense Reorganization and Classification in Kingdon's Model*

Date	Event	Classification in Kingdon's model
Mar. 1949	Based on the report of the first Hoover Commission, President Truman recommends legislation that becomes the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 (Locher, 2002b, p. 26).	Policy entrepreneur, coupling, bandwagons and tipping
Feb. 11, 1953	President Dwight D. Eisenhower appoints the Committee on Department of Defense Organization, led by Nelson Rockefeller, to study defense organization (a.k.a. the "Rockefeller Committee" (Ward, 1993, p. 179)	Symbols: Early warning & preexistent perception of a problem. Policy entrepreneur.
Apr. 11, 1953	The "Rockefeller Committee" submits its final report with recommendations for organizational change in three DOD areas: lines of authority in the DOD; performance of the JCS; efficiency of DOD mission performance (Ward, 1993, p. 180).	Symbols: Early warning & preexistent perception of a problem. Policy entrepreneur & bandwagons and tipping.
Apr. 30, 1953	President Eisenhower submits a letter, known as Reorganization Plan 6, to Congress. The letter contains recommendations for reorganization in the DOD based on the Rockefeller Commission report (Ward, 1993, p. 181).	Origins: All Perception of a problem
Jun. 30, 1953	Reorganization Plan 6 becomes law. Reorganization plans became law after 60 days if Congress did not act with the passage of unfavorable legislation to block a reorganization plan (Ward, 1993, p. 183).	Origins: All Policy entrepreneur.
Jul. 10, 1953	President Eisenhower forms the second Hoover Commission, again led by former President Herbert Hoover. The Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of Government includes a panel to examine the DOD (Ward, 1993, p. 228).	Perception of a problem
1955	The "Report on Business Organization of the Department of Defense" is submitted to Congress by the second Hoover Commission (Ward, 1993, p. 228).	Symbols: Early warning & preexistent perception of a problem. Policy entrepreneur & bandwagons and tipping.
1958	Colonel Goldwater publishes a monograph on the future organization of the United States military with a central theme unity of action. He boldly stated, "our mission is to defend the United States, Canada, Alaska, and the northeast area from an attack: NOT TO DEFEND THE ROLES OF THE RESPECTIVE SERVICES" (Quoted in Edwards, 1995, p. 449).	Symbols: Preexisting perception of a problem
Apr. 3, 1958	President Eisenhower proposes legislation that becomes the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (Ward, 1993, p. 233).	Symbols: Early warning & preexistent perception of a problem. Policy entrepreneur & bandwagons and tipping.
Aug. 6, 1958	Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 signed into law by President Eisenhower (Ward, 1993, p. 234.).	Origins: All Perception of a problem
1966 to 1973	The Navy and Air Force avoid conflict with each other's aerial operations by use of a route package system over Vietnam.	Perception of a problem
1968	The capture of the <i>Pueblo</i> by North Korean forces (Kitfield, 1995, pp. 278).	Focusing event: Crisis Symbol: proximity of events

*Table 5.1: Chronology of Defense Reorganization and Classification in Kingdon's Model*

Date	Event	Classification in Kingdon's model
Jul. 1, 1970	<i>Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense</i> , by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel is submitted (President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 1970).	Origins: All Perception of a problem
Jul. 1, 1974 to Jun. 30, 1978	General Jones serves as the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (Trask & Goldberg, 1997, p. 149),	Participant on the inside of government
Jun. 21, 1978 to Jun. 18, 1982	General Jones serves as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Trask & Goldberg, 1997, p. 146),	Participant on the inside of government
1975	The pirating of the <i>Mayaguez</i> by Cambodian forces (Kitfield, 1995, p. 278).	Focusing event: Crisis Symbol: proximity of events
1977-1980	The Defense Reorganization Studies are commissioned by President Carter and begun but not completed.	Origins: All Symbols: Preexistent perception of a problem & Early warning
Nov. 4, 1979	Iranians storm the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran and take American personnel hostage (Goldwater, 1988, p. 345).	Focusing event: Crisis Symbol: proximity of events
Jan. 1980 to Jan. 1988	Ronald Reagan holds office as President of the United States	Participant on the inside of government
Oct. 1980	The Credible Sport project tests its new hardware—a heavily modified C-130 aircraft. The test ends with the crash of the aircraft which also terminates the project—intended as a second Iranian hostage rescue attempt (Interview with Colonel James Poole, Credible Sport aircrew member).	Focusing event: Crisis Symbol: proximity of events
Apr. 24, 1980	Operation EAGLE CLAW, the U.S. military attempt to rescue 52 remaining American hostages being held in Tehran, Iran (Kreisher, 2000; Shaw & Warnock, 1997, p. 91)	Focusing event: Crisis Symbol: proximity of events
Jan. 18, 1981	American hostages in Iran are released after 444 days of being held against their will (Shaw & Warnock, 1997, p. 94).	Focusing event: Crisis Symbol: proximity of events
Jan. 21, 1981 to Nov. 23, 1987	Caspar Weinberger holds office as SECDEF (Trask & Goldberg, 1997, p. 143).	Participant on the inside of government
Feb. 23, 1981	The Chairman's Special Study Group (CSSG), led by William Brehm, is commissioned (Locher, 2002b, p. 50)	Policy communities: shared concern & relationships between specialists. Primeval soup: Floating ideas & idea advocacy. Criteria for survival: Technical feasibility and value acceptability. Coupling: Problem to policy

*Table 5.1: Chronology of Defense Reorganization and Classification in Kingdon's Model*

Date	Event	Classification in Kingdon's model
Feb. 1982 to Mar. 1982	Arch Barrett convinces Congressman Dick White to look into defense reorganization (Locher, 2002a, pp. 39-40).	Problem recognition and policy entrepreneur
Feb. 3, 1982	General David Jones testifies before a closed session of the HASC (Locher, 2002b, p. 33)	Problem recognition and policy entrepreneur
Apr. 1982	The CSSG submits its final report, known as the Brehm Report, to General Jones (CSSG, 1982).	Policy communities: shared concern & relationships between specialists. Primeval soup: Floating ideas & idea advocacy. Criteria for survival: Technical feasibility and value acceptability. Coupling: Problem to policy
Mar. 1982	General Jones publishes <i>Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff must change in Directors &amp; Boards</i> (Jones, 1982b)	Primeval soup: Floating ideas
1983	Arch Barrett completes his work, <i>An analysis of the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980</i> (Barrett, 1983).	Participant on the inside of government
Feb. 2, 1983	Congressman William Nichols (D-AL) becomes Chairman, Investigations Subcommittee of the HASC, replacing retiring Congressman Richard White (D-TX) (Locher, 2002b, p. 94)	Policy entrepreneur
Feb. 17, 1983	Mass media "jumped" on Jones proposals following Jones interview with John Chancellor of NBC. Story is carried by the <i>New York Times</i> , <i>Washington Post</i> , and <i>Wall Street Journal</i> (Locher, 2002b, p. 38-39).	The national mood: All Political stream and the big picture: All
Jun. 1983	The CSIS study, <i>Toward a more effective defense</i> , is launched by Phil Odeen, Andrew Goodpastor, and Melvin Laird (Locher, 2002b, p. 167).	Policy communities: All Primeval soup: All Criteria for survival: All Coupling: All
Jun. 21, 1983	Senator John Tower (R-TX), Chairman of the SASC, announces the start of comprehensive hearings on defense organization. James Locher is assigned led role to conduct the inquiry. This leads to the production of <i>Defense organization: The need for change</i> , a.k.a. "Locher Report" (Locher, 2002b, pp. 116-117).	Government processes: Personal agendas and jurisdiction
Oct. 23, 1983	Bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 servicemen. Of those killed, the marine fatalities were the "greatest number of marine deaths in a single day since the World War II battle of Iwo Jima" (Kitfield, 1995, p. 260; Locher, 2002b, p. 127).	Focusing event: Crisis Symbol: proximity of events
Oct. 25, 1983 to Nov. 2, 1983	Operation URGENT FURY, the military operations to evacuate American students from the Caribbean island of Grenada (Shaw & Warnock, 1997, p. 102).	Focusing event: Crisis Symbol: proximity of events
Jan. 1985	Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) appointed to be Chairman, SASC (Goldwater, 1988, p.	Government processes: New personnel with new agendas.

*Table 5.1: Chronology of Defense Reorganization and Classification in Kingdon's Model*

Date	Event	Classification in Kingdon's model
Feb. 1985	The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Defense Reorganization Project submits its final report, <i>Toward a more effect defense</i>	Policy communities: shared concern & relationships between specialists. Primeval soup: Floating ideas & idea advocacy. Criteria for survival: Technical feasibility and value acceptability. Coupling: Problem to policy
Jun. 17, 1985	President Reagan announces the formation of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission) after a long and delicate series of background maneuvers by executive and congressional branch staffs	Organization of political forces: All Political stream and the big picture: All
Oct. 5, 1985 to Oct. 6, 1985	Reorganization retreat at Fort A.P. Hill. Attendees included former SECDEFs Harold Brown & James Schlesinger; former CJCS Admiral Thomas Moorer and General David Jones; prominent Congressmen and Senators; SASC staffers (Edwards, 1995, p. 452; Locher, 2002b, pp. 333-345).	Criteria for survival: All. Consensus building: Bargaining and concessions. Policy entrepreneur: Coupling.
Oct. 16, 1985	<i>Defense organization: The need for change</i> , a.k.a. "Locher Report," is published and publicly available (Locher, 1985).	Consensus building: Bargaining and concessions. Policy entrepreneur: Coupling.
Feb. 3, 1986	Senator Barry Goldwater begins duties as Chairman, SASC, replacing Senator John Tower (R-TX). Also, Goldwater's first meeting with the JCS in "the tank" (Goldwater, 1988, p. 334; Locher, 2002b, p. 3)	Consensus building: Bargaining and concessions. Policy entrepreneur: Coupling.
May 7, 1986	Senate votes 95-0 in favor of the legislation that became the Goldwater-Nichols Act following conference committee action. (Edwards, 1995, p. 455).	Policy window
Aug. 5, 1986	The House approves the defense authorization bill for 1987 by a vote of 406-0 with H.R. 4370, the House version of what became the GNA, as a rider (Locher, 2002b, p. 425).	Policy window
Sept. 15, 1986	Senate passes GNA conference report, H.R. 3622, by voice vote (Locher, 2002b, p. 428).	Policy window
Sept. 16, 1986	House passes GNA conference report, H.R. 3622, by voice vote (Locher, 2002b, p. 428).	Policy window
Oct. 1, 1986	President Reagan signs the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 into law as Public Law 99-433 (United States, 1986b)	Policy window

*The Problem Stream: Heart of the Model*

As Kingdon outlines his model three separate streams (problem, policy, and political) must overlap to create a policy window. This study maintains that problems are the heart of the policy streams model. If there were no problems, then there would be no need for policy alternatives since policy alternatives are proposals for doing something about a condition—Kingdon's definitions in reverse. Likewise, without policies there would be little purpose for political behavior—bargaining, compromise, bandwagons, and all types of methods of persuasion associated with alternative selection. Thus, problems are the central element of the policy streams model and the most focused of the three streams. The sole focus of the problem stream is problems, which are conditions that decision makers have decided can be addressed by government. This process entails its own complex set of factors as discussed previously.

Kingdon provides four criteria to evaluate conditions and define them as problems: indicators, focusing events, symbols, and values. The boundaries among these criteria are porous, allowing conditions in one criterion to show up in another criterion—a common feature among the components, elements, and criteria of Kingdon's model.

Indicators and Focusing Events

Kingdon's indicators are typically statistical measures of events and processes that provide quantitative feedback to policy makers. For the GNA debates, some highly visible quantitative indicators were the outrageous prices being paid for seemingly common items—hammers, coffee pots, and wrenches, to name a few. The prices paid may not have been outrageous if all the accounting factors were known, but DOD officials were unable to make the case for the costs and the public was convinced of deep

problems in the DOD, particularly in defense acquisition. Each of these overpricing events served to focus the attention of a public that sought to know what they were getting for their tax dollars during the rising defense budgets of the Reagan years.

As a nation, the United States has a proud military history as a whole and among the individual Services. From the Revolutionary War up through the beginning of WWI, American warfare was compartmentalized by the warfighting medium—sea or land. During WWI, aerial warfare added a third dimension with the advent of aircraft in warfare. However, pride in any one Service, if taken too far, leads to parochialism—the advancement of Service interests ahead of national interests. Moving forward to WWII, the demands of modern warfare had made it clear to then General Eisenhower that the separate, parochial employment of military power was no longer compatible with national defense. The roots of a problem were plainly evident, but Service/cultural pride is not easily dismissed.

### Symbols

Kingdon identifies the preexistent perception of a problem as one criterion that marks the presence of a problem. When the preexistent notion is linked to a focusing event that event becomes a symbol for the problem: “In general, such a symbol acts (much as personal experiences) as reinforcement for something already taking place and as something that rather powerfully focuses attention, rather than as a prime mover in agenda setting” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 97). For General Eisenhower, WWII was a powerful focusing event that came to symbolize the nature of organizational problems in the DOD:

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. Peacetime preparation and organization activity must conform to that fact. Strategic

and tactical planning must be completely united, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. (Quoted in Lederman, 1999, p. 21).

Despite this admonition and a long, public battle with status quo hard-liners, the Services pursued parochial interests as epitomized by the rivalry between the Navy and the Air Force over the control of the role of aircraft and nuclear weapons during what became the Cold War. This fight between the Air Force and the Navy is just one example of the "inherent tensions in American military organization" (Lederman, 1999, pp. 1-4).

Airpower had proven its worth during WWII, winning the Air Force independence from the Army. Nuclear weapons had also proven their military capability and awesome destructive power. The Service that obtained the lead role in any warfare activity, such as weapons development, combat procedures, or force employment, would garner prestige and political influence to obtain limited defense dollars in the post-WWII federal budget (see Clarfield, 1999). Thus, the competition for control over airpower and nuclear weapons would be waged primarily between the Air Force and the Navy, but the Army was not left on the sidelines (see Byron, 1983, pp. 5-9).

### *Early Warning*

Modern parochialism is rooted in the National Security Act of 1947, which created an independent Air Force at the same time it created the National Military Establishment (NME) and subordinated the military departments under a single civilian secretary, the Secretary of Defense. The 1949 Amendment to the NSA continued the centralization of military authority with the subordination of the armed forces from



executive-level departments to military departments. As discussed in chapter I, it was SECDEF Forrestal that pushed for defense organization changes in 1949 that he had adamantly opposed in the debates before the passage of the NSA. Only after becoming the SECDEF did he realize the unworkable nature of the defense organization he had promoted so vigorously as Secretary of the Navy (Clarfield, 1999, p. 59). However, the Navy and the Air Force held onto their parochial views tenaciously for nearly four decades. The crux of the Navy-Air Force tension was in nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them on targets (Clarfield, 1999, pp. 81-85).

The Air Force doctrine of the era focused on strategic bombing—vast numbers of large bombers flying over the armies in the field to strike at the heart of the enemy's military production, supply, and economy. Meanwhile, the Navy pursued a tradition of power projection from the sea and needed a new large-deck aircraft carrier to employ naval aviation. To incorporate the newfound capabilities of airpower and nuclear weapons, the Air Force proposed the B-36 as an intercontinental nuclear bomber and the Navy planned to use its upcoming aircraft carrier, the USS *United States*, dubbed a super-carrier, to project nuclear power from much smaller ship-borne aircraft. Louis Johnson, the Secretary of Defense from 1949-1950, acting on advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, canceled the *United States* over the vehement objections of senior Navy officials. So strong were the sentiments that the episode is known as "the revolt of the Admirals" (Clarfield, 1999, pp. 81-85). This type of cultural cleavage between two branches of the military, in this instance the Air Force and Navy, continues to this day and is marked by operational military failures such as the establishment of separate areas of responsibility during the Vietnam War that kept the Services' operations separate. This occurred

despite the longstanding principles of war, found in Service and Joint Doctrine, that espouse unity of effort, synergy, and massing of forces, to name a few, rather than single-Service areas of operation (see Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 10 September 2001, appendix A).

### *Perception of a Problem*

Moving forward to the Vietnam War era, the cultural cleavages between the Services were again evident in the manner the United States divided Vietnam into zones—route packages—for aerial operations. The Navy controlled route packages nearest the open ocean where the carriers were assigned, while the Air Force had route packages further inland and adjacent to its land-based aircraft airfields. The Air Force further divided its areas between fighters and bombers. The net effect was to bring United States' military power to bear in piece-meal fashion rather than each Service acting in concert with the others.

In the end, the United States withdrew from Vietnam in defeat despite winning nearly all the tactical battles of the war. These tactical victories cost the lives of an unknown number of Vietnamese alongside 55,000 American fatalities. Within two years of the departure of the United States' military forces, Saigon fell to North Vietnamese forces and signaled an end to United States' involvement in Southeast Asia. While international politics were certainly a powerful contextual element, the indicators of organizational cleavages within the Department of Defense that Eisenhower had spoken out against—and made policy recommendations to cure—were clearly evident. Furthermore, Eisenhower's recommendations were in response to problems of coordinating and integrating military operations across the Services towards common

goals—a problem-policy construct of the agenda setting process that is *contrary to Kingdon's policy-problem construct*.

Vietnam reveals that problems regarding the organization of military forces for employment within the Department of Defense are not new. Furthermore, despite the formidable support from Eisenhower for reorganization, both as the senior-ranking United States officer to emerge from WWII and as President, the cleavages described above continued to dominate the specification of alternatives for defense reorganization policy throughout the GNA debates and beyond. However, it was the illumination of new set of organizational problems in 1982 that began the GNA debates.

#### *The Policy Stream: Actors and Ideas?*

As the history of the major legislation concerning the organization of the Department of Defense attests, Defense reorganization is not a new idea or issue, but its prominence on the governmental agenda rises and falls according to the actions of policy entrepreneurs. The initial analysis of the policy stream for this study began with the sudden reemergence of defense reorganization on the governmental agenda in 1982. Arch Barrett, a senior staff member working for the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and a retired Air Force fighter pilot with Vietnam experience, identifies the February 3, 1982 Congressional testimony by General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as the action that ushered defense reorganization onto the governmental agenda for the first time since 1958 (Jones interview, Aug. 20, 2002; see also Kitfield, 1995; Lederman, 1999; Locher, 2002b). Not since General Marshall's 1943 proposals had a sitting CJCS openly criticized the organization he nominally led (Kitfield, 1995, p. 249; Lederman, 1999, p. 11). It is noteworthy that Jones' testimony is

absent from the *Chronology of the United States Air Force: 1947-1997* significant events (Shaw & Warnock, 1997, p. 97).

In an interview with Locher, Jones made it clear that he was fully aware his testimony would spark controversy and that Jones hoped it would move Congress to legislate changes for the JCS that it was incapable of imposing on itself (Locher, 2002a, p. 20). In fact, Jones' article in *Directors & Boards* closes with a description of how Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan viewed the Navy reorganization at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. "Admiral Mahan concluded that no Service could agree to give up sovereignty, but would have to have reorganization forced upon it from outside the organization (Jones, 1982a, p. 13). Jones continues, stating "The Services have an understandable desire to protect organizational interests....Nevertheless, we cannot escape the fact that our national security today requires the integration of Service efforts more than at any time in our history" (Jones, 1982a, p. 13). Jones goes on to provide proposals that would move the DOD to a unified structure to cure the divisiveness of Service parochialism.

#### *The Policy Stream: Ideas and Issues?*

Jones' actions illuminate the central difficulty with terms used in the policy streams model. What are the boundaries between the major components, elements, and criteria? When does the visibility of a policy area (focusing event criteria for the problem stream) become the presentation of shared concerns within a policy community (policy community criteria in the policy stream)? In other words, the presence of a problem in defense organization is documented above in terms of indicators, focusing events, and symbols, and here we have a description of Jones' testimony as the focusing event that brought defense reorganization policy alternatives to the table. It can also be argued that

Jones' testimony was the merger—coupling—of the problem and policy streams. The examination of the circumstances that led to Jones' testimony provides some clarity, but leaves the door open for further investigation and *begins to cast doubt on the clarity of the elements and criteria Kingdon uses to define the bounds of the problem stream.*

It is also tempting to create additional policy streams model sets—one for the reorganization and one for maintenance of the status quo. Kingdon discounts the specification of the status quo as a policy alternative and focuses only on changes to the status quo as policy alternatives. However, *the decision not to act is just as much a decision and enactment of policy as the decision to change.* This tension between policy alternatives creates the appearance of a separate policy streams model set—a problem of model clarity that will reappear in subsequent discussion of policy entrepreneurs lying in wait, which leads us back to focusing events and symbols—again.

#### Focusing Events and Symbols—Again

The organizational logic that produced single-Service areas of operation during the Vietnam conflict continued after the war and produced situations that resulted in highly visible military failures. These military failures serve as focusing events and symbols for change in defense organization (see Lovelace, 2000, pp. 70-73). These events include: the capture of the *Pueblo* in 1968 by North Korean forces; the pirating of the *Mayaguez* by Cambodian forces in 1975; the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran in April of 1980 (Operation EAGLE CLAW) (Kitfield, 1995, pp. 226-227, 278); the subsequent failure of a follow-up hostage rescue plan known as Credible Sport, in October of 1980. These incidents highlighted that “crises requiring a joint military response...were a list of infamy” (Kitfield, 1995, p. 278).

For eight years, from 1974 to 1982, General Jones consecutively held the two highest ranking military positions for an officer. From 1974 to 1978, Jones was the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force—the senior ranking officer in the Air Force, and from 1978 to 1982 he was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)—the highest ranking officer in the military. The point is that Jones saw the nation's military failures from the nation's most senior military positions, and these events focused his attention and that of others in the defense policy community that shared concerns for American military prowess.

In Kingdon's construct, ideas are floated about in the policy primeval soup where policy entrepreneurs act as members of a policy community to advocate ideas and couple them to conditions (that can be defined as problems). However, *in this study the presence of a condition—defined as a problem—appears to precede the floating of ideas in the primeval soup*. Kingdon also allows for the separation and independence of the three streams and then describes the close intermingling of ideas and vague separation of terms to distinguish between the problem and policy streams (1995, pp. 228-229). The data for this study follows this pattern: first with the development of conditions into problems that become symbols by virtue of their proximity; and second these problems develop a following of concerned members in the policy community who share ideas for reasons that are open to subjective judgment (personal gain or good public policy—or both?). A closer examination of the events that demonstrate this coupling is in order.

#### *The Pueblo and Mayaguez Incidents*

These events of "infamy" were due largely to organizational issues that precluded timely response by any American forces from a single Service or jointly, where a joint

operation requires participation from two or more of the military departments (see Joint Publication 1-02, *Dictionary of Military Terms*). The *Pueblo* incident was particularly embarrassing for the United States since the North Koreans captured the crew and vessel in international waters with much of its highly classified intelligence-gathering equipment and materials intact. Organizationally, the United States was unable to mount a response to aid the *Pueblo* despite having a limited, but useable, four hour window of opportunity (Locher, 2002b, p. 30). The American response to the *Mayaguez* pirating was similarly tardy. United States forces recaptured the crewless vessel after it had been towed to a Cambodian port and then mounted a retaliatory attack on Cambodian forces resulting in 18 deaths and 50 casualties to United States' forces (Locher, 2002b, p. 30).

*Operation EAGLE CLAW and Credible Sport*

General Jones was in the National Military Command Center when Operation EAGLE CLAW turned into a disaster at the ground rendezvous point inside Iran known as Desert One (Jones interview Sep. 19, 2002). Eight servicemen—three Marines and five Airmen—were killed in an inferno when one of the helicopters collided with a parked C-130 aircraft while repositioning to execute the decision to abort the mission due to other equipment malfunctions (Lederman, 1999, pp. 30, 51). According to one account, Operation EAGLE CLAW involved forces from all four Services who had trained and rehearsed separately for the rescue attempt—using equipment for the first time as the mission was executed and not meeting each other until the rendezvous at Desert One (Kreisher, 2000). The nation lost brave and daring men as well as creating an image of American military impotence.

To counter this image, the Air Force Special Operations Command devised a plan requiring over 60,000 modifications to each of three C-130 Hercules aircraft to enable them to land in the Tehran soccer stadium, pick up the American hostages, turn around and take off again. During its one test flight to demonstrate the very short field takeoff and landing capabilities to a group of high-ranking military and political leaders, the demonstration aircraft successfully took off in the required distance, but then crashed during the landing when the specially-fitted retro-firing rockets misfired and severed the left wing of the aircraft. The crew survived, but the second rescue plan was scrubbed—highlighting the military's organizational impotence to come together in a time of crisis and successfully execute essential operations. Colonel James Poole was among the aircrews selected to fly the Credible Sport aircraft if the mission was executed. He witnessed the crash of the Credible Sport aircraft on its only test flight and only reluctantly speaks of it 23 years later (Poole interview, Mar. 7, 2003).

In Kingdon's terms, these events were early warning symbols of underlying organizational problems made evident by the proximity of the events. This symbolism was a near fatal blow to the image of American military power that was still reeling from the effects of the Vietnam War. However, *the policy streams model does not identify a specific mechanism or action that would signal the coupling of the problem and policy streams*. Certainly, General Jones' testimony served to move the streams closer together and perhaps even to overlap, but no trigger mechanism is suggested by Kingdon's model.

#### Policy Communities and Coupling the Problem and Policy Streams

National defense has always drawn a great deal of attention from various policy communities. Some communities ride the coattails of defense budgets; some favor social



programs in lieu of military spending; while others simply attempt to bolster the nation's defense. It is this last community, those that share an interest in bolstering the nation's defense, which provided the support for the policy entrepreneurs as they advocated change. Within the JCS, General Jones found support from General Ed Meyers, the Army Chief of Staff. Various think tanks and consultant firms joined in support of General Jones but active-duty military support was longer in coming (see AFJI, Jun. 1982). In the end, several senior officers, including Navy admirals, publicly supported Jones during the reorganization debates (see AFJI, Aug. 1982).

Jones was clearly the policy entrepreneur at this time, coupling the problem and policy streams. However, *Jones' actions before February 3, 1982 are not definitively characterized as either problem definition or policy formulation in the policy primeval soup because Kingdon's terms do not provide sufficient clarity between the two to separate these behaviors in practice.* Jones cannot be separated from his perceptions of the military failures he saw; he is also a part of the alternative specification, based on his perceptions of events. Furthermore, Jones was also working the political stream as he floated ideas that defined problems that can be described as advancing his personal agenda (Jones interview, Sep. 19, 2002), a criterion in support of a government process in the political stream. At this point elements from all three streams are now active. The problem and policy streams have merged and Jones' political activities are drawing in elements from the political stream. However, further analysis using Kingdon's "policy primeval soup" is in order before proceeding to the political stream.

### Primeval Soup: Floating Ideas

Jones published his reorganization views in a highly respected, but low circulation, professional business journal—*Directors & Boards*—in February 1982. Jones wanted his article, “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change,” on the public record as part of a strategy that anticipated the official roadblocks and opposition he later encountered (Interview, Sep. 19, 2002). This strategy conforms to the bandwagon effort Kingdon describes as the emerging consensus in the policy stream. Recall that the emerging consensus is the diffusion of problem and solution awareness (communication) among policy specialists. This study holds that Jones’ strategy also impacted members of Congress toward the pro-reorganization task. Insiders knew how difficult the JCS processes were and recognized the importance of Jones’ actions. Here the data differ from Kingdon because *the policy streams model artificially limits consensus building among government officials to bargaining*. This limitation is imposed without explanation and seemingly limits politicians to joining a consensus only for avoidance of exclusion or to lay claim to benefits. The consensus for good public policy is discounted almost entirely, except as a personal motive (Kingdon, 1995, p. 39 and chapters 6 and 7).

### *Values: Criteria for Survival and Shaping Problem Definition*

Why would Jones take such bold action at the end of a distinguished military career? In short, he acted because of his values, something he had done boldly and tenaciously for many years. Throughout his career Jones sought to correct flaws, operational and organizational, in the units he commanded (Jones interview, Sep. 19, 2002). He determined that his last tour, as CJCS, would be no different. He chose to invest the time and resources (policy entrepreneur) to push and pull on the system to

garner support through persuasion and diffusion of the proposals throughout the policy community.

In February 1981, Jones commissioned Systems Research and Applications Corporation (SRAC) to conduct a defense reorganization study on the needs and organization of the JCS. Here again it is important to note the presence of blurred lines between terms, in this case, problem definition, values, and criteria for survival. In other words, problems are defined based on a value set, and value acceptability is one of the criteria for survival in the policy stream.

*Policy Entrepreneurs: Bandwagons and Tipping*

The momentum for change in the organization of the DOD was built because of Jones' belief that change was needed and his unique position to have his points of view heard and recorded in the public record. Jones certainly had contacts in think tanks, consultant firms, academe, and government. His challenge was to organize their interests alongside his own to create a bandwagon, based on the merits of his ideas for change. With the need for reorganization of the JCS as his basic idea, Jones sought other "specialists" to accept, using Kingdon's terms, the merits of his reorganization proposals for greater unification in the DOD. Jones also wanted political support for his idea, namely, the recommendations of a balanced and unbiased board of senior retired officers. He accomplished these ends with the creation of a study group

In February 1981, Systems Research and Applications Corporation was an experienced defense consulting firm from which the Chairman's Special Study Group (CSSG) was created and commissioned to study JCS organization and functions (CSSG, 1982). The CSSG was headed by William K. Brehm, a recent contributing consultant to

the JCS on two major exercises (Locher, 2002b, p. 50). Brehm held an impeccable reputation among senior military and political leaders, a reputation he earned as a high-ranking Pentagon official for ten years in positions that included Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs before retiring to consultant work with SRAC (Odeen, Goodpaster, & Laird, 1985, p. 64). Just as Jones' envisioned, the CSSG panel consisted of four retired four-star officers, one from each of the Services: General Walter Kerwin, USA; General William McBride, USAF; General Samuel Jaskilka, USMC; and Admiral Frederick Michaelis, USN (Locher, 2002b, p. 50).

The CSSG submitted its final report, *The Organization and Functions of the JCS*, to Jones in April of 1982. The CSSG report is now known as the *Brehm Report* and is similar to the 1945 Richardson Committee study in several ways. First, the studies were commissioned to examine the organization of major components of the DOD at a time when focusing events and symbols made it apparent that change was needed. Second, both reports recommended major military reorganization into a more unified military department (Locher, 2002b, pp. 23-24). The *Brehm Report* begins by quoting Thomas Paine: "A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom" and foreshadows the CSSG call for reorganization (CSSG, 1982, p. 1).

The Brehm Report concludes with seven recommendations for the JCS: (a) Creation of a Vice-Chairman position to assist the Chairman in heading a strengthened staff; (b) refocusing the JCS "on issues of national significance" by reducing "corporate consideration of [routine] issues" and strengthening the authority of the Chairman to

resolve issues; (c) require the Joint Staff to prepare the Service Chiefs for JCS meetings and aid in resolving joint issues; (d) abolish the rule by committee processes of the Joint Chiefs; (e) improve the quality of Joint Staff officers and officers assigned to theater command staffs; (f) involving theater commanders and their staffs in Joint Staff decisions; (g) strengthen the role of the Joint Staff in military decision-making through reorganization (CSSG, 1982, pp. 65-72). These recommendations mimic and expand upon Jones' proposals to "strengthen the role of the Chairman," "limit Service staff involvement in the joint process," and "broaden the training, experience and rewards for joint duty" (Jones, 1982b, pp. 11-13).

Through these and other actions, Jones built a support coalition within the policy community so that changes in the JCS system were not seen as a "Jones crusade." By the introduction of consultants (the CSSG) into the discussion, Jones broadened the push for change (Locher, 2002a, p. 32). However, Jones' push and pull efforts were insufficient to raise reorganization on the agenda very far or for very long. Recall the image of a public policy alternative as a medicine ball and it becomes clear that additional supporters would be needed to keep the policy on the governmental agenda.

### Criteria for Survival

Returning to the criteria for survival, the ideas for change in the organization and functions of the JCS contained in the *Brehm Report* mirrored Jones' own reorganization proposals from his February 3, 1982 testimony and published articles (Jones, 1982a, 1982b). The staff restructuring and quality enhancement were technically feasible, as were the proposals for strengthening the role of the Chairman and the Joint Staff to

rectifying authority with responsibility mismatches. The real tests were based on values that shaped perceptions of the impact of change on civilian control of the military.

As Jones' ideas gathered support from consultant reports—the CSSG and a 1985 report from a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) panel especially—and senior military officers (General Edward Meyer, USA, Chief of Staff; General John Vessey, USA, CJCS 1982-1985; Admiral William Crowe, USN, CJCS 1985-1989), the technical obstacles to defense reorganization shrank and exposed the values-based political battles (Kyle & Schemmer, 1982). Proponents felt that defense reorganization along the lines of Jones' and consultant report's recommendations would improve civilian control of the military while opponents argued the opposite. As Locher reports, the endorsement of the CSIS report by "so many prominent former officials...made it a legitimate issue on Capitol Hill and 'safe' for members to discuss" (2002b, p. 171). Six former Secretaries of Defense—Harold Brown (1977-1981), Clark Clifford (1968-1969), Melvin Laird (1969-1973), Robert McNamara (1961-1968), Elliot Richardson (1973), and James Schlesinger (1973-1975) endorsed the CSIS report (Odeen, et al., 1985, back cover). This enhanced defense reorganization's position in the governmental agenda and moved it upwards towards the decision agenda and was no doubt aided by the composition of the CSIS panel. The CSIS panel included Senators William Cohen (R-ME) and Sam Nunn (D-GA); Congressmen Les Aspin (D-WI) and Newt Gingrich (R-GA); Hon. William Brehm and Donald Rice; academics Barry Blechman and Samuel P. Huntington; Generals David C. Jones and Ed Meyer, to name but a few.

Values also shaped how Jones approached challenges. Throughout his career, Jones tackled problems head-on and normally worked within the system to correct them

until the system would no longer accept inputs. Shortly after Jones' statements went public, Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), told him to submit his proposals through the JCS (Locher, 2002b, p. 39). Ironically, these same JCS processes were the crux of the controversy as they fostered obstructionism and parochial views. According to Jones, the JCS's formal rules for the submission of advice stated

By law, if we cannot reach unanimous agreement on an issue, we must inform the Secretary of Defense. We are understandably reluctant to forward disagreements, so we invest much time and effort trying to accommodate differing views of the Chiefs. (Jones, 1982a, p. 7; see also Goldwater, 1988, p. 350)

Since Weinberger openly opposed reorganization and knew that the Navy and Marine Corps were against change, it may be assumed he knew that unanimity would not be forthcoming and the Jones' proposals would pass into obscurity through obstructionism in the JCS decision making system (see Locher, 2002b, p. 39).

Jones also provides statistics and analysis that support a view of a dysfunctional organization if the JCS is viewed "as the military board of a government corporation" (Jones, 1982a, p. 6). For example, "at 75% of the Board meetings, one or more of the directors are represented by substitutes" which inhibits continuity and slows an already cumbersome review and approval process for corporate activities (p. 6). These data from Jones served to sell his ideas for reform to the corporate-minded executives both within the government and in the private sector but Kingdon's model begins to break down when categorizing these data.

The policy streams model provides insufficient clarity between terms to determine objective measures for the criteria for survival, specifically the technical feasibility, value acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints. Jones' arguments and positions could easily be categorized in all three areas and all ideas that survive must survive Kingdon's criteria, but not all ideas rise to a decision agenda status or, if they do, all are not enacted. This is the core of debate in any organization. Within large organizations like the DOD, there will be no shortage of positions on a policy's technical feasibility, value acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints. In other words, *Kingdon gives us the criteria for survival without a means to measure the merits of each criterion or to compare the outcomes of one criterion test to another*. Without weighted measures, the criteria for survival become factors to consider rather than true criteria with weighted measures of merit.

### *The Political Stream: Balance and Positioning*

Both the problem and policy streams discussions have shown how Kingdon's model applies well to the data observed in the passage of the GNA. The fit has been assessed positive in each case yet ambiguities remain. This problem continues with the political stream in the struggle for balance in government evidenced by the posturing and positioning of participants to either advance or retard a policy alternative on the agenda.

### The National Mood

Kingdon criteria for assessing the national mood include the climate in the country, changes in public opinion, and broad social movements. Nearly a decade after the United States withdrew from Vietnam the climate in the country was neutral at best with regard to military matters. Military performance was taken for granted and



expected, but only in the “right” circumstances. The broad social movement against the war effort limited these “right” circumstances to only the gravest conditions of national survival, and even then some advocated for peace and surrender in the place of self-defense that may involve violence and warfare.

If the discussion of national mood were to end here, it would be a simple matter to develop a consensus of understanding of the national mood. But, Kingdon continues by defining the national mood as all three—climate in the country, changes in public opinion, and broad social movements—synonymously describing the national mood (1995, p. 146). He then posits that the national mood may not reside in the mass public but rather in the sense of public officials about what their constituents are really thinking, as synthesized by information from various opinion and news sources (pp. 149). These definitions of terms again blur the lines rather than clarify boundaries. If Kingdon had not provided the elaboration of these terms, or if one uses a summary form of Kingdon’s model (Parsons, 1995, pp. 192-194), it is a simple matter to provide data to support an assessment of the national mood. However, if an additional layer of personal, subjective assessment by public officials is added, the political stream begins to lose coherence. Thus, national mood in the GNA case is assessed only as a null. Regardless of the national mood, defense reorganization was on the governmental agenda in 1982, and it had only two directions to move—rising to the decision agenda or falling off the agenda completely. The processes of government would determine which way it would move.

#### Government Processes: The Means of Participant Influence

Arch Barrett was in the HASC chambers when Jones testified about the broken JCS system and immediately recognized the significance of Jones’ remarks (Kitfield,

1995, p. 249). Barrett's boss, the Chairman of the HASC Investigations Subcommittee, Congressman Richard White (D-TX), nodded politely but indicated no overt interest in pursuing the matter, citing a full workload for the committee (Locher, 2002a, pp. 39-40; Locher 2002b, p. 62). Barrett eventually persuaded White to take up the matter, but White's effort was lackluster because he was due to retire in less than one year. Barrett kept the issue alive in the HASC until Congressman Bill Nichols (D-AL) joined the fight when he assumed the post of Chairman of the HASC Investigations Subcommittee. Upon taking the role as Chairman on February 2, 1983 with full knowledge of "the previous year's exhaustive efforts [for defense reorganization], the slow-talking Nichols said: 'This is unfinished business. We need to put it on our agenda'" (Locher, 2002b, p. 94). However, many HASC staffers still viewed defense reorganization as Dick White's issue—one that would retire with him (Locher, 2002a, p. 75).

Locher reports that Nichols had significantly more political cache than White (2002b, p. 94) and that Nichols was widely well-regarded. A decorated WWII veteran who lost a leg as a result of combat, Nichols "always treated people 'with tremendous dignity'" (p. 95). These qualities gave him credibility within Congress and the defense policy community. However, Barrett continued as the primary policy entrepreneur for defense reorganization in the House as Nichols was beginning his tenure as Chairman of the HASC Investigations Subcommittee and saw the issue as the former chairman's unfinished business (p. 94). Due to the bicameral structure of the United States Congress, a policy entrepreneur in both chambers—the House and Senate—was needed to keep defense reorganization on the governmental agenda.

### Government Processes: Personal Agendas

In the Senate, Senator John Tower was working on a strategy to move from the Senate to the Department of Defense as the Secretary—a job he had openly sought since 1980 (Tower, 1991, p. 12). Tower recognized the movement in the defense reorganization policy community but preferred to maintain the status quo and actually favored defense reorganization along the lines recommended by Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, a decentralization of the DOD to pre-1947 structures (Tower, 1991, p. 247; Locher, 2002b, pp. 114-119). The basic logic supporting Krulak's view was that the nation had won WWII with a decentralized structure—a claim the centralized structure proponents could not make in light of American involvement in Korea and Vietnam. Seeking to capitalize on the activity in the defense policy community, Tower sought to study reorganization, apparently more for political clout than actual policy initiative. However, SASC Staffer James Locher was unaware of Tower's preferences for defense reorganization when he volunteered to lead the SASC study into defense reorganization announced by Tower in June of 1983 (Tower, 1991, p. 247; Locher, 2002b, pp. 116-117).

### Consensus Building, Political Maneuvers, and Bargaining

Locher began working on the report that finally emerged in 1985 as *Defense Reorganization: The Need for Change* for the SASC while other policy entrepreneurs and interest groups were also active—both in supporting reorganization and in trying to stop the reorganization effort. In formulating their approach to the study of defense reorganization, Locher and his team “prematurely focused on solutions,” analogous to Lindblom's successive limited comparisons. However, they were advised by SASC

Minority Staff Director James Roche, now Secretary of the Air Force and nominee to be the next Secretary of the Army, "to focus on problems and their causes....Only when you have precisely identified what needs to be fixed will you be able to formulate effective solutions" (Locher, 2002b, p. 118). Roche's advice advocated a rational approach by focusing on problems first and then a comprehensive approach to develop solutions based on the problems, rather than cursory impressions of problems. The final *Defense Reorganization* report totals 645 pages and can only be described as rational and comprehensive. *Defense Reorganization* covers the history of defense reorganization, detailing the debates and issues of the NSA debates. Locher's team also examined the extant defense reorganization studies conducted by academics and think tanks. Prominent studies include *Toward a More Effective Defense* (Feb. 1985), *Reappraising Defense Reorganization* (1983), and the *Brehm Report* (June 1982).

The completion of *Defense Reorganization* soon became the focus of survival for the defense reorganization debate. Opponents felt that if the report could be controlled or limited, the debate would die the status quo maintained. The SASC Chief of Staff, James McGovern, was opposed to reorganization and actively sought to transform the report, even ordering it to be edited to favor his position of decentralization while Locher was away on other SASC business (Locher, 2002b, p. 120). This was a blatant blocking activity and Kingdon states that blocking activities occur more frequently than positive activities, especially from interest groups (Kingdon, 1995, p. 69). As an extension of this criterion it seems likely that blocking activities dominate the defenders of the status quo, such as McGovern. Tower also participated in some blocking by isolating himself from the SASC staff, inserting McGovern between himself and communication from all SASC

staff members (Locher, 2002b, p. 120). This created significant friction between Locher and McGovern, but Locher continued work on the reorganization study. However, the motive or rationale for McGovern's blocking activity is not revealed in the data obtained. There may have been interest group linkages but *the policy streams model does not adequately discuss competition between the policy entrepreneurs for alternative specification dominance*. This behavior most closely fits as political behavior but there is no discussion of how competition from entrepreneurs from the same staff will impact alternative survival in the policy primeval soup. Nonetheless, these blocking activities were interrupted when Tower retired in 1984 (Tower, 1991, p. 31).

#### Returning to Governmental Processes: New Personnel

The departure of Tower set the stage for the entrance of Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) who became defense reorganization's most ardent advocate. Goldwater had been in the military, active duty and reserves, for more than 30 years. Upon taking the reins of the SASC, Goldwater held a meeting with his staff and advised them that they no longer needed to provide the chairman—him—with White Papers on every issue. Goldwater knew what he needed, and if he needed their assistance, which he doubted, he would let them know (Locher, 2002b, p. 215). McGovern was isolated from Locher's study team when Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), ranking minority member of the SASC, informed Goldwater that McGovern had been leaking drafts of Locher's work to John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy and a zealous opponent of any defense reorganization that centralized control and diminished his control over the Navy (Locher, 2002b, p. 220). Goldwater informed McGovern that Locher was to report directly to him for all reorganization matters and Nunn extended the isolation by removing his chief of staff

from the reorganization effort as well—leaving Locher as the sole SASC point-man for reorganization for *both* political parties.

The stage was set for committee debates and political maneuvers. Nichols and Barrett continued to have success in passing reorganization legislation in the House, but the Senate failed to act and the measures died. However, defense reorganization continued to hold agenda status while the Senate debates and processes stretched into months and years. Furthermore, academics, think tanks, researchers, and consultants continued their studies with proponents on both sides of the issue. However, as study results were made public, the case for defense reorganization appeared much stronger and moved ever higher on the decision agenda, sometimes aided by reorganization opponents. Arch Barrett recalls statements from Admiral Thomas Moorer, USN and former CJCS, fondly:

I came to welcome Moorer's testimony year after year...His poorly, though strongly argued positions against any change probably resolved or converted many members [of Congress] to favor reform. The alternative would be to associate themselves with the untenable positions of an intellectually shallow, superficial, self-serving, and curmudgeonly witness.

(Barrett quoted in Locher, 2002a, p. 73)

### *Participants*

The analysis so far has followed the appearance of defense reorganization on the governmental agenda and its migration to the decision agenda with HASC and SASC hearings. An emerging consensus was built as a growing number of prominent reorganization studies came out strongly in favor of reorganization. Some of these

studies were conducted by government officials; others were paid for by the government but conducted by consultants and academics; and yet others were completed as independent research efforts. Senator Tower baptized defense reorganization onto the decision agenda with the SASC hearings on defense reorganization in 1983, but the hearings were political maneuvers for his career more than for the merits of the alternative. Barrett and Nichols kept the issue alive in the House where defense reorganization measures passed in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 with the last measure being adopted, in part, by the Senate in their version of the GNA legislation. The 1984 measure also passed both houses as an amendment to the 1985 Defense Authorization Bill (S2407). While the 1984 changes to the DOD were considered “scrap” and insignificant to enact real change, Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO), a proponent for reorganization and prominent member of the HASC, commended an angry Arch Barrett on the “victory” as the first “JCS reform that’s passed Congress since 1958. We’ve broken the dam” (Kitfield, 1995, p. 282). While these various studies were highlighting the problems of defense organization and posing some alternatives for improvement, Locher and his team were busy with their reorganization study and preparing to implement Goldwater’s strategy for the SASC and Senate battles that lay ahead.

Many reorganization studies of the era, to include the most prominent ones—Brehm (CSSG, 1982), Barrett (1983), and CSIS (1985)—recommended policy alternatives that advanced unification and centralization of the DOD to increase civilian control of the military. These studies also recommended increasing the influence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide a unified vision and direction for the

military Services as one force. The emerging consensus for defense reorganization was so strong that shortly after assuming duties as the SASC Chairman in December 1984, Goldwater attended a briefing on the CSIS study given by the panel's vice chairman, General Andrew Goodpastor. The CSIS study was itself the object of political battles, but the credentials of the panel members were impeccable. During WWII, Goodpastor was a war planner for General George C. Marshall and was later staff secretary to President Eisenhower during the defense reorganization debates of 1958 (Locher, 2002b, p. 216; Goodpastor, 1977, biographical sketch). Goldwater was attentive, supportive, and animated during the briefing—but not openly committed to the effort (Locher, 2002b, p. 216). However, Goldwater soon became defense reorganization's leading advocate.

On the other side of the debate were those who favored the status quo—and one, Lieutenant General Victor “Brute” Krulak, who advocated a return to pre-1947 organizational structures under the rationale that these structures had won WWII; therefore, they must have been good (Krulak, 1983; Locher, 2002b, p. 119). Krulak was so persuasive that he convinced Senator Tower of the correctness of his retro-policy position. J. D. Hittle was also among the outspoken opponents of Locher's and Barrett's reorganization efforts. Hittle was a retired Marine Corps Brigadier General with the duty history of being in the official Marine Corps opposition group to the reorganization proposals of 1949, 1953, and 1958. In other words, Hittle had a long history of being on the point in opposing unification. As quoted earlier, Admiral Moorer was also a noted and vocal opponent, but one whose comments proponents came to welcome. However, the largest and most influential of the status quo hard-liners was Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. In his early years as the Secretary of the Navy, Lehman challenged and



defeated Congress on several issues and became regarded as one of the most powerful men in Washington, D.C.—surpassing his boss, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger handily (Locher, 2002b, pp. 252-253).

The pool of reorganization advocates and status quo hard-liners contains participants from every category named by Kingdon. As a micro-chasm of this pool, the CSIS study team included business leaders, consultants, researchers, academics, former administration officials, and political appointees. Specifically, the CSIS panel included prominent legislators—Les Aspin and William Cohen—who would later hold the office of SECDEF; Senator Sam Nunn, Congressman Newt Gingrich, Hon. William Brehm, and Donald Rice; academics Barry Blechman and Samuel P. Huntington; Generals David C. Jones and Ed Meyer. The forward to the CSIS report, “The View From the Top” endorsed the report and its recommendations with the signatures of six former secretaries of defense (Blechman & Lynn, 1985, p. x). The CSIS report was considered the most influential of the think tank reports and was central to focusing Goldwater’s attention to defense reorganization only two months before he took the reigns of the SASC as chairman (Kitfield, 1995, p. 284; Locher, 2002b, p. 216).

### *Building Bridges: Kingdon on Defense*

Applying Kingdon’s model to the CSIS study we find that the study forms a bridge across several components, elements, and criteria of the policy streams model. First, the CSIS study was “the most influential study in terms of the political debate then unfolding” (Locher, 2002b, p. 171). The influence of the study stemmed from the credibility of the Center and the credentials of its members. The credibility of the Center stemmed from the balance of views held by its members, including credible positions

offered by the status quo camp as well. Support for reorganization and opposition to reorganization both appeared within CSIS, but the unqualified position of the study panel members was pro-reorganization. CSIS members who opposed the positions being taken by the report—obtained while it was still in draft form—acted to thwart funding to the Center in an effort to stop the study while at the same time proffering their policy alternative. While both positions had technical feasibility and value acceptance, they differed on the means of achieving the ends of improved military performance.

A further bridge to the national mood was implied by the political overtones of the debate. The endorsement of the CSIS report by “so many prominent former officials...made it a legitimate issue on Capitol Hill and ‘safe’ for members to discuss” (Locher, 2002b, p. 171). Kingdon asserts that the national mood goes far beyond opinion polls and news coverage, but extends to the “sense” policy makers have regarding what people are talking about and what they are saying. In turn, it is impossible to separate what people said (a political stream criterion) from the discussions within the policy primeval soup (a policy stream criterion). In Kingdon’s terms, this might be considered softening up or consensus building (primeval soup criteria) or bandwagon behavior in either the policy (emerging consensus) or political (bargaining and concessions) stream.

Most importantly, the CSIS study began to open the policy window for defense reorganization due to the credibility of the study, the panel, and the sponsors. The CSIS study was quickly supported by further research efforts, to include the release of Locher’s *Defense Reorganization: The Need for Change*. Integrally linked to this policy window was the political maneuver by President Reagan to commission David Packard, the renowned industrialist (founder of Hewlett-Packard) and respected political appointee

(Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1969-1971), to lead a comprehensive study of defense management, covering virtually all aspects of the DOD, with a focus on business practices (President's Blue Ribbon Commission, 1986, Appendix, p. 27). This was a political maneuver by Reagan, who had mostly remained on the sidelines during the reorganization debates in order to defer to the judgment of his close friend, SECDEF Caspar Weinberger. Reagan's intentions for the Packard Commission are unclear, but Reagan provided unequivocal support to the Commission and their reports. The CSIS study and some proximate media coverage of focusing events—such as \$600 hammers and transport aircraft coffee pots that would brew coffee in conditions that would kill anyone actually in the aircraft—forced Reagan to take some action. Thus, the Packard Commission was formed. Locher had hoped that the Commission would release its reports before his own *Defense Reorganization*. However, it is likely that the outside opinions of the Packard Commission as expressed in reports released just as reorganization bills were being addressed in each chamber may have provided a “tipping point” of support for reorganization. Had the Commission released its reports sooner, the opponents of reorganization might have been more organized and the outcome of the floor votes might have been different.

### *Postscript*

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 continued a dramatic flow through the procedures of conference committee resolution, filing deadlines, and the congressional calendar—pushing the limits until the very end. In the Senate, S. 2295, the *Barry Goldwater Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* passed on a roll-call vote of 95-0 on May 7, 1986. In the House, H.R. 4370, the

*Bill Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* passed on approval of an amendment to attach H.R. 4370 to the defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1987. The vote was held on August 5, 1986 and the tally was 406-4 in favor. The conference committee reported out on September 12, 1986 with a resolved measure that was filed at 11 p.m. that evening with the Clerk of the House (Locher, 2002b, p. 428). President Reagan signed the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* into law on October 1, 1986.

### Spillover

The policy streams model has one element that can only be observed in retrospect—the spillover effect. This element occurs when high agenda status is achieved by an issue following on the success of a previous similar issue, typically from related policy communities within the same policy area (Kingdon, 1995, p. 190). This occurred dramatically following the passage of the GNA. The focus of the GNA was on the joint warfare operations of conventional combat (front-line fighting) forces. The GNA, in Section 212, directs studies for the consideration of creating three functional unified combatant commands—a strategic command, special operations command, and transportation command. The strategic command study would focus on the organization of nuclear forces; the special operations study concerned unconventional—special operations—forces; and the transportation command study examined the consolidation of military air, land, and sea transportation forces into a single command structure.

### *United States Transportation Command*

The creation of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in 1987 is significant because the JCS, led by General Jones, recommended the creation of a

consolidated transportation command in 1981 to meet the growing transportation needs of the modern United States military. This suggestion was met with a legal ban on the creation of such a command in the Fiscal Year 1982 DOD Authorization Act due to heavy lobbying by Army and Navy interests (Cole, Poole, Schnabel, Watson, & Webb, 1995, p. 101). Further spillover occurred when the Packard Commission recommended the creation of such a command in its February 1986 interim report. This was followed on April 1, 1986, by direction from President Reagan to SECDEF Weinberger to follow through and pursue the creation of a transportation command. After much debate within the Pentagon, an agreement was reached providing for the establishment of United States Transportation Command, USTRANSCOM, on July 1, 1987 (Cole et al., 1995, pp. 101-102).

*United States Special Operations Command and United States Strategic Command*

In similar fashion, suggestions for the creation of a special operations command had floated around in Washington for several years, but not until the national tragedy of EAGLE CLAW and embarrassment of Credible Sport was there a focusing event sufficient to alter the status quo. The Services were rightly concerned about command and control issues and the creation of a new "fifth Service" within the DOD (the Coast Guard is normally considered the fifth Service). Again, much debate and political positioning occurred with the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Defense Authorization Act of 1987 providing the legal basis for United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which established its headquarters on April 14, 1987 (Cole et al., 1995, pp. 97-101). Finally, the end of the Cold War led to changes with the Services'

“strategic” commands, resulting in the creation of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), on June 1, 1992 (pp. 108-112).

### Summary

Table 5.2 summarizes the assessments made during this analysis. It is not an exhaustive list of the elements and criteria in Kingdon’s model, but it is an attempt to break policy streams down into useful, observable components. The preponderance of the data presented in Table 5.2 suggests a positive relationship to Kingdon’s model. The areas with the greatest fit are in the participant categories and spillover. Kingdon’s model provides for participants from all walks of political life, thus there were no participants that could not be described by Kingdon’s terms. This was also a weakness

*Table 5.2: Policy Streams Components, Elements, Criteria, & Assessment of Data Fit*

Components	Elements	Criteria	Assessment
<b>Problem stream:</b> Problems are conditions we believe we should do something about—giving problems two elements, the event and a “perceptual, interpretative element” (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 109-110).	Indicators	Statistical data Feedback mechanisms	Positive
	Focusing Events	Visibility of policy area Basic unit of policy domain	Positive
	Symbols	Preexistent perception of a problem Early warning Proximity of events	Positive
<b>Policy stream:</b> Ideas of various participants are “floated around” between other participants where ideas recombine and change to overcome obstacles and emerge on the short list of ideas for serious consideration as the alternative choice for a problem from the problem stream (Kingdon, 1995, chapter 6).	Policy communities	Shared concern in specific area Relationships between specialists for the exchange of ideas	Positive
	Primeval soup	Floating ideas Idea promotion incentives Idea advocacy Future return	Positive
	Criteria for survival	Technical feasibility Value acceptability Anticipation of future constraints (budgetary and public acceptance)	Positive

*Table 5.2: Policy Streams Components, Elements, Criteria, & Assessment of Data Fit*

Components	Elements	Criteria	Assessment
<b>Political stream:</b> The perception of and reaction to various organized activities (Kingdon, 1995, p. 150).	Policy entrepreneurs & primeval soup	Emerging consensus "No new thing under the sun" Importance of available alternative	Positive
	The national mood	The climate in the country Changes in public opinion Broad social movements	Null
	Organized political forces	Pressure from interest groups The mobilization of electorates The actions of political elites	Positive
	Government processes	Personal agendas New personnel with new agendas Jurisdiction	Positive
	Consensus building	Emphasizes bargaining Concessions in return for support Concessions for fear of exclusion from benefits	Positive
	Political stream and the big picture	Maneuvering and bargaining Balance of forces vying for political power	Positive
<b>Policy Windows:</b> The coupling of the three streams—frequently limited by the ability to couple the political stream.	Coupling	Importance of coupling Seizing opportunities Problem windows Political windows	Positive
	Policy entrepreneurs	Qualities Entrepreneurs & coupling	Positive
	Occurrence of windows	Predictable windows Unpredictable windows Competition for place on agenda	Positive
	Spillovers	Related policy follows on the momentum of another	Positive
<b>Participants:</b> Participants include virtually everyone, either as an individual or as a member	Inside government	Administration Civil servants Capitol Hill	Positive

*Table 5.2: Policy Streams Components, Elements, Criteria, & Assessment of Data Fit*

Components	Elements	Criteria	Assessment
of a group. This conception integrates interest group theories and provides a means to discuss the importance of participants—they are the source of agenda items and alternatives (Kingdon, 1995, pp. 15-16).	Outside government	Interest groups Academics, researchers, consultants The media Elections-related participants	Positive

since Kingdon's model did not filter out anyone from being considered a participant. As the postscript section in the previous chapter showed, the creation of the United States Transportation Command, United States Special Operations Command, and the reorganization of the United States Strategic Command were all directly linked to the momentum for change associated with the Goldwater-Nichols Act. However, the fit of data with these two areas is not surprising and should be expected, given the broad latitude in Kingdon's definitions.

The latitude in terminology was also a factor in the areas with the most concerns about the fit of the data. These areas are the problem stream and the national mood. As has been stated before, Kingdon's policy-problem construct is not supported by the data, but rather a problem-policy construct. While the research does show that the idea of defense reorganization is not new, the specifics of each proposal differed at least on the margins. To take Kingdon's position would suggest that there truly is nothing new in the world so there is no need to try to develop policies to address the problems that are observed. Clearly, this is not desirable. In the national mood area, the inability to extract distinguishable definitions of terms from Kingdon highlights the slippery nature of his definitions. For example, Kingdon provides a concise statement of what he suggests is



the national mood (1995, p. 147) only to negate his own explanation in the following pages (pp. 148-150). This lack of clarity and confusion of terms leads directly to the conclusions in the following chapter.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

*All models are wrong. Some models are useful.*

Buster McCrabb

The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) stands out as a significant public policy event that raises many questions, and John Kingdon's policy streams model held the promise of providing some answers. While the declared purpose of this study was to understand why a major defense reorganization policy appeared after nearly four decades of inactivity, the study also provided an opportunity to evaluate the utility of Kingdon's frequently cited model in a new policy arena. Having examined the passage of the GNA and the policy streams model in detail, the following conclusions are presented.

### *Foundations, Fits and Flaws*

The policy streams model is enticing and intuitive at face value. The components, elements, and criteria described earlier make *prima facie* sense of a vastly complex array of independent variables by modeling them as three streams, each containing processes and behaviors that impact the movement of the stream and the interaction with the other two streams. Through the coupling of problem, policy, and political process streams, a policy window, an opportunity for action or serious consideration of given initiatives, is created (Kingdon, 1995, p. 168). In this policy window a policy choice, the serious consideration by decision makers of a specific alternative as the means to address a

specific problem, is possible. If the advocates of a policy have made the proper couplings among the three streams, the opportunity for a choice enacting their policy may soon follow. This study finds that defense is a complex policy arena with many interests and participants competing to shape the form and function of the Department of Defense. Needless to say, this was known at the outset. While the study did not find a definitive answer to why defense reorganization gained status on the governmental and decision agendas, Kingdon's model shed some light onto the study of the policy process.

### Foundations

When we look at the architecture of Kingdon's model we find that the political foundation was laid by the work of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and John Jay in the *Federalist Papers*. Kingdon's core components—the problem, policy, and politics streams—are all evident in the *Federalist Papers*. The central problems at that time concerned the “mischiefs of faction”—interest groups in today's vernacular. The policy alternatives that were presented were various forms of government, with the *Federalist Papers* advocating for the government structure we have today that addresses the politics of power sharing in a government for the people, by the people, and of the people. David Truman expands the political science foundation of the problem stream with his seminal work on the role of interest groups in American politics. In short, the study of American politics is the study of interest groups. Taking Truman's ideas a bit further, E. E. Schattschneider (1975) puts a point on the role of interest groups and ties them with Kingdon's policy and politics streams, respectively, with his claims that “*the definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power*” and “*organization is the mobilization of bias*” [emphasis in the original] (pp. 66, 69). In simple terms, deciding what the contents

are of the items to be considered for implementation is powerful. Secondly, organization implies purpose and membership implies a shared purpose—the mobilization of bias. Combined, Schattschneider's remarks imply that organizations have a view on issues and seek to define the alternatives in their interests. Kingdon's concepts of the problem, policy, and politics streams can be seen to incorporate these and many other social science theories. Focusing on the policy stream, we find another foundation built on the work of James Q. Wilson (1989) ("material" incentives for policy entrepreneurs), Charles Darwin (1859) and Richard Dawkins (1987) (evolution and the survival of ideas), and Douglass Cater (1964) (the content of ideas and political power) to name but a few. In short, Kingdon's model is a conglomeration of many ideas.

#### Fits

Kingdon's model has the respected work of many noted scholars as its foundation. This is strength because any model must have a solid basis. However, if there are too many foundational ideas, clarity may suffer. Overall, as Table 5.2 shows, the policy streams model and the passage of the GNA appear to fit together quite well. The components, elements, and criteria derived from Kingdon's model were all observed in the data surrounding the GNA debates.

Operational military failures served as focusing events and policy entrepreneurs were ready with solutions. Thus, the problem and policy streams were coupled, but the political environment was not receptive to reorganization. Although reorganization advocates held influential positions in the Congress, on committees, on congressional staffs, in think tanks, with consultant firms, and in academe, advocates of the status quo were present in abundance in powerful decision making positions as well. Secretary of

Defense Weinberger and Secretary of the Navy Lehman were adamantly opposed to congressional action. President Reagan sought neutral ground as a means to support his Secretary of Defense, a longtime friend, while not alienating powerful Senators and Representatives. In the end, the defense of the status quo was overcome by political factors and the proposed reorganization that is the GNA was passed into law. However, nagging questions remain. Kingdon's model helps us understand how the context of the time shaped the final outcome, but the ability to understand the specific mechanism that placed defense reorganization onto the agenda and then sustained and elevated it to the formal decision agenda of Congress was not found with Kingdon's model.

#### Flaws

The flaws in Kingdon's policy streams model outweigh the fits by a significant margin. This study concludes that eight flaws, including one with the central premise of the model, preclude the use of the model to explain why an idea's time has come. These flaws are Kingdon's inability to separate ideas beyond the most macro level. This leads to the central flaw in Kingdon's construct—he puts the formation of policy ahead of the determination of problems. He then justifies this by explaining how policy entrepreneurs lay in wait for the right problem to come along rather than learning across time and space—the transference of lessons from one experience to another. Kingdon also hurt his model by incorporating an unproven and unwieldy model from the natural sciences—evolution—as an analogous model that operates in the policy stream. This, of course, introduces unwanted baggage from the incorporated model. Finally, Kingdon fails on three critical fronts. He fails to provide a structure for the testing and analysis of his model, his definitions are vague (at best), and he uses the outcomes of policy decisions to

explain parts of his model rather than the other way around—as the model should. Each of these flaws are discussed in detail below.

### *Nothing New*

Kingdon set out to discover “how does an idea’s time come?” His focus on the idea is appropriate, but he truncates the search for the origin of an idea on the grounds that the idea is what is important, not the origin, and the search for the origin leads to infinite regress. To bolster his point, Kingdon cites Old Testament Scripture that tells us there is nothing new under the sun. Taken to its logical conclusion, infinite regress in this context implies that everything we know today has always been known. Evidently, when we think we have an original idea, according to Kingdon’s logic, someone else has already had the idea so finding its origin is unimportant. Kingdon’s logic would equate smoke signals to today’s Internet—both transmit messages over great distances. What is missing, of course, is the means that are used to transmit the messages, the number of recipients, and a host of other contextual elements. Kingdon’s logic focuses on the ends—what is to be achieved—at the macro level as the boundary of an idea. In other words, Kingdon does not demonstrate the ability to define what “new” means. In the smoke signals and Internet example, the end is the ability to communicate over a great distance. However, if the means are considered, then significant differences emerge. Imagine the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulating smoke signals in order to ensure the clarity of the message and the conditions under which a message could be sent rather than regulating electromagnetic frequencies to implement public policy that provides for the orderly flow of communications. Clearly the means of communication makes a difference as to what policy should be enacted, so there must be

new ideas to deal with new means. Thus, Kingdon's logic and definition of ideas is in error and leads to a second deficiency with the policy streams model—the sequence of problems and policies.

*Flawed Central Premise: The Problem-Policy Sequence*

In describing the timing relationship between problems and policies, Kingdon states that policy ideas *precede* problems whereas policy ideas *follow* problems in conventional logic. He arrives at this conclusion due to his positions on the origins of ideas: the source of an idea is not as important as the existence of the idea; the search for the source of an idea leads to a fruitless infinite regress; and ideas come from anywhere. Even if the source of an idea could be identified, it would be unimportant to the processes in the policy stream since, according to Kingdon, there is not a pattern of policy idea leadership (1995, pp. 71-73). From this policy-before-the-problem sequence, he then claims that policy entrepreneurs “lie in wait” for a policy window with an idea in hand to couple to a problem (1995, p. 181). Carl Grafton and Anne Permaloff (2001a) offer additional evidence that Kingdon's logic does not hold in transportation policy due to his failure to account for significant socio-economic-technological (SET) changes and they show evidence that contradicts Kingdon's policy-before-the-problem sequence in abortion policy.

Kingdon argues that the source of an idea is less important than the idea itself and leads to infinite regress, never finding the source. Thus, he artificially truncates the process in the problem stream—the only process in the problem stream—of problem definition. If the definition of alternatives is “the supreme instrument of power,” as E. E. Schattschneider argued, then alternatives must be assumed to be formulated for a

purpose. The only purpose that makes sense is to address problems. Thus, the definition of problems must be critical to the specification of alternatives. This implies that problems must come before the alternatives can be specified. However, if the analysis timeline is truncated artificially, as it is by Kingdon, then policy alternatives may seem to appear before the problems they are attached to arise. Kingdon undermines his logic when he discusses the importance of the available alternative, which appears to put the problem *after* the policy alternative until he states: "The chances for a problem to rise on the *decision* agenda are *dramatically* increased if a solution is attached" [emphasis in the original] (1995, p. 143). Here, the problem occurs *before* the policy, but is apparently not regarded as a problem until after a solution is attached. In other words, no solution, no problem; know solution, know problem.

In this study, Kingdon's logic argues that General Jones' February 3, 1982, testimony could be viewed as the source of a policy alternative to address an undefined problem because there was not a consensus that the conditions Jones addressed were problems. There was also great resistance to changing the status quo which inhibited the formation of a consensus on a solution. Recall that "conditions become defined as problems when we come to believe that we should do something about them" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 109) and you have the "no solution, no problem" half of the argument. However, Jones' testimony, articles, and interviews clearly spell out an alternative to address conditions that can only be described as longstanding problems, but they were not recognized as problems until an acceptable alternative was presented ("know solution, know problem").



The origins of the problem Jones addressed and that led to the GNA are found in the policy debates surrounding the National Security Act of 1947. Eisenhower witnessed firsthand the costs of not applying military force as a team. The Pacific theater of operations had to be divided between Admiral Halsey and General McArthur because of their overly strong-willed opinions on how to win the war—and beat the other Services to the victory parade. Eisenhower also witnessed how the combination of forces, properly coordinated, could gain the most advantage from modern technology and yield a significant advantage to the force that fought as a team. This was the motivation behind the 1947 reorganization efforts that ultimately unified the cabinet-level War and Navy Departments into subordinate departments under a single cabinet-level Secretary of Defense. Although many compromises and bargains were struck to gain passage (consensus building in Kingdon's political stream component), the foundation for unity of command and unity of effort was laid.

Significant to the analysis here is that the 1947 act did not eliminate the problems within the DOD. Amendments were offered and won hard-fought victory in 1949, followed in 1953 by President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan #6, and then by the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. At that time, Eisenhower commented that

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. Peacetime preparation and organization activity must conform to that fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely united, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons

systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. (Quoted in Lederman, 1999, p. 21)

However, Service parochialism continued and led to further military failures—focusing events—that triggered a call for further legislation—the GNA. Thus, the research for information on the declared purposes of the GNA leads back to the post-WWII debates for the NSA of 1947. In sum, defense organization—the problem—has a timeline and so do policies—the NSA of 1947, as amended, and the GNA of 1986. Logic demands that problems precede policies—even if only for an instant—rather than the other way around.

Kingdon's policy-before-the-problem sequence is not observed in the GNA debates unless the time span is artificially truncated. Defense reorganization appears on the systemic agenda throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Elihu Root led major changes in the War Department in the early 1900's (Millet & Maslowski, 1994, pp. 326-329) and the introduction of aircraft as a weapon of war initiated a series of organizational changes to incorporate aerial warfare into the nation's defense. Organizational issues were again prominent during WWII, reaching the lower rungs of the decision agenda as early as 1943 when General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, proposed changes to the extant Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) structure. Serious consideration of Marshall's reorganization plans was delayed until after the war, emerging again in the debates for the National Security Act of 1947 (Lederman, 1999, p. 11). Millet and Maslowski (1994) list "reform" eleven times in their military history of the United States with the first citation discussion the reorganization of the War Department in 1812 "to bring order from chaos" (pp. 126-128). Clearly, reorganization is not a new problem. To deny the

importance of the source of an idea creates this obvious chronology problem but it also creates a third serious deficiency in the policy streams model—the assumption of exclusivity

Looking back at the GNA debates it may appear that policy entrepreneurs were “lying in wait” for a problem if the search for the origin of ideas is truncated according to Kingdon’s argument. However, it is actually Kingdon’s definition of problems that leads to this confusion. Recall that problems are conditions that we feel we can do something about (Kingdon, 1995, p. 109). But this explanation does not claim that observers are unaware of conditions—only that it is not defined as a problem until something can be done to address the condition. This is a false logic that justifies an outcome regardless of the inputs.

Problems must precede policies, and in this study they did: the origin of ideas found in the GNA is credited to General Dwight Eisenhower who formed the concepts embodied in the GNA after observing serious problems in modern military organization and planning throughout his career, especially during his WWII service. Those problems had roots going back even farther. Nearly forty years after Eisenhower’s observations that separate warfare is gone forever, Rep. Bill Nichols proclaimed that the GNA ... “fulfills the aims of President Eisenhower...Congress rejected President Eisenhower’s appeals in the 1950’s. Today...we can now report: mission accomplished” (Locher, 1996, p. 17). In summary, the data show that defense organization problems preceded defense reorganization policies and therefore, a central component of Kingdon’s model has a flawed foundation.

*Learning Across Time and Space*

The policy streams model, as presented by Kingdon, is a unitary model. In other words, it is an exclusive model that encompasses all problems, policies, and politics in the three streams. Kingdon studied health and transportation policy to develop a single model of agenda setting. He later studied federal budget policy (taxes and expenditures) alongside another study of healthcare, again to support a single model of agenda setting. However, if multiple policy streams model sets are active then the appearance of alternatives could precede the appearance of the problems they are attached to, but only because the problems occur earlier in a different policy stream set. This is nothing more than the transfer of ideas from one policy area to another—something that Richard Rose (1993) calls learning across time and space.

Learning across time and space is a better description of Kingdon's study of transportation policy that is part of the foundation of his model. Kingdon states that policy entrepreneurs were lying in wait with transportation policy alternatives in hand for the right transportation problem to occur and be coupled with their ready-made alternative. If learning across time and space—across policy areas, from history, and from policy makers in other locales—is considered, then a policy-before-the-problem construct is possible, but it must be remembered that the alternative was first developed to address a problem, albeit in another policy area. In Kingdon's transportation study he contends that policy entrepreneurs were waiting with mass transit policy alternatives to attach to a politically viable problem.

An excellent example of the constant solution adapting to the changing mosaic of problems and politics is the case of urban mass transit. When a

federal program for mass transit was first proposed, it was sold primarily as a straight-forward traffic management tool....When the traffic and congestion issues played themselves out in the problem stream, advocates of mass transit looked for the next prominent problem to which to attach their solution. Along came the environmental movement....The environmental movement faded, and what was the next big push? You guessed it: energy. (1995, p. 173)

The difficulty with this logic is that it denies that problems existed in other policy areas until a problem could be mated with the policy alternative already in hand. Kingdon's argument makes it appear that the environmental movement existed without its own set of problems before those problems were needed for matching with transportation policies or that environmental problems existed at all. Grafton and Permaloff (2001a) first observed this policy-before-the-problem logic error and attributed the flaw to a unidirectional approach in the policy streams model that explains each problem-policy pairing as a separate event and one that recognizes feedback in the policy process only once rather than dynamically (p. 14).

#### *Misfit Analogy and Excess Baggage*

The inclusion of the evolution analogy to describe the policy stream detracted from the model's merits by introducing a controversial theory from the natural sciences into policy theory, and in so doing, introducing the controversial elements of that controversial theory. Essential for any theory are the assumptions built into its structure. For example, if one assumes that only the best public policy alternatives survive in the

policy primeval soup, then the policy alternative that emerges is likely to be labeled as the best one for the problem to which it has been paired. But what is meant by best?

Thus, the natural selection paradigm adds to both the simplicity and complexity of the policy streams model. Policy alternatives clearly compete with each other, changing and adapting to garner more and more support in an effort to survive, but each maintains its own character and distinctiveness. The facts of competition and adaptation are simple and understood, but the mechanisms of change are highly complex and less understood and not illuminated by Kingdon's model.

Regarding "the policy primeval soup," Roger Cobb asks, "is it consommé?" (1985, p. 413). It has been said that a theory that describes everything in general describes nothing in particular. Aside from being a controversial theory, Darwinian macro-evolution is frequently used to describe everything in general with the result that nothing in particular is gained. The literature on both sides of the macro-evolution issue requires assumptions to understand our observations of the scientific record. For this discussion, it is sufficient to state that the evolution analogy added chance and randomness to a model seeking to illuminate a process already abundantly supplied with independent variables. This worked against the objective of Kingdon's study by obscuring the central process he sought to illuminate. Cobb observes that evolution makes reading policy studies more entertaining, but not necessarily more productive.

### *Simplicity and Complexity*

The creation-evolution debate mirrors the simplicity and complexity issues found in Kingdon's model. While the validity of evolution will not be addressed here (see Zimmer, 2001, for the evolution perspective; see Dembski, 1999, for a science-theology

perspective), both sides of the creation-evolution argument agree that the specific mechanism of evolution remains unknown (see Gish, 1995). Both sides also agree that there are significant gaps in the fossil record that cannot be satisfactorily explained by science. When Kingdon included the process of natural selection in the policy streams model, he also incorporated its unspecified change mechanism and fossil record gaps into the character of the policy streams model, particularly when he describes ideas as floating in a policy primeval soup being subjected to evolutionary “criteria for survival” (Kingdon, 1995, chapter 6). As such, the specific mechanism that drives the alternative specification process of the policy stream—a major component of the model—is unknown. Compounding the simplicity and complexity dilemma is the lack of specificity in the terms and definitions of the model.

For example, when a participant enlists the aid of noted specialists to build a coalition, do others join from the persuasion of the idea, from the credibility of other experts who are promoting the idea, or do they join to share in the bounty from a bargaining perspective? Do they join for a combination of reasons, or for some independent reason—a phenomenon that Kingdon reports with regularity?

Kingdon does not capture these possibilities adequately despite their obvious occurrence in the data he observed and in this study as exemplified with the commissioning of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report led by Philip Odeen, a noted business leader and political appointee with “impeccable credentials in the military establishment” (Locher, 2002b, p. 167; Odeen bio). The CSIS panel was co-chaired by General Andrew Goodpastor, an man of equally impeccable credentials, having directly served presidents from Eisenhower to Carter in sensitive

positions during troubled times (Goodpastor bio; Locher, 2002b, p. 167). In sum, there were many political bargains struck and promises made, both to induce and to coerce, in order to create the CSIS panel (Locher, 2002b, pp. chapter 8). Kingdon's lack of specificity and definition of terms leaves too much room for interpretation and misinterpretation of terms and concepts; misplacement of data; and the selective analysis of data to fit criteria to either prove or disprove the theory. These are flaws in the construct of the model that preclude it from being operationalized—specifically structured so that it may be unambiguously applied to understand agenda-setting and the policy process.

The methodology for this study called for the analysis of data according to the major components, elements, and criteria categories developed from Kingdon's policy streams model. The analysis would then proceed with a simple coding scheme of positive, negative, or null to indicate the assessment of the fit or match between the model and the data. Ideally, the coding would have a measure of merit to gauge the assignment of a value. The methodology developed criteria as the measures of merit, but these measures suffered from the lack of specificity in Kingdon's terms and led from one subjective judgment to another in an attempt to define terms and operationalize the policy streams model as an analysis tool. Compounding this, when Kingdon does specify details of a concept, he runs opposite conventional thinking with questionable support and logic.

#### *Lack of Structure for Cross-application*

Another issue concerns the structure of the model. Robert Yin's case study methodology provides a systematic means for analyzing outcomes without controlling the



inputs—ideal for policy studies. Thus Yin provides a means to examine the utility of Kingdon's model in a policy area beyond Kingdon's original study. The first hurdle was to determine a means to apply systematically the policy streams model to defense policy. As presented in Kingdon's book, the policy streams model has no specific formulae or definitive statements relating independent variables to outcomes or means of measuring independent variables except via outcomes. In other words, the only way we know that, for example, the three streams merge and the window of opportunity is opened is that the policy is placed on the decision agenda and is ultimately enacted. The only way Kingdon's model could be validated or invalidated would be if researchers had a way to determine that the streams met and that the window opened regardless of the outcome (enactment or failure to pass) of the measure.

Kingdon's study of the healthcare reform movement of 1993 for the second edition of his book, demonstrates this logic—a self-justifying structure—through the use of vague, non-specific definitions of terms. If an alternative is adopted into public policy, then the three streams merged in a policy window and the components, elements, and criteria are described in terms that uphold the model. If an alternative is *not* adopted into public policy, then Kingdon describes the components, elements, or criteria that failed to meet his coding standards, but still upholding his model. This lack of clear structure precludes cross-application of his model and imbues it with severe terminology deficiencies.

#### *Lack of Specificity*

Kingdon tends to scatter explanatory discussions for the same term or concept throughout his book without ever arriving at a specific definition, or he confuses by

incorporating multiple taxonomies to describe the same things. For example, five agenda types are described in the first chapter over several pages of the text. However, three of the types are actually different taxonomies for the same agenda type—the governmental/policy/formal agenda. Using this expanded taxonomy aligns Kingdon's term (governmental) with other works, but also causes confusion, testability problems, and a sense of trying to nail Jell-O to the wall. Recalling these words from Kingdon, "The reader can invert other definitions to suit his or her taste," and it is clear that Kingdon's position on specificity is specifically vague (1995, p. 82).

*Testability problems.*

The lack of specificity makes data classification, interpretation, and analysis very difficult and highly subjective. For example, "bandwagons and tipping" are discussed twice, once in the policy stream and once in the political stream. In the policy stream, the bandwagon ... "process emphasizes persuasion and diffusion: An idea with something to recommend it, according to the criteria for survival, becomes accepted by ever larger numbers of specialists" and in the political stream, bandwagons are ... "a process of coalition building: bargains are struck, concessions are given in return for participation in a coalition, and participation in the goodies to be obtained" (Kingdon, 1995, p. 141). However, these separate definitions discount that the same idea may generate a bandwagon appeal in both realms simultaneously or be triggered from one to the other by the actions of other participants (see Kingdon, 1995, p. 39, especially chapters 6 and 7).

*Nailing Jell-O.*

Roger Cobb notes that the definitions of agenda provided by Kingdon are "slippery" (1985, p. 412). This study found it difficult to specify and define many of the

terms Kingdon used to describe what this study categorized as the components, elements, criteria, and other characteristics of the policy streams model. Although every attempt was made to define Kingdon's terms from the context of his work and with cross-reference to outside sources, subjective interpretation was required. Kingdon himself cites this as a limitation on his interview data (1995, p. 47). The coding of the data required a subjective assessment to categorize responses, which in turn would change the weights of the qualitative measurements he used. Thus, the subjective nature of data within the model, and the subjective assessment required to distill its framework, are other issues needing remedy.

#### *Self-Justifying Structure*

The 1993-1994 health care reform push led by Hillary Clinton is described by Kingdon as fitting almost all of the elements and criteria to be another proof of his model. However, he caveats the policy and politics streams, describing the policy community as being in "disarray" and organized political forces "weren't all on the side of action" (1995, p. 218). Kingdon's rationale implies that the successful coupling of the three streams is accompanied by consensus, cooperation, and compromise that led to decision agenda status and enactment. Failing these conditions, the policy alternative either fails to rise on the agenda or the policy window closes before it can be enacted. In other words, the policy streams model is self-justifying.

This study found evidence similar to Kingdon's description of the 1993-1994 health care push in the debates prior to the passage of the GNA. There was not a consensus among either the reorganization or status quo camps and it was clear that the legislation faced strong opposition within Congress, the DOD, and a lack of support from

the President. In Kingdon's words, referring to his 1993 case study on health care, "it was not clear that this proposal would be enough to bring the policy stream on line and move the issue to the decision agenda" (1995, p. 221). The same could easily be said of the GNA proposals. Similarly, the GNA could be described by Kingdon's summary of the health care debate:

The problems were recognized, the politics at least tolerated action, but the hang-up was the policy stream. A prominent place on the governmental agenda was therefore assured, a policy window was open, but movement onto the decision agenda and eventual enactment depended on a process of consensus-building among the advocates and specialists around a particular package of policies. (p. 221)

Kingdon goes on to state: "Such consensus is better built before the window opens" which introduces his self-justifying conclusion: "the opportunity may have passed before agreement could be reached" (p. 221). Again, the only way Kingdon's model could be validated or invalidated would be if researchers had a way to determine that the streams met and that the window opened regardless of the outcome (enactment or failure to pass) of the measure, but Kingdon uses the outcome to validate the model.

While the strength of the case study method is to observe outcomes without controlling inputs, there is still a need for a comparison framework. Kingdon does not provide one, so it must be distilled by interpretation of his book, and interpretation is highly subjective. As used by Kingdon, the subjective nature of his model validates itself, as discussed above, and also enables the researcher to define terms on an "as needed" basis. The researcher who tries to define Kingdon's terms with clarity and

precision will find the experience analogous to nailing Jell-O to the wall—it can't be done, and the result is slippery.

### *Research Questions Answered?*

At the outset of this research, three questions were posed: Why was defense reorganization on the decision agenda? Why was defense reorganization on the decision agenda in 1986? Does the policy streams approach to agenda setting and policy formulation tell us anything about defense reorganization policy? Of these three questions, the first one to be answered is the third one posed—does the policy streams approach to agenda setting and policy formulation tell us anything about defense reorganization policy? Answering this question first will answer the first two (if the model fits) and illuminate three points specific to defense policy. First, what is (are) the driver(s) for defense reorganization policy? Second, what are the mechanisms for change in problems, policies, and politics (Kingdon's three streams)? Understanding the mechanisms for change will aid in understanding, if not controlling, the advent of future change, which is the third point. How can decision-makers know when the time for an idea has come?

To the third question, does the policy streams approach to agenda setting and policy formulation tell us anything about defense reorganization policy, the answer is a highly reserved "yes." The problem is that it does not tell us anything really new. In general conversations with people, on the news, and in discussions regarding this research, the phrase, "window of opportunity" occurred frequently and with great general understanding—it is part of our vernacular and it is intuitive. However, explaining the mechanisms that open a window of opportunity is not intuitive and the intent of this

research was to understand the rise of issues on the agenda beyond an intuitive level. The policy streams model does not further the understanding of agenda status beyond an intuitive level. Thus, no illumination is provided for the drivers of defense reorganization policy, the mechanisms of change, or for knowing when an idea's time has come. Given the failure of Kingdon's policy streams model to move understanding of the rise of issues onto and up the agenda beyond an intuitive level, the first and second research questions of this study are made moot. However, Kingdon's model is not without utility.

### *Lessons Learned*

The policy streams approach provides a means to organize complex processes and behaviors into an intellectually manageable framework for lay discussions. From these discussions the model also provides a roadmap for further research to investigate connections, relationships, and other contextual elements using the more refined and defined fields of study embedded within the policy streams model. The dangers of building a model on faulty assumptions (problem-policy sequence issue) is also apparent, as are the difficulties in relying as heavily on interviews as Kingdon did to develop a model. The approach by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) is significantly more reliable in that it relies on written records spanning nearly 100 years rather than just the short 4-year period covered by Kingdon's original study. In other words, longitudinal research reveals patterns and context not observable over the shorter term. Kingdon (1995) addresses this factor towards the end of his work in a section titled, "on randomness and pattern":

We still encounter considerable doses of messiness, accident, fortuitous coupling, and dumb luck. Subjects sometimes rise on agendas without our

understanding completely why. We are sometimes surprised by the couplings that take place. The fortuitous appearance or absence of key participants affect [sic] outcomes. There remains some degree of unpredictability. (p. 206).

With Kingdon's above comments in mind and the lengthy defense that would be required to mitigate them as shortfalls, the conclusions reached in this study are not surprising, but they are disappointing nonetheless. Understanding the agenda setting process beyond mere intuition is vitally important for the advancement of policy studies. To do so will require research with another model as its basis.

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## LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Barrett, Arch. (August 20, 2002). Telephone interview by author from Montgomery, AL. Notes available.

Barrett, Arch. (September 20, 2002). Telephone interview by author from Montgomery, AL. Notes available.

Jones, David C. (September 19, 2002). Telephone interview by author from Montgomery, AL. Notes available.

Locher, James R. III. (Fall 2000-Summer 2001). The author contacted Mr. James Locher from Montgomery, AL several times by telephone and email early on in the research phase. Mr. Locher provided this writer with information that identified source documents for further research as well as a copy of his *Victory on the Potomac* manuscript. Mr. Locher also clarified details of events uncovered in research or presented in *Victory*. No notes.